Security Aware Service Composition by Pino, Luca
Pino, Luca (2015). Security Aware Service Composition. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City 
University London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Pino, Luca (2015). Security Aware Service Composition. (Unpublished Doctoral 
thesis, City University London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/13170/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  
Security Aware Service 
Composition 
Luca Pino, Department of Computer Science 
School of Mathematics, Computer Science and Engineering 
City University London 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor George Spanoudakis 
 
 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
May 2015  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
2 / 253 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
3 / 253 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................... 16 
Declaration ................................................................................................ 17 
Abstract ..................................................................................................... 18 
1.  Introduction ........................................................................................ 19 
1.1  Research Area and Questions ........................................................ 19 
1.2  Research Objectives ...................................................................... 24 
1.3  Research Assumptions .................................................................. 25 
1.4  Contributions ................................................................................ 27 
1.5  Publications .................................................................................. 29 
1.6  Outline .......................................................................................... 31 
2.  Literature Review ............................................................................... 33 
2.1  Overview ...................................................................................... 33 
2.2  Service Discovery ......................................................................... 33 
2.2.1  Text matching service discovery ........................................ 35 
2.2.2  Semantic service discovery ................................................ 35 
2.2.3  Graph matching techniques ................................................ 36 
2.2.4  Context awareness ............................................................. 37 
2.2.5  Summary ........................................................................... 37 
2.3  Service Composition ..................................................................... 40 
2.3.1  Definition of Service Workflows ....................................... 40 
2.3.2  Instantiation of Service Workflows .................................... 44 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
4 / 253 
2.3.3  Summary ............................................................................ 48 
2.4  Security in Service Oriented Computing ....................................... 49 
2.4.1  Security Languages and Standards ..................................... 49 
2.4.2  Security Design and Implementation .................................. 52 
2.4.3  Security aware Service Discovery ...................................... 54 
2.4.4  Security aware Service Composition .................................. 56 
2.4.5  Security aware Design of SBS ........................................... 59 
3.  Conceptual Foundations ..................................................................... 63 
3.1  Overview ....................................................................................... 63 
3.2  Software Service ........................................................................... 63 
3.2.1  Web Service ....................................................................... 65 
3.3  Service Discovery ......................................................................... 66 
3.4  Service Composition ..................................................................... 67 
3.4.1  Business Process Management ........................................... 68 
3.5  Cloud Computing .......................................................................... 69 
4.  Enabling Languages, Techniques and Tools ..................................... 71 
4.1  Overview ....................................................................................... 71 
4.2  Web Services Languages ............................................................... 71 
4.2.1  WSDL ................................................................................ 71 
4.2.2  BPEL ................................................................................. 74 
4.3  Drools ........................................................................................... 74 
4.4  Runtime Service Discovery Tool ................................................... 77 
4.4.1  Architecture ....................................................................... 77 
4.4.2  Discovery process .............................................................. 78 
4.4.3  Query Language ................................................................. 79 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
5 / 253 
4.5  Eclipse BPEL Designer ................................................................. 82 
5.  Secure Composition Patterns ............................................................. 85 
5.1  Overview ...................................................................................... 85 
5.2  Orchestration Patterns ................................................................... 86 
5.3  Secure Composition Patterns ........................................................ 91 
5.3.1  Representation of a Secure Composition Pattern ............... 92 
5.3.2  Integrity ............................................................................. 94 
5.3.3  Confidentiality ................................................................... 99 
5.3.4  Availability ...................................................................... 106 
5.4  Security Inference Rules ............................................................. 110 
5.4.1  Methodology to Encode the Rules ................................... 110 
5.4.2  Integrity ........................................................................... 118 
5.4.3  Confidentiality ................................................................. 120 
5.4.4  Availability ...................................................................... 123 
5.5  Summary .................................................................................... 128 
6.  Security Aware Service Composition Process ................................. 130 
6.1  Overview .................................................................................... 130 
6.2  Scenario ...................................................................................... 130 
6.2.1  Stock Broker SBS ............................................................ 131 
6.2.2  Security Threats ............................................................... 133 
6.3  Workflows .................................................................................. 136 
6.4  Algorithms .................................................................................. 141 
6.4.1  Inference of Security Requirements ................................. 141 
6.4.2  Verification of Security Requirements ............................. 146 
6.4.3  Validation of Workflows ................................................. 148 
6.4.4  Discovery of Secure Workflows ...................................... 151 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
6 / 253 
6.4.5  Workflow Instantiation .................................................... 155 
6.5  Summary ..................................................................................... 158 
7.  Implementation ................................................................................. 159 
7.1  Overview ..................................................................................... 159 
7.2  Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool .................................... 160 
7.2.1  Query language ................................................................ 160 
7.2.2  Architecture ..................................................................... 162 
7.2.3  Detailed Design of the Composition Manager .................. 163 
7.2.4  Example ........................................................................... 170 
7.3  Security Aware BPEL Design Tool ............................................. 181 
7.3.1  Architecture ..................................................................... 182 
7.3.2  Detailed Design of the Security Extension ....................... 184 
7.3.3  Example ........................................................................... 191 
7.4  Summary ..................................................................................... 196 
8.  Evaluation ......................................................................................... 198 
8.1  Overview ..................................................................................... 198 
8.2  Evaluation Setup ......................................................................... 198 
8.2.1  Scenario ........................................................................... 198 
8.2.2  Configuration ................................................................... 201 
8.2.3  Threats to validity ............................................................ 203 
8.3  Evaluation Results ....................................................................... 204 
8.4  Summary ..................................................................................... 212 
9.  Conclusions ........................................................................................ 214 
9.1  Overview ..................................................................................... 214 
9.2  Contributions .............................................................................. 214 
9.3  Approach Implications ................................................................ 218 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
7 / 253 
9.4  Future Work ................................................................................ 219 
Bibliography ............................................................................................ 221 
Appendix A:  Performance Test Results ................................................ 241 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
8 / 253 
List of Figures 
Figure 4.1: Discovery Framework structure .......................................... 77 
Figure 4.2: Overview of the schema of SerDiQueL .............................. 79 
Figure 4.3: Screenshot of the BPEL Designer ....................................... 83 
Figure 5.1: Example of workflow pattern recursion .............................. 88 
Figure 5.2: Example of a sequential orchestration pattern .................... 89 
Figure 5.3: The Cascade orchestration pattern ...................................... 90 
Figure 5.4: Example of a parallel orchestration pattern ........................ 91 
Figure 5.5: Example of a secure composition pattern ........................... 93 
Figure 5.6: Precede Integrity on Cascade Pattern ................................. 96 
Figure 5.7: PSP on Cascade Pattern .................................................... 102 
Figure 5.8: PSP on Product Pattern ..................................................... 104 
Figure 5.9: Maximum Execution Time on Generic Sequential Pattern 108 
Figure 5.10: Maximum Execution Time on Generic Choice Pattern ... 109 
Figure 5.11: Class diagram of the activity and pattern classes available 
for the security production rules ................................................... 113 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
9 / 253 
Figure 5.12: Class diagram of the requirement and security property 
classes available for the security production rules ........................ 115 
Figure 6.1: The Stock Broker SBS workflow ..................................... 132 
Figure 6.2: The Workflow element of the abstract workflow schema . 138 
Figure 6.3: The OrchestrationType type of the abstract workflow schema
 ..................................................................................................... 139 
Figure 6.4: The PlaceholderType type of the abstract workflow schema
 ..................................................................................................... 140 
Figure 6.5: The ProcessOrder workflow ............................................. 144 
Figure 6.6: The Orchestration Patterns of the ProcessOrder workflow 145 
Figure 6.7: Services used by the ProcessOrder SBS ........................... 150 
Figure 6.8: The GetStockDetails service (a) and the workflow that can 
replace the GetStockDetail service (b) .......................................... 153 
Figure 7.1: Architecture of the Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool
 ..................................................................................................... 162 
Figure 7.2: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager ........ 164 
Figure 7.3: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager.secrule
 ..................................................................................................... 165 
Figure 7.4: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager 
.workflow ..................................................................................... 167 
Figure 7.5: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager.bpel . 169 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
10 / 253 
Figure 7.6: Representation of the abstract workflow extracted from the 
tests execution ............................................................................... 174 
Figure 7.7: Representation of the abstract workflow after the first 
instantiation .................................................................................. 179 
Figure 7.8: Representation of the abstract workflow after the second 
instantiation .................................................................................. 180 
Figure 7.9: Representation of the final workflow ............................... 180 
Figure 7.10: Execution result of the composition example ................. 181 
Figure 7.11: Architecture of the Security Aware BPEL Design Tool .. 183 
Figure 7.12: Class Diagram of the package securityextension ............ 184 
Figure 7.13: Class Diagram of the package securityextension 
.securitymodel ............................................................................... 186 
Figure 7.14: Class Diagram of the package securityextension.gui ...... 188 
Figure 7.15: Class Diagram of other packages part of the extension ... 190 
Figure 7.16: Security Specification for the GetCurrentStockDetails 
activity .......................................................................................... 192 
Figure 7.17: The activity contextual menu showing the “Verify Security 
Property” option ............................................................................ 193 
Figure 7.18: The Validation and Adaptation view .............................. 194 
Figure 7.19: BPEL process after the adaptation of a service composition 
in place of the GetCurrentStockDetails activity ............................ 195 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
11 / 253 
Figure 8.1: Comparison of the single service discovery, inference rules, 
and abstract WF matching execution times over the different queries
 ..................................................................................................... 206 
Figure 8.2: Proportion of the execution time spent for each composition 
operation over the different queries .............................................. 206 
Figure 8.3: Correlation between the number of generated sub-queries 
and the composition time over the different queries ..................... 207 
Figure 8.4: Comparison of the single service and service composition 
discovery times over the different sizes of the registry ................. 209 
Figure 8.5: Comparison of the abstract WF matching and the inference 
rule times over the different sizes of the registry .......................... 210 
Figure 8.6: Correlation between the composition algorithm time and the 
number of generated workflows and sub-queries over the registry 
sizes .............................................................................................. 210 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
12 / 253 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary of the single service discovery approaches. ......... 39 
Table 2.2: Summary of approaches supporting automated construction of 
service compositions. ...................................................................... 44 
Table 2.3: Summary of the automated service discovery in service 
composition approaches. ................................................................. 48 
Table 4.1: Example of a WSDL ............................................................ 73 
Table 4.2: Drools rule structure ............................................................ 75 
Table 4.3: Example of Drools conditions .............................................. 76 
Table 4.4: Example of a Drools rule ..................................................... 76 
Table 4.5: Example of behavioural conditions of a SerDiQueL query .. 80 
Table 4.6: Example of constraint conditions of a SerDiQueL query ..... 82 
Table 5.1: Snippet encoding an orchestration pattern into a Drools rule
 ...................................................................................................... 114 
Table 5.2: Snippet encoding a security requirement into a Drools rule
 ...................................................................................................... 116 
Table 5.3: Snippet encoding the creation of the inferred security 
requirements in a Drools rule ........................................................ 117 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
13 / 253 
Table 5.4: Inference rule for Precede Integrity on Cascade Pattern .... 119 
Table 5.5: Inference rule for PSP on Cascade Pattern ........................ 121 
Table 5.6: Inference rule for PSP on Product Pattern ......................... 122 
Table 5.7: Inference rule for Availability ........................................... 124 
Table 5.8: Verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on 
Partner Link Activity .................................................................... 125 
Table 5.9: Verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on 
Generic Sequential Pattern ........................................................... 126 
Table 5.10: Verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on the 
Choice Pattern .............................................................................. 128 
Table 6.1: Example of a workflow ..................................................... 137 
Table 6.2: Example of an abstract workflow ...................................... 140 
Table 6.3: Algorithm for the inference of Security Requirements ...... 143 
Table 6.4: Algorithm for the verification of Security Requirements ... 147 
Table 6.5: Algorithm for the validation of workflows ........................ 149 
Table 6.6: Algorithm for the discovery of secure workflows .............. 152 
Table 6.7: Example of query making explicit references to certificate 
parts through XPath ...................................................................... 154 
Table 6.8: Workflow Instantiation Algorithm .................................... 156 
Table 7.1: Example of a security requirement expressed in A-
SerDiQueL ................................................................................... 161 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
14 / 253 
Table 7.2: Description of the classes in the package compositionmanager
 ...................................................................................................... 164 
Table 7.3: Description of the classes in the package compositionmanager 
.secrule .......................................................................................... 166 
Table 7.4: Description of the classes in the package compositionmanager 
.workflow ...................................................................................... 168 
Table 7.5: Description of the classes in the package 
compositionmanager.bpel ............................................................. 170 
Table 7.6: Stock Service replacement query ....................................... 173 
Table 7.7: Get ISIN discovery query .................................................. 178 
Table 7.8: Description of the classes in the package securityextension
 ...................................................................................................... 185 
Table 7.9: Description of the classes in the package securityextension 
.securitymodel ............................................................................... 187 
Table 7.10: Description of the classes in the package securityextension 
.gui ................................................................................................ 189 
Table 7.11: Description of the classes in the other packages part of the 
extension ....................................................................................... 191 
Table 8.1: Execution times by operations, with 1200 services in the 
registry .......................................................................................... 204 
Table 8.2: Summary of the results for each registry size, in milliseconds
 ...................................................................................................... 208 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
15 / 253 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
16 / 253 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank all the people that have supported and assisted me 
during these years. My appreciation goes to my supervisor Professor George 
Spanoudakis for providing me the opportunity to work on stimulating 
project, and for his useful comments, remarks and engagement throughout 
my experience.  
I would like to express my gratitude to all the members of the 
Department of Computer Science, including the administrative and 
technical staff that contributed through my journey at City University. In 
particular amongst all I would like to thank Mark Firman and the Technical 
Support Team (TST) for their continuous support. Many thanks go also to 
all the ASSERT4SOA project partners for the great support and 
collaboration.  
I would like to extend my appreciation to the friends that I made during 
this journey, for their encouragements and for the great time spent together, 
so thanks Dr. Daniel Wolff, Reinier de Valk, Srikanth Cherla, Muhammad 
Asad, Maria Krotsiani, Spyros Katopodis, Icamaan da Silva, Dr. Ricardo 
Contreras, Dr. Evangelia Kalyvianaki and Dr. Christos Kloukinas. 
My deepest gratitude goes to my closest friends, now spread all around 
the world, for their support, advice and patience. So long and thanks for all 
the fish, Dr. Mayla Brusò, Benedetta Basile, Giulia Borghini and Veronica 
Varanini. 
Last but not least, I am very grateful to my parents and to my 
girlfriend, Stefania, for their constant love, help and assistance in every day 
of my life.  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
17 / 253 
Declaration 
The author grants powers of discretion to the University Librarian to 
allow this thesis to be copied in whole or in part without further reference to 
him. This permission covers only single copies make for study purposes, 
subject to normal conditions of acknowledgement. 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
18 / 253 
Abstract 
Security assurance of Service-Based Systems (SBS) is a necessity and a 
key challenge in Service Oriented Computing. Several approaches have 
been introduced in order to take care of the security aspect of SBSs, from 
the design to the implementation stages. Such solutions, however, require 
expertise with regards to security languages and technologies or modelling 
formalisms. Furthermore, existing approaches allow only limited 
verification of security properties over a service composition, as they focus 
just on specific properties and require expressing compositions and 
properties in a model based formalism. 
In this thesis we present a unified security aware service composition 
approach capable of validation of arbitrary security properties. This 
approach allows SBS designers to build secure applications without the 
need to learn formal models thanks to security descriptors for services, 
being they self-appointed or certified by an external third-party.  
More specifically, the framework presented in this thesis allows 
expressing and propagating security requirements expressed for a security 
composition to requirements for the single activities of the composition, and 
checking security requirements over security service descriptors. The 
approach relies on the new core concept of secure composition patterns, 
modelling proven implications of security requirements within an 
orchestration pattern. The framework has been implemented and tested 
extensively in both a SBS design-time and runtime scenario, based 
respectively on Eclipse BPEL Designer and the Runtime Service Discovery 
Tool. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Area and Questions 
The service-oriented computing (SOC) paradigm is aimed at addressing 
the need for constructing adaptable interoperable applications involving 
heterogeneous components over networks, known as software services, and 
offering access to utilities from a broad range of different devices. SOC 
focuses on interoperability and reuse by promoting the development of 
applications through composition of software services that might be 
deployed and running on different computational infrastructures. 
Technically a software service is a piece of autonomous and self-contained 
software accessible over a network through a collection of operations that 
are listed in the service interface.  
SOC has been wildly embraced by the software industry 
[10][12][41][42][93], thanks also to the ability to simplify the 
communication and integration with business partners and with legacy 
systems [55][78]. Its adoption as business solution, however, has also raised 
a number of collateral concerns faced by the engineering, the operations and 
the business sectors. More specifically, some of the major concerns in the 
engineering and the operations fields are about studying the quality of 
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services that are used in service based systems (SBS) and the existence of 
agreements between service providers and service consumers to regulate 
them, the ability to discover and compose services and the ability to adapt a 
SBS dynamically [55].  
Service composition, in particular, follows the SOC concept of building 
software out of existing or new reusable services, in order to provide a new 
functionality or to automate a task. The new functionality can be made 
available as a new service that solves more complex problems. The SBS 
lifecycle benefits from the service composition concept, as service 
compositions can be used to help both the SBS design phase -allowing the 
interoperation with more than one service per task- and whilst a SBS is in 
operation at runtime -allowing discovery and adaptation (i.e., replacement) 
of service compositions when single services providing a functionality are 
no longer available.  
From the business perspective, however, an additional and very critical 
concern is about the security of services and the SBSs that use them [55]. 
Some of the characteristics that make SOC a successful paradigm, in fact, 
are also the ones that facilitate security attacks: e.g. the network access to 
services introduce all the security threats of classical distributed systems 
[102], whilst service interfaces and interoperability features preclude to 
adopt the concept of security-by-obscurity [17][24][78].  
To address security there has been significant research which 
established (a) new additional stages to the development process in order to 
take into consideration the security requirements during the design and 
implementation of a service [29][38][66], (b) special security services that 
provide the mechanisms to protect other services (security-as-a-service) 
[16][38][39][76], and (c) extensions to support security for available 
languages and protocols [72][73][74][75][76][77][109]. Several security 
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extensions to languages and protocols have been through a process of 
standardization, following the concept of interoperability of SOC. These 
extensions introduce solutions to: ensure integrity and confidentiality in the 
messages exchanged (i.e., WS-Security [77], WS-SecureConversation [74]), 
provide mechanisms to construct trust relationships between organizations, 
or “security domains”, through the usage of a special security service 
providing security tokens (i.e., WS-Trust [76]), and provide authentication 
and authorization of identities between organizations, or “security 
domains”, thanks to federation agreements (i.e., WS-Federation [73], 
SAML [72]).  
An open problem in this field is about security of service compositions. 
To assess the security of a service composition, in fact, the security of the 
individual services part of the composition must be taken into account, but 
it is not enough. In order to evaluate the security of the service composition, 
the order of execution of the composing services and the communications 
between them must be examined. In this scenario two key questions arise: 
(1) which security properties can be deducted from the security of the 
services within a service composition, and (2) how is it possible to require a 
service composition to preserve a security property? 
This work is about assessing and constructing secure compositions of 
services allowing the support of security at both design and runtime. A 
possible use of secure service composition is to help the design and 
development of a SBS that calls different services. In this case a SBS design 
tool can also offer some security validation mechanisms that automatically 
generates and checks the security properties required by the single services 
part of the composition executed by the SBS, in order for the SBS to 
guarantee some more general security requirements on the whole SBS. 
Support of security at runtime allows automatic adaptation (i.e., 
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replacement) of services that are no longer available with services or service 
compositions that guarantee the same level of security requested from the 
initial service. In this case, it is very important to support the discovery and 
construction of service compositions that preserve the requested security 
properties. 
Another issue in the security field is how to obtain assurance that a 
service complies with a given security property (e.g., confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, authenticity). WS-Policy [109] and WS-
SecurityPolicy [75] allow the specification, by the service provider, of 
which security mechanisms are in place. These policy languages support the 
development and negotiation of the security aspects of the communication, 
however they do not provide a general and objective assurance (i.e., based 
on third-party evaluation) of the security property guaranteed by the service. 
A proposed solution for this problem is the introduction of security 
certificates providing assurance that a service complies with a given 
security property [80].  
The service certification approach is based on the traditional concept of 
software certification that has been used for non-service based software 
systems and software components. In this paradigm certificates are provided 
(and signed off) by some certification authority after assessing the 
compliance of the software with the required security property. For this 
approach to be effective, the certification authority must be trusted by 
service consumers and providers. This idea is aimed at providing assurance 
to all the possible users of the security properties granted by the software. In 
particular Common Criteria [18] is the international standard for traditional 
software certification (ISO/IEC 15408:2009 [45]), developed by the 
governments of Canada, US, UK, France, Germany and Netherlands in 
order to ensure security of the software used by the government and critical 
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infrastructures. Since these certificates are produced in order to be checked 
by IT or government personnel, they are human-readable system-wide 
documents that can easily exceed the hundreds of pages (e.g. by putting 
together the Certification Report, Security Target and Protection Profile of a 
CC certificate: see [19] for some examples).  
The service-oriented paradigm, instead, introduces automatic software 
provisioning with concepts like runtime service discovery, service 
adaptation and service composition, thanks to a set of machine-readable 
interfaces. In order to ensure also the security of a SBS, then, certificates 
should also have a machine-readable equivalent for software services 
available at runtime and digitally signed as advocated, for example, by the 
ASSERT4SOA project [5][80]. 
With such certification scheme in place it is possible to envision a 
security aware service discovery mechanism that would allow also the 
specification of security requirements in a query to find and sort the 
services relevant for a task. In particular a security aware service discovery 
process can find sets of relevant services during the design and the 
development of a SBS, but it can be also quite useful in the context of run-
time replacement. In this case the service discovery system should maintain 
an updated buffer of relevant services for a query so that the SBS can 
receive updates and substitute an unavailable or underperforming service 
with another one at run-time, while maintaining the same security features 
required to the original service. 
Using this certification scheme allows also increasing the level of trust 
in solutions founded on automatic assessment of the security of service 
compositions. 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate the problem of assessing 
the security of service compositions and develop a solution that would 
enable the generation of secure service compositions out of software 
services with known (certified) security properties. To address this overall 
aim, our goal was to construct a framework that automatically infers the 
security requirements for the services part of a service composition, in order 
to guarantee general security requirements on the whole composition. This 
framework is aimed at SBS designers and developers engaged in building 
applications that require some security constraints. 
The research objectives planned to achieve this can be listed as follows: 
I. Literature review.  
To provide an analysis of the related works regarding security aware 
service composition that defines the subject area, its terminology, the 
existent models and case studies. This analysis should describe the 
different frameworks and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of 
each approach, in order to identify the gap that this research intends 
to fill. 
II. Model of secure composition framework.  
To design a framework that allows automated reasoning on the 
security requirements of a service composition, to be able to 
generate security requirements for the services part of that 
composition that would guarantee the general requirements on the 
composition to hold. The framework shall envision some security 
patterns depicting abstract inferences that are proved to hold and 
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computed offline, in order to use those at run-time to ease the 
reasoning process and make the framework more responsive. 
III. Prototype of a discovery tool performing security aware service 
composition. 
To design and develop a plugin for a service discovery tool that 
takes into account security requirements and that is able to 
automatically build service compositions that would answer a given 
discovery query. The focus should be on the inference of security 
requirements from the composition level to the services in the 
composition, by means of the framework designed as objective II. 
IV. Prototype of a design tool for security aware service compositions. 
To design and develop a plugin for a SBS design tool that uses the 
framework results to propagate general security requirements to the 
single activities in a composition, to be able to automatically query 
for the services that will be used by the designed system and 
guarantee the required security at the same time. 
V. Evaluation of the discovery tool. 
The aim of the evaluation is to assess that the prototype resulting 
from the above objective behave as it would be expected and in a 
reasonable amount of time. This translates in some assessments of 
relevance from end-user developers to be able to evaluate the recall 
and precision of the system, and performance tests.  
1.3 Research Assumptions 
To shape the research, some assumptions were made giving some 
starting points and directions to the work: 
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• The availability of machine-readable descriptors of service security.  
• The service compositions supported by our research are 
orchestrations, i.e., processes which coordinate individual software 
services and in which there is a single central coordinator that 
determines the order of the interaction and acts as an intermediary of 
all the communications (e.g., it receives results from a service and 
passes them, or some of them, to other services).  
• The prototype of the discovery tool described as objective III makes 
usage of a service discovery approach supporting the proactive 
discovery of services at runtime. Such approach has been researched 
and implemented in a tool, called RSDT [115], by the Software 
Engineering Group of City University (a more detailed description is 
in Section 4.3). 
• The discovery approach allows service discovery at development 
time, when there is already an estimated structure of the needed 
service. This means that the tool won’t allow a simple browse of the 
registry, based only on service names or similar. 
• The service discovery is envisioned as an incremental process of 
refinement of the query based on the discovery results.  
• The focus of the research is on the inference of security in service 
compositions, so the functional composition part of the process 
might use existing state of the art ideas. 
• Finally, the registries and all the parties involved in the discovery 
process are assumed to be trusted parties. This means that they 
should comply with a set of security dispositions to assure the 
security of the process. 
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1.4 Contributions 
This research is aimed to provide a framework for service discovery 
and composition supporting inference and validation of security 
requirements. The framework allows constructing dynamically a service 
composition that respects given security requirements by means of a set of 
production rules and service discovery. Contributions of this research work 
include: 
• Design of a service composition mechanism to infer and validate 
security requirements 
To handle the question, we introduce the concept of secure 
composition patterns, i.e., models describing abstract dependencies 
between the service composition security requirements and the 
component service security requirements. The dependencies are 
formally proven in order to ensure the same level of security of the 
original requirements. 
The patterns can be applied in different steps of a composition 
lifetime, to discover services guaranteeing the security or to validate 
the security of an existing composition.  
• Initial set of secure composition patterns and production rules 
An initial set of secure composition patterns, comprising patterns for 
integrity, confidentiality and availability, is given to prove and 
exemplify the approach. The secure composition patterns are 
encoded into security production rules that can be deployed to a rule-
based system.  
• Secure composition inference algorithm 
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The process of security requirements inference from the service 
composition layer to the single composing services is achieved 
through a recursive algorithm that makes use of the secure 
composition patterns. This information can be used to assess the 
security of existing compositions (e.g. during the SBS design time) 
or to construct secure service compositions (e.g. to replace a service 
with a composition with the same level of security at either design or 
runtime).  
• Prototype of a discovery and composition tool supporting security 
This prototype allows the creation of service compositions during the 
discovery of a service, and guarantees that the service compositions 
have the requested level of security. The tool allows adaptation of 
SBS at both design and runtime. The latter is achieved by taking 
advantage of the proactive capabilities of the discovery tool. 
• Prototype of a design tool supporting validation and adaptation 
based on the security of service compositions 
This prototype allows the validation of the security requirements 
during an SBS design. The tool shows alternative services or service 
compositions that comply with the functionality and the security 
requested. The alternative services or service composition can be 
used to request automatic adaptation of the designed SBS. 
• Integration with the ASSERT4SOA toolkit 
The approach and the prototypes have been integrated with the 
certification framework proposed by the ASSERT4SOA project. The 
certification framework provides further assurance with respect to 
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the security of the services, increasing the level of trust in the 
solutions provided by the presented approach. 
• Evaluation of the approach 
To prove the feasibility and scalability of the approach, the service 
discovery and composition performances have been tested. 
1.5 Publications 
The contributions in this thesis have been submitted to conferences and 
workshops in order to collect feedback and disseminate the ideas presented 
to fellow researchers and organizations that work in the field.  
In the following you can find a list of the published papers: 
• Pino, L., and Spanoudakis, G. (2012, May). Finding secure 
compositions of software services: Towards a pattern based 
approach. In 5th IFIP International Conference on New 
Technologies, Mobility and Security, 2012 (NTMS'12), pp. 1-5. 
IEEE. DOI: 10.1109/NTMS.2012.6208741. [82]  
This paper describes an early version of the framework and 
introduces the concept of secure composition patterns. In this work 
the security production rules were encoded in Situation Calculus [62] 
and it was necessary to retain some information about the services 
internals (i.e., the “Security related actions on data”).  
• Pino, L., and Spanoudakis, G. (2012, June). Constructing secure 
service compositions with patterns. In IEEE Eighth World Congress 
on Services, 2012 (SERVICES'12), pp. 184-191. IEEE. DOI: 
10.1109/SERVICES.2012.61. [81] 
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This paper presents an updated version of the framework and 
introduces an early version of the secure composition algorithm. In 
this version of the algorithm we were using patterns to address the 
construction of security composition respecting the required 
functionality (through the usage of ontologies and OWL-S [61] 
based patterns), and the security production rules were used to infer 
the security requirements of the composition. 
• Pino, L., Spanoudakis, G., Fuchs, A., and Gürgens, S. (2014, April). 
Discovering Secure Service Compositions. In 4th International 
Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Sciences 
(CLOSER'14). DOI: 10.5220/0004855702420253. [84]  
This paper presents an example of a formal proof underlying a secure 
composition pattern on integrity, allowing trusting the solutions 
based on such pattern. Furthermore, the paper presents the encoding 
of the secure composition pattern into security production rules as 
Drools production rules, which represents our final choice for the 
encoding of the rules (as Drools is a fast, reliable and widely support 
rule-based decision system [47]). Finally the paper describes an 
updated version of the algorithm and presents the service discovery 
and composition prototype, with some initial evaluation figures. 
• Pino, L., Spanoudakis, G., Fuchs, A., and Gürgens, S. (to appear). 
Generating Secure Service Compositions. In Cloud Computing and 
Services Science: Fourth International Conference, CLOSER 2014, 
Barcelona, Spain, April 3-4, 2014, Revised Selected Papers. 
Springer. [85]  
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This work is an extension of the previous paper that elaborates some 
further the formalisms used for the proof, based on Security 
Modelling Framework (SeMF) [37]. 
• Pino, L., Mahbub, K., and Spanoudakis, G. (2014, November). 
Designing Secure Service Workflows in BPEL. In Proceedings of 
the international conference on Service-Oriented Computing 
(ICSOC’14), pp. 551-559. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. DOI: 
10.1007/978-3-662-45391-9_48. [83] 
This paper is focused on the SBS design tool that supports validation 
and adaptation based on the security of compositions. This work 
presents the latest version of the security requirement inference 
algorithm and how this is applied in order to validate the security of 
portions of BPEL workflows and to adapt secure service 
compositions in a BPEL workflow. 
1.6 Outline 
The thesis is organised in 9 chapters as follows.  
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the existing approaches dealing with 
service discovery, service composition. We focus in particular on the 
security support in these fields and the existing standards and languages that 
address the security issue. 
In Chapter 3 we summarise the concepts and definitions that are used in 
this thesis, from the Service Oriented Computing field.  
Chapter 4 describes the languages and tools used in the context of this 
research. More specifically this chapter focuses on the WSDL and BPEL 
languages, used as the most common service description and service 
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composition languages, and on Drools, RSDT and Eclipse BPEL Designer, 
respectively the rule-based system, the runtime discovery platform and the 
SBS design tool used for the implementation of the prototypes.  
Chapter 5 presents the secure composition pattern approach. We 
introduce some examples of secure composition patterns with the respective 
proofs. Furthermore, this chapter contains a methodology to encode the 
patterns into security production rules and the rules corresponding to the 
patterns presented earlier. 
Chapter 6 describes the service composition process based on the 
secure composition patterns. This process makes usage of the security 
production rules introduced in Chapter 5. The algorithms underlying the 
service composition process are presented and discussed through the usage 
of examples. 
Chapter 7 contains the implementation details of the two prototypes 
that use the secure service composition process in order to offer validation 
and adaptation of secure service compositions. In particular, it describes 
how the discovery platform and the SBS design tool presented in Chapter 4 
have been extended in order to support security and service compositions. 
Chapter 8 presents the setup and the results of the performance 
evaluation of the discovery and the composition process. The chapter 
contains the description of the configuration and the scenario, and the 
explanation of the numerical results obtained from the tests. 
Finally, in Chapter 9 we present the conclusions. In this chapter we 
highlight the contributions of the approach, the implications that this 
approach has on the field and some topics for future works. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter presents an analysis of the existing works in the fields of 
service discovery and service composition, focusing in particular on the 
supported security features. This is followed by an analysis of the standard 
and languages that support security in the SOC field. Furthermore, all the 
approaches are summarized and put into relation with the contents of this 
thesis.  
2.2 Service Discovery 
In this section we provide an overview of single service discovery 
techniques, i.e., techniques that support the discovery of a service for a SBS 
without attempting to formulate complete or partial service compositions. 
They merely attempt to identify a single service that can fit within a system 
based on given criteria that this service needs to satisfy. In many cases, 
these criteria may express conditions that are necessary for the new service 
to fit within an existing service composition. Also, the discovered service 
may be a composite service itself. None of these cases, however, is treated 
as discovery of service compositions in the context of this work as the 
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discovery process does not attempt to create a new composition. Techniques 
supporting the discovery of service compositions are overviewed in Section 
2.3 below.  
The techniques that we overview are classified into groups depending 
on the main characteristics of the algorithmic approach deployed for service 
discovery. According to this criterion, techniques are grouped into: 
• Text matching service discovery – These are techniques that make 
use of information retrieval techniques. In this group, discovery 
criteria are expressed as keywords which are subsequently matched 
with textual or structural descriptions of services. Typically, such 
techniques are deployed for early and design time service discovery. 
• Semantic service discovery – These are techniques that assume 
descriptions of services that have been expressed in an ontology or 
annotated with links to ontological descriptions. Such techniques 
make use of the ontological descriptions during the matching process 
in order to improve the precision and completeness of the discovery 
process. 
• Graph matching techniques – These are techniques that make use of 
different types of graph matching techniques (e.g. weighted bipartite 
graph matching, graph transformations, etc.) without relying on any 
form of ontology or formal reasoning of semantic service 
descriptions.  
A summary of representative techniques in each of the above categories 
is provided below. 
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2.2.1 Text matching service discovery 
Keyword-based retrieval underpins some service registries available on 
the Internet (e.g. Xignite [112] and WebserviceX [111]) and some basic 
built-in clients for development platforms (e.g. jUDDI GUI [103], Eclipse 
Web Services Explorer [26]). These approaches may also offer discovery 
through service categories and the use of tagged service descriptions. Text 
based service discovery is easy to use, due to the simplicity in the 
expression of the discovery queries. It is also useful in static service 
discovery, where the developers of SBS are usually concerned with finding 
a service that fits their requirements or the requirements of an application 
being designed. However, it cannot offer the matching precision that is 
required in dynamic service discovery that is executed to support automatic 
service replacement in applications at runtime. This is because in the 
analysis and design stages of SBSs, it is often useful to identify even 
services that do not match perfectly with what is required as a means of 
exploring alternative solutions and considering alterative designs and 
implementation paths for the application. At runtime, however, when the 
design of the overall application and its coordination logic have been fixed, 
the imprecision that typically characterizes keyword-based techniques is not 
acceptable, as decisions about replacing the partner services of a system 
with alternatives identified during the discovery process, in many cases, 
need to be taken in an automated manner. 
2.2.2 Semantic service discovery 
Semantic service discovery techniques constitute a significant approach 
to service discovery that is based on explicit representations of the 
semantics of services and logic reasoning techniques that analyse these 
representations. There has been a vast number of techniques that realise the 
semantic service discovery approach, including [50][56].  
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A system realising the semantic approach is OWLS-MX [50]. OWLS-
MX uses logic based approximate matching and information retrieval 
techniques.  
A semantic approach has also been advocated in [56], where a service 
discovery prototype that uses a Description Logic reasoner to match service 
discovery requests with ontology based service descriptions expressed in 
DAML-S.  
Despite some experimental evidence showing acceptable precision and 
recall over competitors, however, the semantic approaches do not appear to 
be adequate for dynamic service discovery. This is because the ontological 
matches do not necessarily coincide with behavioural and interface 
matching at the level required for dynamic service discovery.  
2.2.3 Graph matching techniques 
Other approaches for service discovery consider graph transformation 
rules [49], or behavioural matching [32][67][92]. The work in [49] is 
limited since it cannot account for changes in the order or names of the 
parameters. In [92], the authors use service behaviour signatures to improve 
service discovery. In AOWS [33][96] the functional and quality 
characteristics of components and services are described as aspects and 
discovery is based on a formal analysis and validation of these descriptions. 
The work in [67] advocates the use of behavioural specifications 
represented as BPEL for service discovery for resolving ambiguities 
between requests and services and uses a tree-alignment algorithm to 
identify matches between request and services. 
Graph matching underpins also the Runtime Service Discovery Tool 
(RSDT) [115][116] developed within City University of London. This 
system uses graph morphism detection algorithms to match service 
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interfaces and graph search algorithms to identify the compatibility of 
behavioural discovery criteria with behavioural service description models 
expressed in BPEL. Furthermore, this tool offers the capability to subscribe 
queries in order to have them executed and maintained proactively, in order 
to offer timely runtime service discovery to SBSs.  
2.2.4 Context awareness 
Several approaches have also been proposed to support context 
awareness in service discovery [11][20][79][113]. In [20], context 
information is represented by key-value pairs attached to the edges of a 
graph representing service classifications. This approach does not integrate 
context information with behavioural and quality matching. Furthermore, 
the context information is stored explicitly in a service repository that must 
be updated following context changes. In [9] queries, services and context 
information are expressed in ontologies. The approach in [11] focuses on 
user context information (e.g. location and time) and uses it to discover the 
most appropriate network operator before making phone calls. The work in 
[113] locates components based on context-aware browsing. The above 
context-aware approaches support simple conditions regarding context 
information in service discovery, do not fully integrate context with 
behavioural criteria in service discovery, and have limited applicability 
since they depend on the use of specific ontologies for the expression of 
context conditions.  
2.2.5 Summary 
In summary, most of the proposed approaches support service 
discovery based on limited sets of service criteria and using a reactive 
approach for query execution. Unlike them, RSDT supports dynamic service 
discovery based on a comprehensive set of service and application criteria 
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including but not limited to structural, functional, quality, and contextual 
characteristics. This tool supports both reactive and proactive service 
discovery, resulting in more efficient service replacement during the 
execution of a SBS. 
Due to these reasons, RSDT was selected as a reasonable choice to be 
the basis for developing support for handling security related criteria and 
handling compositions as part of service discovery. In particular the 
extensible support for query criteria to any XML service description allows 
matching any form of security property specification, whilst the proactive 
service discovery support allows obtaining timely results even when the 
computation may require some time, as while performing service 
composition. 
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Approach Algorithm Service descr. 
language 
QoS 
support 
Xignite [112]  Keyword-based WSDL No 
WebserviceX [111]  Keyword-based WSDL No 
OWLS-MX [50]  Semantic  
(logic-based and IR) 
OWL-S No 
Li, L. et al. [56]  Semantic 
 (logic-based) 
DAML-S No 
Mikhaiel, R. et al. [67]  Graph-based  
(tree alignment) 
BPEL No 
Shen, Z. et al. [92] Graph-based  
(RE-tree [15]) 
Behaviour 
signatures  
(new language) 
No 
AWOS [33][96]  Graph-based AOWSDL [95]  
(new language) 
Yes 
RSDT [115][116]  Graph-based  
(morphism detection) 
WSDL, BPEL 
and XMLs 
Yes 
Cuddy, S. et al. [20]  Context graph-based Not explained No 
Beeri, C. et al. [9]  Context graph-based BPEL No 
Bormann, F. et al. [11]  Context n/a – not on WS No 
Ye, Y. et al. [113] Context n/a – not on WS No 
Table 2.1: Summary of the single service discovery approaches. 
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2.3 Service Composition 
If the basic single service discovery fails to find the requested 
functionality, there is another way a discovery platform can try to fulfil the 
request: to compose an ad-hoc service on the fly by discovering and 
combining some services that provide the different parts of the 
functionality. 
This additional step in the discovery process can be realized with the 
aid of different approaches arising from several areas of research (formal 
methods, automated reasoning, semantic computing, distributed systems, 
etc.) [8]. This wide range of possibilities offers a lot of solutions that can 
satisfy different types of discovery (static or dynamic, with human 
intervention or not), based mostly on which parts of the composition 
process can be automated. In particular we categorize the works in this area 
within two main groups: 
• Approaches which automate the translation of the service query into 
workflows containing activity placeholders that need to be bounded 
to concrete services; 
• Approaches that focus on automating the service discovery, 
adaptation and binding, when the workflow is already available. 
2.3.1 Definition of Service Workflows 
The approach of automating the phase of finding or building a new 
service composition is a step in the direction of dynamicity and it also 
answers to problems of complexity, response-time and scalability of a 
manual approach. The problem is typically to find or construct a workflow 
(or plan) that can satisfy the requirements. This step is usually followed by 
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the discovery and adaptation of services in order to instantiate the service 
composition, as explained in Section 2.3.2. 
A solution to this problem is using reference process models, in 
domains in which such models exist, in order to generate a set of standard 
workflows that offer specific business functionalities. Some examples of 
such standard process models are the Health Level 7 (HL7) in the health 
domain [40], SWIFT used by financial institutions [98], and Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) [70], RosettaNet [34], IBM BPM Industry Packs [43] that 
specify models for a variety of fields (e.g., manufacturing, 
telecommunications, …).  
Whenever a process model does not yet exist, however, the need to 
construct a workflow ad-hoc arises. An early work on this is SAHARA 
[60][87], a framework to compose services in a Wide-Area network, where 
the approach is not specific on services, rather it composes more generic 
data operators. The “composition path” (i.e., the workflow) is built by 
running the shortest path algorithm on the graph of the operator space. They 
propose to build domain-specific graphs and to cache popular results to 
limit the size of the graphs, but the solution isn’t scalable in a more general 
context without the notion of local and wide-area paths. Furthermore the 
data operator point of view is a little restricting, not allowing for example a 
service to just retrieve information or to compose data from/to different 
services.  
Another work from the same period is SWORD [86], a toolkit for 
efficient service composition. In this work a service is represented as a rule 
expressing that given certain inputs, the service will provide a certain 
output. These rules are expressed using Entity-Relationship assertions and 
are elaborated through a rule-based Expert System to generate plans, given 
the pre-conditions and post-conditions of the requirement. They allow only 
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simple queries, by not allowing arbitrary joins (like “find all pairs of movies 
with the same director”) and not providing arithmetic/function symbols, to 
maintain an efficient and simple model. 
Most recent works, however, prefer to use standard languages to 
describe services (and composition requests), in particular OWL-S (and 
DAML-S). The reasons are mostly business-related and include: (a) in this 
way developers don’t need to learn further languages, (b) it simplifies the 
process of integrating an existent service discovery platform and (c) to 
avoid the error-prone (manual) process of converting the service 
descriptions in another language. 
A framework for the automated service composition is described in 
[58] and it uses the services’ DAML-S description (DAML-S is a 
predecessor of OWL-S). In particular, the approach of this work is to try to 
find a single service corresponding to the high-level goal requested by the 
user, in case this step fails then a repository of abstract workflows is 
interrogated. Only if also this other step fails the framework tries to build a 
new composition, by chaining services through their input-output and 
precondition-effect descriptions. The matching of IOPEs (i.e., Input, 
Output, Precondition and Effect) is provided by a specific component that 
admits the composition of the I/O data from different services, allowing the 
creation of complex compositions. 
In [88][89] the DAML-S Service Profile of each service is converted in 
extralogical axioms of propositional Linear Logic. The service composition 
request is then specified as a Linear Logic sequent and the system uses a 
theorem prover to check if the request can be satisfied by a composition of 
services. If a composition is possible, then a process calculus representation 
of it is generated from the proof and it is possible to request a workflow 
model (DAML-S Service Profile or BPEL4WS). Non-functional properties, 
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like security and QoS ones, are taken in consideration as well as the 
functional ones, thanks to inference rules. 
CoSMoS [30][31] is a semantic-based model for services and 
compositions that is slightly different from OWL-S since it allows also 
semantic annotation of operation “concepts” (in addition of I/O) that cannot 
be defined as data types. In this context they introduce SeGSeC: a service 
composition mechanism that supports CoSMoS (i.e., semantic annotations). 
In this work the services must be described in CoSMoS/WSDL and the 
service request can be written in natural language: the tool then translates it 
into a CoSMoS semantic graph representation. The composition starts with 
the discovery of the service for the initial concept in the request (the one 
that provides the goal output) and then goes on by finding the services that 
provide the inputs for the initial service, using also the semantic 
information. At the end of the composition process the workflow is checked 
to guarantee that it satisfies the semantic request; otherwise the tool tries to 
find other compositions.  
One of the most recent works in the field is DynamiCoS [53][94], a 
framework for dynamic service composition that supports requests in 
natural language (but also in a formal language based on OWL) and 
functional and non-functional properties. The first step of the composition 
in this framework is the service discovery, based on semantic concepts. The 
semantic connections between the I/O of the discovered services are stored 
in a Casual Link Matrix (CLM); so then the composition is built starting 
from the requested output searching backwards for compatible services 
through the CLM. 
The framework itself does not include the service discovery component 
and the necessary interpreters to convert the service descriptions in the 
internal formalism (it is claimed that the approach can be applied with 
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OWL-S Service Profile, WSMO Capability Model or SA-WSDL 
specification). 
Approach Algorithm Service 
description 
language 
Allowed 
WF 
patterns 
Security 
support 
SAHARA 
[60][87] 
Graph-based n/a - not only on 
WS 
Choice No 
SWORD 
[86] 
Logic-based 
(rule-based 
system) 
Based on ER-
model 
(new language) 
Parallel  No 
Majithia, S. 
et al. [58]  
Backward 
chain of I/O 
DAML-S - No 
Rao, J. 
[88][89]  
Logic-based 
(theorem 
proving) 
DAML-S Choice 
and 
parallel 
As service 
goals and 
constraints 
CoSMoS / 
SeGSeC 
[30][31]  
Semantic 
graph-based 
CoSMoS/WSDL  
(new language) 
Choice No 
DynamiCoS 
[53][94] 
Semantic 
graph-based  
Internal, needs 
interpreters  
(new language) 
- Yes / not 
explained 
Table 2.2: Summary of approaches supporting automated construction of 
service compositions.  
2.3.2 Instantiation of Service Workflows  
This research area focuses on finding, given a workflow, the most 
suitable services for the activities in the workflow or, in case no perfect 
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matches are available, to adapt the workflow to consider the services that 
behave in a very similar way to the activities involved. The “most suitable” 
unit of measure is in the majority of the works based on the semantic 
correlation. Some other works focus on reaching the best QoS, after a first 
selection of services. 
The earliest work on this subject is eFlow [14]: a platform for 
composition of services. This platform offers means of describing the 
workflow of the services through the GUI (by defining flow graphs) or 
through a simple composition language (an XML language called CSDL: 
Composite Service Definition Language) that allows dynamic discovery of 
services or dynamic selection and instantiation (with possibilities of 
multiple instantiations) of services from a list. The discovery is obtained by 
executing generic XQL queries on the repository of the service descriptions 
as the platform allows any XML format for the service descriptions. The 
obtained dynamic composition, however, isn’t guaranteed to be working 
correctly: the framework is built just to compose but it doesn’t perform any 
verification after the composition. 
An example of work that extensively uses semantic computing is [64], 
an ontology-based framework for automatic service composition. The 
desired workflow, with semantic annotations, is described through a 
language called CSSL (Composite Service Specification Language). 
Syntactic, semantic and qualitative composability rules are used to select 
the services for the composition. In particular the service WSDLs must be 
augmented with semantic properties from the DAML+OIL ontology 
presented in the paper. An interesting feature from this work is the 
introduction of three measures for the selection between the different 
resulting compositions, called ranking, relevance and completeness (in 
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particular the first two measures are calculated on the basis of stored 
templates). 
Another work on automatic composition based on ontologies is [51]. In 
this work the service request is defined with TWFO (Transactional 
WorkFlow Ontology), an ontology used to describe workflows with 
transaction support. The main difference with other works is that the service 
registry must also contain the workflow of the services used in the 
discovery process (expressed in TWFO as well). Then, after the candidate 
services are found through the DAML-S registry, the system tries to 
compose the workflow of each service in the requested workflow (called 
Master Workflow). The work does not go too much into details on the 
discovery process. 
Regarding the automatic service composition based on QoS criteria, it 
should be noted that this kind of approach needs, in addition to the 
workflow of the composite service, the list of the compatible services for 
each activity as input. So, since a list of services has been already 
discovered, the matter to solve is reduced to just aggregate the different 
QoS data to find the best composition. A work in this area is [46], that uses 
some of the workflow patterns from [107] to define aggregation functions 
for QoS criteria. The patterns are used to do a stepwise graph reduction, and 
for every step the aggregated value of the QoS criteria is calculated.  
Another work on QoS composition, even though quite domain specific, 
is SpiderNet [35][36], a framework for QoS assurance and load balancing of 
multimedia service compositions. The input of their tool is the composition 
of functionalities (a function graph) and a QoS requirement vector. Then the 
service composition is achieved through the bounded composition probing 
protocol: at each step a probe is sent from the actual service node to the 
most promising of its neighbours, to look for the next functions. Each node 
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provides as a result the list of the service components that implement the 
desired functions and the statistical QoS (the assumption is that the nodes 
are cooperative and trustworthy). The drawbacks of this work are that the 
composition process is slow and that the algorithm is based on probing the 
network, so it can be used only on bounded networks. 
A more complete approach is given in METEOR-S [1][97], where the 
semantic and the QoS approaches are combined in a single automatic 
service composition framework. METEOR-S is more broadly a framework 
for the complete lifecycle of semantic web services; the particular 
component that deals with service composition is called MWSCF 
(METEOR-S Web Service Composition Framework).  
The definition of the desired workflow is made through a specific GUI 
tool, where the user (service designer) should also associate each activity to 
a discovery URL. Then the framework ranks the services on two 
dimensions: the semantic matching and the QoS criteria matching. The 
service designer can specify the weights of each criterion to have control on 
the service selection process. The framework is not able to automatically 
generate an executable but it needs some user intervention for the data 
binding. 
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Approach Matching 
approach 
Input format 
(workflow) 
Service 
description 
Security 
support 
eFlow [14]  n/a CSDL and XQL  XML No 
Medjahed, 
B. et al. [64]  
Syntactic 
and 
semantic 
logic-based 
CSSL WSDL with 
semantic in 
DAML+OIL 
Privacy 
and 
encryption 
Korhonen, J. 
et al. [51]  
Ontology-
based 
reasoning 
TWFO DAML-S and 
TWFO 
No 
Jaeger, M.C. 
et al. [46]  
QoS 
aggregation 
(minimize 
function) 
Workflow 
(+candidate 
services) 
n/a Encryption 
SpiderNet 
[35][36]  
Network 
probing 
Function graph 
and QoS req. 
vector 
Function 
names  
No 
METEOR-S 
[1][97] 
Semantic 
and QoS 
ranking 
BPEL-like, 
generated 
through a GUI 
WSDL 
(+semantics), 
WSEL (QoS) 
No 
Table 2.3: Summary of the automated service discovery in service 
composition approaches. 
2.3.3 Summary 
The works on Service Composition comprise results from a wide area 
of fields. A variety of languages have been used to encode service 
descriptions and workflows, with no standard being embraced by the 
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community. The recent trend, however, has been to adopt semantic-aware 
specifications and solutions. 
In more detail, we have presented the works in this field by 
categorizing them in the ones that discover or build a composition plan that 
can provide a given functionality, and the ones that instantiate workflow 
plans with services that will collaborate to implement the given 
functionality. In the context of this thesis we do not wish to address directly 
the former, as our assumption is that any approach in the literature may be 
used, but we enhance the solutions for the latter with extended security 
support. The described works that handle the instantiation of service 
workflows, in fact, present a very limited support for security, as described 
in more detail in Section 2.4.4. 
2.4 Security in Service Oriented Computing 
In this section we provide an overview of how the security problem has 
been addressed in the service-oriented computing (SOC) field. In particular, 
we are going to describe first the security standards and solutions that have 
been introduced in the SOC field and then how security has been handled in 
the context of Service Discovery, Service Composition and SBS Design. 
2.4.1 Security Languages and Standards 
In order to deal with security issues that used to hold back a wider 
usage of services, the SOC community has actively worked on 
standardizing a set of languages and protocols that would help the 
development of secure services and SBS. 
WS-Security [77] is an OASIS standard that extends SOAP in order to 
allow enforcing confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation on XML 
messages, thanks to encryption, signature and identifying security token 
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capabilities. This standard does not provide a complete solution for security, 
however is used as a building block for further protocols. WS-
SecureConversation [74] extends the use cases of WS-Security providing a 
way to establish security contexts for multiple message exchanges, reducing 
the overhead introduced by key negotiation. 
WS-Trust [76] is another OASIS standard that introduces the 
mechanisms to manage security tokens in order to build trust relationships 
between organizations, or “security domains”. WS-Trust defines the process 
of issuing, renewing and validating of security tokens by the Security Token 
Service, the key exchange process and the format of the message used for 
each one of these operations. 
SAML [72] and WS-Federation [73] are two OASIS standards for 
identity federation specifications that provide the means for shared 
authentication and authorization of identities between organizations, or 
“security domains”, thanks to federation agreements (e.g., single sign-on 
mechanisms). 
WS-Policy [109] is a W3C recommendation that allows the 
specification, by the service provider, of which QoS or security policies are 
in place. WS-SecurityPolicy [75] is an OASIS standard used to specify and 
negotiate security policies, based on WS-Policy, that can defined on a wide 
range of technologies, from transport layer security to the usage of 
protocols specified by WS-Security, WS-Trust and so on.  
Common Criteria (CC) [18] is the international standard for traditional 
software certification (ISO/IEC 15408:2009 [45]), developed by the 
governments of Canada, US, UK, France, Germany and Netherlands in 
order to ensure security of the software used by the government and critical 
infrastructures. In CC vendors ask testing laboratories to evaluate their 
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software in order to check if it meets the security functional and assurance 
requirements (SFRs and SARs) they claim. After testing, CC certificates 
can be released produced by certification bodies in order to be checked by 
the users; for this reason the certificates are human-readable system-wide 
documents that can easily exceed the hundreds of pages (e.g. by putting 
together the Certification Report, Security Target and Protection Profile of a 
CC certificate: see [19] for some examples). 
The ASSERT4SOA project [5][80] aimed to solve the shortcomings of 
traditional software certification in the SOC field. In particular, the 
proposed approach advocates the usage of machine-readable security 
certificates available at runtime and digitally signed by trusted third-parties 
(Certification Authorities, or CA). Each security certificate describes a 
security property that has been verified to hold for a given service. The 
certificates can be seen as additional service descriptions placed in service 
registries and available to clients and to service discovery processes. 
2.4.1.1 Summary 
The standards introduced in the SOC field encompass a number of 
mechanisms to support a wide range of security requirements, offering 
solutions to service developers for their implementations. 
As the approach presented in this thesis is meant to assess security of 
service compositions, it does not need to go in the level of detail of the 
security implementation for a service. In fact, from the point of view of a 
SBS designer or a service user, all the concepts introduced by the WS-* 
standards are very fine grained, as they are used at a technical level to solve 
a problem, but they might be far too complicated for potential clients. In 
this sense, service users might want to know which security properties hold 
for a service without the need of the information about how the property is 
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achieved, e.g. knowing that a piece of data is treated with confidentiality, or 
that the service is available at the 99.99% of the time. 
Furthermore, users cannot always know, and therefore trust, the Service 
Provider that offers a service and the level of security he/she declares. 
Security certificates offer third-party security guarantee for service users, 
without the need to investigate the exact mechanism that assure the 
requested security property. 
For these reasons the implementation of our work uses security 
certificates, since our approach is mainly directed to SBS designers; 
however our solution can support any kind of security descriptor.  
2.4.2 Security Design and Implementation 
For the design and implementation of secure services, the research has 
been focused on: (a) additional stages to the development process in order 
to take into consideration the security requirements during the design and 
implementation of a service [29][38][66], and (b) special security services 
that provide the mechanisms to protect other services (security-as-a-service) 
[16][38][39][76]. 
[29] introduces the usage of a formal framework called SI*/Secure 
Tropos during the Early Requirements Engineering phase in order to model 
and analyse security requirements. The requirements are then used to 
produce a Secure BPEL workflow that goes through an iterative process of 
refinement. [66] proposes to use SecureUML in order to encode security 
requirements at design time. Then, before implementing the solution, an 
additional step is introduces in order to investigate the SOA Security Meta-
model. At this stage a set of Security Pattern is used to convert the security 
requirements into security constraints that describe how to achieve the 
security requirement. PWSSec [38] describes a set of complementary stages 
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to be added to service development phases in order to support security. In 
particular WSSecReq is a first design phase aimed to specify the security 
requirements, WSSecArch is a phase where the requirements are used in 
conjunction with security architectural patterns in order to define the 
security architecture, and WSSecTech is the final design phase where a set 
of WS security standards (see the previous section) are identified starting 
from the security architecture designed in the previous stage. In particular 
during the WSSecArch stage, security services are added to the architecture 
in order to support a required security mechanism. 
AO4BPEL [16] allows the integration of security specifications in a 
BPEL process. These specifications are then used to indicate security 
functionalities that are offered by a special Security Service, and integrate 
them in the AO4BPEL process. Sectet [39] is a framework for the 
implementation of security patterns from design to the implementation of an 
orchestration. Sectet enables the design of orchestrations as UML message 
flow diagrams, which are converted into workflows and used to generate 
stubs for actual orchestrations. In orchestrations, services are wrapped by 
Policy Enforcement Points, whose purpose is to provide the required 
security properties.  
2.4.2.1 Summary 
In order to ease the application of security measures to new services, 
the described approaches introduce new design phases and new security 
services. These approaches, however, differ from the work presented in this 
thesis as they aim to support security for a service, not a service 
composition. Furthermore, the processes described in the literature often 
require human intervention or additional security services, whilst our 
approach does not introduce such requirements. 
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2.4.3 Security aware Service Discovery 
In this section we provide an overview of single service discovery 
techniques supporting security constraints, i.e., techniques that perform the 
discovery of a service without attempting to perform service composition 
(even though a discovered service may be a composite service itself). 
Frameworks supporting the discovery of service compositions are 
overviewed in Section 2.4.4 below.  
In [105] the authors describe an approach to Web Service discovery 
based on privacy preferences. The preferences are specified as part of 
privacy policies (architecturally placed with service descriptions in a central 
service repository). The privacy descriptions consist of a vocabulary for 
properties including terms for disclosure, openness and anonymity. The 
process of applying the privacy-aware policy for the web services is 
accomplished in several stages. First, a client sends their preferences to a 
discovery agent. Then, a correspondence will be established between the 
user’s interests and the web service privacy policies. Finally, the degree of 
user confidence to the privacy-aware policies on services is evaluated and a 
selection is made based upon the confidence levels obtained.  
Similarly, the work presented in [48] uses policies described in 
extended service descriptions for authorization and privacy for semantic 
web services. The descriptions are proposed ontologies to annotate OWL-S 
input and output parameters with respect to their security characteristics, 
including encryption and digital signatures. Several extensions to OWL-S 
are proposed in the form of objects. First an information object which itself 
is extended to support either encrypted information or signed information. 
The approach also adds a series of policy types to OWL-S including a 
PrivacyPolicy, ConfidentialityPolicy and AuthorizationPolicy. The authors 
describe a design-time “best service selection” process. They also discuss 
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how this may be used for run-time compliance checking, but allude to the 
difficulties of trusting what providers offer as descriptions and what the 
services they provide actually undertake in execution. 
[106] introduces a context-aware service discovery approach that 
makes usage of security policies. A threat analysis is given for the service 
discovery process, which led to the specification of security policies. The 
service client or the service provider can enforce security policies in order 
to restrict the access to their respective profiles during service discovery. 
FSSD [69] is a decentralized peer-to-peer service discovery protocol 
that allows users to adjust their degrees of collaboration, security and 
privacy. In particular this work investigates the trade-off between these 
three characteristics and introduces a common secure trust overlay that may 
work in multiple administrative domains and that is independent of network 
and security infrastructures.  
2.4.3.1 Summary 
Existing research has focused largely on two sub-areas: the first being 
service discovery driven by some specific security or privacy constraint and 
second, the security of the service discovery mechanisms. 
In our work we are interested in the former, which is yet to see a 
comprehensive solution in the literature, as typically only subsets of 
security properties are supported. In our approach, instead, we extend an 
existing service discovery tool with capabilities to match any security 
property with a service security description, in order to support security 
aware discovery to be used when instantiating a service composition. 
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2.4.4 Security aware Service Composition 
The efforts to provide security in service compositions can be 
summarized in two categories, the ones that merely verify that an existing 
service composition guarantee a given security property, and the ones that 
take security properties into account during the construction of a service 
composition. 
2.4.4.1 Verification of Service Compositions security 
properties 
Among the works focusing on security in service composition 
particular relevance has been given to verification, through model checking, 
of already existent compositions’ security. The service composition can be 
checked for flaws at design time or in a later stage of development, usually 
after concrete services are associated with each task. To perform the check 
the composition is modelled with formal languages and the requirements are 
expressed as properties on the model.  
The design time verification is applied on a specification of the system. 
To encourage the use of this kind of verification, the language of the 
required specification is conventionally a common language of the Software 
Engineering area, usually UML.  
Works meant for design time verification of security properties, like 
[22] and [23], usually support the system definition in UML (or similar 
tools), since it is a common language used in the Software Engineering area, 
encouraging in this way the use of this kind of approach. In particular [23] 
has an unusual approach with respect to the normal verification since they 
add the concept of patterns. Basically, the first step in their approach is to 
express security design patterns (i.e., design patterns of best practices to 
achieve some security goal) in UML sequence diagram. These patterns are 
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then converted into the formal language CCS [68] through some rules. The 
model checking of the security properties can be done, in the end, on 
compositions of these security patterns, to verify if the security properties 
are preserved. 
A more general work in the verification of security properties in service 
composition is in [6][7]. They introduce a calculus (a typed extension of λ-
calculus) to describe and compose services. In particular their language can 
be used to describe a model and check the security-related activities (access 
events, e.g. writing a file, opening a socket connection) of a service 
composition. The main remark on this work is that there’s no description of 
the modelling phase, leaving to the reader the burden of planning how to 
convert the services into their language. 
Another work in the verification of service composition area is Aniketos 
[4]. This work introduces a set of security patterns that are defined as design 
patterns that guarantee some security goal. These patterns are used to secure 
software during the design phase, which is human based, and to monitor 
changes related to the requested security policy at runtime. 
2.4.4.2 Security aware Definition and Instantiation of 
Service Workflows 
Another point of view regarding security in service composition is to 
obtain the guarantee that a composition respects some security policies 
directly from the discovery process, when an automatic composition of 
services approach is used.  
A work that falls into this category is [54], where planning techniques 
are used to compose workflows compliant with some lattice-based access 
control models (e.g. multi-level secure systems). The focus is on how to 
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find efficient algorithms for workflow planning, even though in the limited 
case of sequences of operators. 
In [13] the authors describe an approach to security conscious web 
service composition through the declaration of security constraints required 
on service provision and of the constraints declared by service providers. 
Security constraints are declared in SAML assertions [72]. Examples are 
provided for both authentication and authorisation assertions although a 
common security ontology is not provided. The architecture of using the 
constraints specified is based upon a Web Service brokering model. A 
Secure WS-Broker (SWS-Broker) is used to manage service requests and 
sets of security constraints, identifies a well-known business process (i.e., 
the workflow) compatible with the request from a library and tries to 
instantiate such workflow with appropriate services that respect also the 
security constraints. The approach also provides an implementation of the 
broker consisting of a workflow modeller, service locator, security 
matchmaker and WS-BPEL generator. The security matchmaker builds a 
tree structure of the path of security considerations (from the constraints 
applied to the workflow) and analyses the possible composition paths and 
security constraints from discovered services. WS-Agreement nodes are 
also generated as part of service message structures to express the 
constraints applied.  
2.4.4.3 Summary 
Approaches allowing verification of service composition security 
require modelling the service composition, its services and the security 
property to check them through formal languages, in order to be able to say 
if the security property is satisfied.  
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The works that handle security during the definition and the 
instantiation of service workflows, instead, add a security aware discovery 
dimension during the composition of the services. Furthermore, as 
summarized in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, some of the works in Section 2.3 
allow the expression of few security properties in the request as well as non-
functional properties.  
Our approach does not require the knowledge of any formal language 
or knowledge about the internals of the services, as services are software 
components that may be available from an external provider unwilling to 
share information about the service internals. Furthermore model based 
approaches are usually specialised to verify a specific security property, 
whilst our approach allows the inference and validation of any security 
property, given that a formal proof of composition results exists. 
Finally, in almost all the approaches taken into consideration, security 
properties are specified and checked only against single services in the 
composition, not giving information on the overall security of the 
composition. In our approach, instead, it is possible to require a security 
property over an entire service composition in order to be used to infer 
which security properties are required by the services part of the 
composition. This allows treating a service composition as a single service, 
permitting in this way the substitution of a single service that has a set of 
security requirements with a service composition that is generated online 
and that respects the same security requirements of the original service. 
2.4.5 Security aware Design of SBS 
The definition and verification of security requirements is an aspect 
that is not only important during the design and development of services, 
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but also fundamental when designing SBS. The following approaches define 
some initial steps in the direction of security aware design of SBS. 
One direction of research [27][29] is to define new languages for the 
specification of security requirements over a BPEL. These approaches can 
be seen as a first step to support the design of secure SBSs, but lack of 
appropriate editors to aid the use of the new language at design time.  
The work in [29] introduces a language to specify high-level security 
requirements in a business process description. This specification language 
is a BPEL dialect that abstracts low level details about the security 
implementation, allowing devising secure workflows at design time. The 
approach presented in [27] focuses on the definition of a language for 
specifying security policies in order to simplify the verification when a 
BPEL business process is used in different enterprises. The policies apply 
on single services part of a business process, so no security requirement can 
be formulated for the composition as a whole. 
The Sec-MoSC (Security for Model-oriented Service Composition) tool 
[100] is an extension of the Eclipse BPMN Modeller that allows to design 
BPMN business processes and to add security requirements to them. In this 
approach, security requirements are expressed by (i) the security property 
category (e.g., Confidentiality, Integrity, …), called NF-Attribute, (ii) the 
level of the property (i.e., High, Medium, Low), called NF-Statement and 
(iii) the security mechanism that implements the property (e.g., 
Confidentiality can be implemented by UseCryptography, that has 
properties about Encryption Type, Algorithm, Encrypted Message Parts and 
Key Length), called NF-Action. After selecting the NF-Attribute and NF-
Statement for a BPMN element, a default set of NF-Actions that implements 
the requested property are automatically added in the security requirement.  
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The tool needs human intervention to associate services to the BPMN 
activities, but it filters the service repository based on the NF-Attributes and 
NF-Statements in the security requirements to ease this task. The user needs 
also to add manually the data mappings and the predicates for the control 
flow (e.g., loops and conditions for decision commands) to enable the 
encoding of the BPMN process, which does not contain this kind of 
information, into an executable BPEL process. An interesting feature of this 
approach is the usage of an auxiliary security engine during the execution of 
the BPEL process that performs the NF-Actions that were required to the 
BPMN process itself.  
Another similar approach, on QoS requirements instead of security 
ones, can be found in the METEOR-S project (see Section 2.3.2). The 
project made available several tools to manage annotations in WSDLs and 
UDDI registries, as all the declarations in the WSDLs must be linked to 
ontological concepts. These tools can be used to semantically annotate an 
abstract BPEL process, allowing also the specification of QoS requirements. 
The annotations are then used to discover appropriate services for the BPEL 
process, using an enhanced UDDI registry. The demo of this approach [57] 
shows, however, that the generation of the abstract BPEL process is 
external to their toolset (they use a BPEL design tool from IBM called 
BPWS4J Editor) and that the BPEL must be imported into the METEOR-S 
tool for the annotation to take place. Furthermore, this approach requires 
extensive semantic annotation of all the services in the registry, their 
behaviour and inputs/output.  
2.4.5.1 Summary 
In order to allow the specification of security requirements during the 
design of a SBS, some works in the literature define new languages for the 
specification of security requirements over a BPEL. These approaches are 
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an interesting first step to taking care of security at design time, however 
further efforts might be required in order for SBS designer to use them, e.g., 
provide some user friendly editors. Furthermore such approaches might 
benefit by allowing the specification, inference or the validation of security 
requirements over pieces of the composition, instead of allowing only the 
specification over single activities. 
Other works in the area provide editors to guide the SBS designer to 
specify security requirements for single activities in a workflow and bound 
appropriate services that respect the requirements. The approach presented 
in this thesis is meant to extend this, allowing the SBS designer to use a 
single tool in order to (a) design the (executable) BPEL process for an SBS, 
(b) specify security requirements for single activities or workflow 
fragments, (c) automatically infer the security requirements over the single 
activities part of a workflow from the security requirements on the entire 
workflow, (c) validate the security requirements by checking services 
security descriptors, (d) discover alternative services or build service 
composition that satisfy the requirements, and (e) automatically replace a 
service with an alternative service or service composition.  
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Chapter 3 
Conceptual Foundations 
3.1 Overview 
In this chapter we cover the conceptual foundations that underpin the 
research outcomes of this thesis by giving definitions and explaining the 
relations between concepts used in our approach. The focus of this chapter 
will be on software services and service related topics, e.g. service 
discovery, service composition and cloud computing.  
In the context of this work we are going to use the terms Software 
Service and service interchangeably. 
3.2 Software Service 
Software Services are the basic components of the Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) paradigm, i.e., an emerging paradigm that employs 
services to support rapid and simple development, usage and composition of 
distributed applications:  
“A service in SOA is an exposed piece of functionality with three 
essential properties. A SOA-based service is a self-contained (i.e., the 
service maintains its own state) and platform-independent (i.e., the interface 
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contract to the service is platform independent) service that can be 
dynamically located and invoked. The primary value of SOA is that it 
enables the reuse of existing services, either as standalone or as part of 
composite applications that perform more complex functions by 
orchestrating numerous services and pieces of information. A simple service 
is reused in different ways and combined with other services to perform a 
specific business function.” [78]  
In other words a Software Service is a self-contained piece of 
interoperable software exposed over a network that might be accessed 
programmatically by other software applications through the discovery and 
invocation of a specific public interface. By using or combining different 
software services a software application can provide larger and more 
complex functionalities; we call such applications Service Based Systems 
(SBS). 
 “The service interface part defines service functionality visible to the 
external world and provides the means to access this functionality. The 
service describes its own interface characteristics, i.e., the operations 
available, the parameters, data typing, and the access protocols, in such a 
way that other software modules can determine what it does, how to invoke 
its functionality, and what result to expect in return.” [78] 
Software services are developed and offered to users (i.e., Service 
Clients) by entities called Service Providers. When a Service Provider 
makes available a service, it publishes also a service interface description in 
order to define how potential clients can access the service. Service 
Registries are collections of service interfaces (from one or more service 
providers) that allow clients to look up for the service they need. The 
decoupling of these concepts allows a service to be used by other entities 
than the Service Provider, i.e., the Service Clients, to build their own SBS. 
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Furthermore, it allows using a service for applications that may have been 
unforeseen by the Service Provider. 
3.2.1 Web Service 
One of the most common implementations of the Software Service 
concept is called Web Service. The definition of Web Service, as given by 
the leading standard organization for the Web, the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C), is the following: 
“A Web service is a software system designed to support interoperable 
machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface 
described in a machine-processable format (specifically WSDL). Other 
systems interact with the Web service in a manner prescribed by its 
description using SOAP-messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with an 
XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related standards.” [110] 
While being a little outdated (as SOAP is no longer the only protocol 
used to exchange messages by Web Services), this definition provides a 
good introduction to the spectrum of technologies that characterize Web 
Services. In essence Web Services are Software Services that can be 
described, used and coordinated through XML artefacts and that are 
conveyed through web-related standards as HTTP. In particular XML 
encodings promote interoperability, as their text-based representation is 
platform-independent. 
In more detail, Web Services have their service interface described in 
WSDL, an XML-based language that allows definition of types, operations 
and bindings, and they can expose bindings to a variety of architectures, 
most notably based on SOAP or REST. SOAP is a protocol that uses XML-
based messages to exchange data, whilst REST is an architectural style that 
allows for stateless and cacheable services (called RESTful services) and 
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that uses a more compact representation, thanks to the usage of the HTTP 
methods (i.e., GET, PUT, POST, DELETE). 
3.3 Service Discovery 
The process of finding a service suitable for the client’s needs is called 
Service Discovery. More formally, Service Discovery can be defined as the 
act of locating software services that meet a set of discovery criteria, by 
matching the criteria against the service interfaces that are published in 
service registries.  
The requirements of the service client are called discovery criteria and 
they are used to guide the Service Discovery process. In particular the 
logical combination of criteria sent to a service discovery platform in order 
to obtain a list of compatible services is called Service Query. 
Different types of Service Discovery can be distinguished at different 
phases of a SBS lifecycle. The Static Service Discovery is used at design or 
development time in order to bound software services during the 
implementation of a SBS. The human designer of the SBS surveys the 
results of the static service discovery, and potentially requests new 
discovery processes iteratively, until the designer finds the best suitable 
service for the application. The Dynamic Service Discovery, instead, can be 
requested at runtime by a SBS in order to bind to the most appropriate 
service during execution. This can happen either because the SBS has been 
left purposely unbound at design time or because one or more services 
bound to it failed to satisfy the requirements, so they should be substituted. 
In the dynamic service discovery scenario, the SBS designer has to specify 
the Service Query that must be used by the SBS to request the discovery of 
services, in this way some application can even avoid requesting for human 
intervention during the replacement process. 
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3.4 Service Composition 
As mentioned above, a set of services might be combined to achieve a 
more complex functionality; the product of such process is called a Service 
Composition: 
“Composite services (and processes) integrate multiple services – and 
put together new business functions – by combining new and existing 
application assets in a logical flow. Service composition combines services 
following a certain composition pattern to achieve a business goal, solve a 
problem, or provide new service functions. The definition of composite 
services requires coordinating the flow of control and information between 
the component services.” [78] 
There are two techniques that allow the definition of a Service 
Composition; these are called Service Orchestration and Service 
Choreography.  
“Orchestration describes how Web services can interact with each 
other at the message level, including the business logic and execution order 
of the interactions from the perspective and under control of a single 
endpoint. […] With orchestration, the business process interactions are 
always controlled from the (private) perspective of one of the business 
parties involved in the process.” [78] 
In other words, a Service Orchestration is a Service Composition 
controlled by a single entity, called coordinator, which executes a process 
that uses software services in order to accomplish a business objective.  
Service Choreography is defined instead as: 
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“Choreography is typically associated with the public (globally visible) 
message exchanges, rules of interaction, and agreements that occur between 
multiple business process endpoints, rather than a specific business process 
that is executed by a single party. Choreography tracks the sequence of 
messages that may involve multiple parties and multiple sources, including 
customers, suppliers, and partners, where each party involved in the process 
describes the part it plays in the interaction and no party “owns” the 
conversation.” [78] 
This is very similar to the Service Orchestration, but instead of 
describing the instructions for a single party perspective, the Service 
Choreography requires a description of all the interactions between all the 
parties involved in the composition in order to accomplish the goal. In this 
sense, Service Choreography can be seen also as the collection of all the 
Service Orchestrations of each involved party. 
The approach presented in this work focuses on Service Orchestration, 
so when referring to Service Composition we hint at compositions obtained 
through Service Orchestration, if not stated otherwise. 
3.4.1 Business Process Management 
Many concepts used in the Service Orchestration field are taken from 
the Business Process Management area. Business Process Management 
focuses on modelling workflows and processes within an organization. 
In this context, a Business Process is defined as the collection of 
structurally linked activities that realise a business goal. A Workflow is a 
model of the procedural steps through which documents, products or tasks 
have to pass to carry out the Business Process, where the procedural steps 
may be in some occasions automatable. In particular when the steps are 
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limited to requests to Software Services, a Workflow corresponds to a 
Service Orchestration. 
A concept from the Business Process Management field that is used in 
this work is the one proposed by van Der Aalst, W.M. et al., called 
Workflow Patterns [107]. The Workflow Patterns are a collection of design 
patterns describing the control flow dependencies between activities in a 
Workflow.  
3.5 Cloud Computing 
Cloud Computing is a recent paradigm to share resources in order to 
provide scalable services: 
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction.” [65] 
In particular, based on the offered resources, the provision can be 
distinguished in three models:  
i. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The cloud provider offers 
computing resources, including but not limited to physical and 
virtual machines, storage, firewalls and load balancers. Some 
examples include Amazon EC2, Rackspace Cloud, Google Compute 
Engine. 
ii. Platform as a Service (PaaS). The cloud provider offers a software 
platform in order to allow deployment of services without the need 
to manage the underlying infrastructure and its scalability. The 
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platform usually includes operating system, databases, servers and 
execution environments. Some examples include Google App 
Engine, Microsoft Windows Azure, Salesforce Force.com. 
iii. Software as a Service (SaaS). The cloud provider offers applications 
or (web) services on demand, running on the platform. Examples 
include Google Apps, Microsoft Office 365, Salesforce 
AppExchange, Xignite Market Data Cloud. 
Furthermore clouds can be classified in Private, Public or Hybrid 
Clouds if the infrastructure is, respectively, for the exclusive usage of a 
single organization, provisioned to the general public, or a composition of 
distinct cloud infrastructures. 
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Chapter 4 
Enabling Languages, Techniques 
and Tools 
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter we present the languages, techniques and tools that are 
used to implement this research. In particular WSDL and BPEL are 
languages commonly used in the Web Services area to define respectively 
service interfaces and business processes (i.e., orchestrations). Drools is a 
rule-based system we use to encode the patterns that underpin this thesis. 
RSDT and BPEL Designer are respectively a (proactive) service discovery 
tool and a service orchestration designer tool that we augmented with the 
security capabilities offered by our approach.  
4.2 Web Services Languages 
4.2.1 WSDL 
The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is the service 
interface description language, based on XML, which allows the definition 
of the operations and messages that can be sent to and received from a 
service, and the protocols and the addresses to contact the service. 
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The current version of the specification, 2.0, is a W3C recommendation 
[108]. As most of the tools and languages, however, currently support only 
WSDL version 1.1, we are going to describe this version instead of the 
latest one. 
As shown in Table 4.1, a WSDL document is composed of five 
elements: types, message, portType, binding and service. The 
types element allows listing the data type definitions used by the service. 
The message element allows defining the data communicated by the 
service, using the types previously declared. The portType element lists 
the operations supported by the service. The binding element allows the 
specification of the protocol and data format specification for the abstract 
service operations described in the port type part. Finally the service 
element specifies the address to contact the service, called service endpoint. 
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<definitions xmlns=... name="HelloWorld"> 
 
  <types> 
    <xsd:schema ...> 
      <xsd:element name="RequestType"> 
        <xsd:complexType><xsd:sequence> 
            <xsd:element name="in" type="xsd:string"/> 
        </xsd:sequence></xsd:complexType> 
      </xsd:element> 
      <xsd:element name="ResponseType"> 
        <xsd:complexType><xsd:sequence> 
            <xsd:element name="out" type="xsd:string"/> 
        </xsd:sequence></xsd:complexType> 
      </xsd:element> 
    </xsd:schema> 
  </types> 
 
  <message name="OperationRequest"> 
    <part element="RequestType" name="parameters"/> 
  </message> 
  <message name="OperationResponse"> 
    <part element="ResponseType" name="parameters"/> 
  </message> 
 
  <portType name="HelloWorld"> 
    <operation name="Operation"> 
      <input message="OperationRequest"/> 
      <output message="OperationResponse"/> 
    </operation> 
  </portType> 
 
  <binding name="HelloWorldSOAP" type="HelloWorld"> 
    <soap:binding style="document"  
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/> 
    <operation name="Operation"> 
      <soap:operation  
soapAction="http://www.example.org/Operation"/> 
      <input><soap:body use="literal"/></input> 
      <output><soap:body use="literal"/></output> 
    </operation> 
  </binding> 
 
  <service name="HelloWorld"> 
    <port binding="HelloWorldSOAP" name="HelloWorldSOAP"> 
      <soap:address location="http://www.example.org/"/> 
    </port> 
  </service> 
</definitions> 
Table 4.1: Example of a WSDL 
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4.2.2 BPEL 
BPEL (short for WS-BPEL, Web Services Business Process Execution 
Language) is an XML based orchestration language that allows defining 
business processes that interact with external services. The interaction with 
external services is described through partner links, i.e., connectors between 
the service ports, as specified in the WSDL, and the business process. 
The current version of BPEL, 2.0, is an OASIS standard and allows the 
specification of both abstract and executable business processes. 
BPEL activities can be discriminated in three categories: 
I. Activities that control the process flow. These include sequence, 
if‐else, while, repeatUntil, forEach, flow, pick, wait and 
exit. 
II. Activities that perform the actions of the process, i.e., web service 
invocation (invoke), assigning values to variables (assign) and 
receive and reply messages (receive and reply). 
III. Management activities, such as fault generation (throw) and 
handling (faultHandlers). 
4.3 Drools 
Drools is a production rule system that allows rule reasoning for object-
oriented languages. As in most rule engines, the production rules in Drools 
are used to derive information from data facts, usually stored in a 
Knowledge Base (KB). This reasoning process is based on the Rete 
algorithm [28], i.e., a pattern-matching algorithm for that is able to scale 
well for large numbers of data facts and rules.  
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A production rule in Drools has two parts. The first part is a set of 
conditions and the second part is a list of actions. When a rule is applied, 
the Drools rule engine checks, through pattern-matching, whether the 
conditions of the rule match on the facts in the KB and, if they do, the list of 
the actions of the rule are executed as a consequence. Table 4.2 presents the 
overall structure of Drools rules. 
The conditions of a rule are expressed as patterns on the objects that 
encode the facts in the Drools KB. The patterns can be connected through a 
set of logical operators (e.g., and, or, not, exists, forall) and when no 
operator is explicitly declared, the engine assumes and uses the “and” 
operation as a default. The syntax is pretty flexible (especially w.r.t. the 
common programming languages), as most of the punctuation, double 
quotes and newlines are optional. 
rule "name" 
    when 
        conditions 
    then 
        actions 
end 
Table 4.2: Drools rule structure 
A pattern defines an object type and a set of constraints on the data of 
the objects that can match it. When an object that matches the object type in 
a pattern and the related set of constraints is found, the pattern is evaluated 
as true. In addition, it is possible to declare a variable (usually prefixed 
with a dollar sign to make it more easily identifiable) that can be 
subsequently used to refer to the matched object (or object field in the 
conditions). This is done by prefixing the variable name (followed by a 
colon) to the pattern. 
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$redApple : Apple( color == "Red" ) 
(Bowl( contents contains $redApple ) 
or Fridge( contents contains $redApple )) 
Table 4.3: Example of Drools conditions 
The conditions in Table 4.3, for example, activate the rule for each red 
apple found in the Knowledge Base that is contained in a bowl or in a 
fridge. The example includes also the “contains” operator used in a 
constraint: this operator checks if the specified value is contained in an 
array, list or set.  
The actions in the consequence part are usually meant to modify the 
Knowledge Base by inserting, retracting or updating the objects in it. This is 
encoded through the keywords “insert”, “update” or “retract” followed with 
the object to modify in parenthesis. 
rule "Thrash expired bananas" 
    when 
        $expiredBanana : Banana( color == "Black" ) 
        $fridge : Fridge( contents contains $expiredBanana )) 
    then 
        $fridge.getContents().remove($expiredBanana); 
        update($fridge); 
        insert(new Bin($expiredBanana)); 
end 
Table 4.4: Example of a Drools rule  
The rule in Table 4.4 gives an example of a complete rule. This rule is 
activated (“fired”) against all the black bananas contained in a fridge. Each 
black banana is then removed from the fridge and put into a new bin. The 
updated fridge and the new bin are reported to the KB because these new 
facts could lead to the activation of another rule. 
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4.4 Runtime Service Discovery Tool 
The Runtime Service Discovery Tool (RSDT) is a discovery framework 
that has been developed at City University to support the discovery of 
services at runtime [115]. 
The framework supports the discovery of single services based on 
criteria regarding the interface, behaviour and quality of services, in a 
reactive or a proactive mode, i.e., when a need for finding a service at arises 
(reactive mode) or continually in order to maintain up-to-date sets of 
candidate services that could be used to replace the constituent services of 
an SBS when any of these services fails (proactive mode).  
4.4.1 Architecture 
The approach to service discovery is shown in Figure 4.1. The 
framework accepts service discovery queries from SBSs, and finds services 
in external service registries that satisfy the conditions of the queries. 
Queries can be submitted for execution in reactive (PULL) or proactive 
(PUSH) mode. 
 
Figure 4.1: Discovery Framework structure 
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The framework includes a Discovery Engine that is responsible for the 
retrieving individual service descriptions from external service registries 
and matching them with the queries. It also includes Registry Watchers 
which poll external registries periodically to check if there are new services 
or amended service descriptions that would alter the candidate sets of 
services that are maintained for queries executed in proactive mode. 
4.4.2 Discovery process 
The discovery process starts when the Discovery Engine receives a 
query that should be used for discovering replacement services for one of 
the partner services of an SBS. Queries are expressed in an XML based 
language, called SerDiQueL. The discovery engine executes the received 
query at least once (in proactive mode multiple executions may be triggered 
by changes in the services) and returns any services that match the 
discovery criteria of the query. Any services and that match with the 
discovery criteria of the query at this stage are used to update a Candidate 
Service Set. This set is used as a cache of replacement services for the 
partner service that was associated with the query in the first place and any 
subsequent service replacement request will retrieve the first service from 
this set.  
It should also be noted that the initial formation of the Candidate 
Service Set is followed by ordering the elements of this set in descending 
order of the degree of match that they have with these criteria.  
Certain parts of the overall discovery process can be also triggered by 
events other than a request for the execution of a query. These events are:  
• service replacement requests resulting in removal of the first service 
in the Candidate Service Set in order to use it in the SBS;  
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• publications of new security descriptions for one of the services in 
the candidate service set that should trigger the re-evaluation of the 
security related criteria for a candidate set that has been built for a 
query executed in proactive mode and possibly a re-ordering of this 
set; and 
• changes in the descriptions of services in the service registries or the 
publication of new services in them that can lead to the execution of 
queries executed in the proactive mode. 
4.4.3 Query Language 
The queries of the discovery framework are expressed in SerDiQueL 
[101], an XML-based language that allows the specification of interface, 
behavioural, and QoS conditions about the services to be discovered.  
 
Figure 4.2: Overview of the schema of SerDiQueL 
The top-level schema of SerDiQueL is shown in Figure 4.2. Each query 
has a name, a query ID, a set of parameters and a set of conditions. In 
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particular the parameter mode allow to specify if the query has to be 
executed in the reactive (PULL) or in the proactive (PUSH) mode.  
The StructuralQuery part of the query contains the structural 
description of the service being discovered, i.e., the WSDL specification. 
<BehaviourQuery> 
  <Requires> 
    <MemberDescription ID="login" synchronous="true"  
opName="BankTransferService.login" /> 
    <MemberDescription ID="credit" synchronous="true"  
opName="BankTransferService.credit" /> 
    <MemberDescription ID="transferAmount" synchronous="true"  
opName="BankTransferService.transferAmount" /> 
    <MemberDescription ID="debit" synchronous="true"  
opName="BankTransferService.debit" /> 
    <MemberDescription ID="balance" synchronous="true"  
opName="BankTransferService.getBalance" /> 
    <MemberDescription ID="logout" synchronous="true"  
opName="BankTransferService.logout" /> 
  </Requires> 
  <Expression> 
    <Condition> 
      <GuaranteedMember IDREF="login" /> 
    </Condition> 
  </Expression> 
  <LogicalOperator operator="AND" /> 
  <Expression> 
    <Condition> 
      <Sequence ID="pay"> 
        <Member IDREF="credit" /> 
        <Member IDREF="transferAmount" /> 
        <Member IDREF="debit" /> 
        <Member IDREF="balance" /> 
      </Sequence> 
    </Condition> 
    <Condition> 
      <OccursBefore immediate="false" guaranteed="false"> 
        <Member1 IDREF="login" /> 
        <Member2 IDREF="pay" /> 
      </OccursBefore> 
    </Condition> 
  </Expression> 
</BehaviourQuery> 
Table 4.5: Example of behavioural conditions of a SerDiQueL query 
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The BehaviourQuery part, instead, contains the behaviour of the 
client, in terms of operation calls and their ordering, as expected by the 
service. An example of a BehaviourQuery is shown in Table 4.5. The 
query in the example requires the existence of a set of operations (i.e., 
login, credit, transferAmount, debit, getBalance, logout). 
Furthermore every trace of interaction with this service must include a 
login (the GuaranteedMember condition). The last condition in the 
example specifies that a payment, composed as a sequence of credit, 
transferAmount, debit and balance, must be always preceded by a 
login. 
The ConstraintQuery part allows to specify a set of constraint on 
any kind of service description (or facet). Table 4.6 shows an example of 
ConstraintQuery on a quality of service facet (QoS). The first constraint 
is required to match (HARD constraint) and checks if the organisation name 
is CITY. The second constraint, instead, doesn’t have necessarily to match, 
as it is used for ordering the resulting set of services (SOFT constraint). 
This constraint is composed by two conditions joined by the AND operator, 
checking that the service is available from 00:00 till 24:00. 
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<ConstraintQuery name="C1" type="HARD"> 
  <LogicalExpression><Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
      <Operand1> 
        <NonContextOperand facetName="QoS" facetType="QoS"> 
          //QoSCharacteristic[Name="Organisation"]/Constant 
        </NonContextOperand> 
      </Operand1> 
      <Operand2><Constant type="STRING">CITY</Constant></Operand2> 
  </Condition></LogicalExpression> 
</ConstraintQuery> 
 
<ConstraintQuery name="C2" type="SOFT"> 
  <LogicalExpression> 
    <Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
      <Operand1> 
        <NonContextOperand facetName="QoS" facetType="QoS"> 
          //QoSCharacteristic[Name="Availability"]/Metrics 
/Metric[Name="OpenTime"][Unit="Hours"]/MinValue 
        </NonContextOperand> 
      </Operand1> 
      <Operand2><Constant type="STRING">00:00</Constant></Operand2> 
    </Condition> 
 
    <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
 
    <LogicalExpression> 
      <Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
        <Operand1> 
          <NonContextOperand facetName="QoS" facetType="QoS"> 
            //QoSCharacteristic[Name="Availability"]/Metrics 
/Metric[Name="OpenTime"][Unit="Hours"]/MaxValue 
        </NonContextOperand> 
        </Operand1> 
        <Operand2><Constant type="STRING">24:00</Constant></Operand2> 
      </Condition> 
    </LogicalExpression> 
  </LogicalExpression> 
</ConstraintQuery> 
Table 4.6: Example of constraint conditions of a SerDiQueL query 
4.5 Eclipse BPEL Designer 
BPEL Designer is a plugin for the Eclipse IDE that offers a visual 
representation for reading and editing WS-BPEL 2.0 processes, allowing the 
specification of SBS based on BPEL. The editor provides graphical 
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representation of BPEL constructs and processes using shapes, icons, forms 
and wizards to guide the user. 
 
Figure 4.3: Screenshot of the BPEL Designer 
Figure 4.3 shows a screenshot of the user interface of BPEL Designer. 
As shown in the figure, the user interface is divided in several parts, called 
Views. Starting from the top right we have the Project Explorer View, the 
Editor View (that contains two subparts, the Palette and the Tray) and the 
Properties View.  
The Project Explorer lists the file resources part of a project, allowing 
opening, renaming, moving or deleting any resource.  
Properties View 
Editor View Palette Tray Project Explorer 
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Once a BPEL file is opened, the Editor View presents in the main part 
the graphical workflow representation of the BPEL process, allowing 
editing it. A Source tab on the bottom left of the view allows checking and 
editing the process code directly. The Palette contains the building blocks, 
i.e., BPEL activities that can be dragged and dropped in the main editing 
area in order to be added to the process. The Tray summarizes the BPEL 
process, listing all the elements part of the process, including the ones that 
do not have a graphical representation, allowing managing the entire 
process. 
The Properties View provides detailed information of the selected 
element of the BPEL process, allowing editing them. For example, the 
Properties View of an invoke activity allows to select the partner link, port 
type, operation and variables of the operation of a partner service that 
should be invoked.  
The BPEL Designer has been also integrated with Apache ODE in 
order to allow seamless deployment and execution of the produced BPEL 
processes in a BPEL execution engine. 
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Chapter 5 
Secure Composition Patterns 
5.1 Overview 
The secure composition patterns are the part of the framework that is 
able to infer the needed security requirements. These are inferred for the 
parts of a composition and partner services involved in them. Inferences are 
driven by the security requirements on the whole composition. In other 
words, the inference process attempts to identify security requirements for 
the individual partner services which would be sufficient to guarantee the 
security requirements for the entire composition. 
The secure composition patterns summarize some general security 
inferences on activity placeholders. Activity placeholders are instantiated by 
either other patterns or operations of individual partner services (when a 
pattern is instantiated to generate a executable service workflow). 
More specifically a secure composition pattern contains three parts: (i) 
the orchestration pattern between activity placeholders representing the 
workflow on which the inferences apply (WF in the following), (ii) the 
security requirement requested for the composition (RSP) and (iii) the 
security requirements needed from the activity placeholders of the 
orchestration pattern to guarantee the security requirements for the whole 
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composition (ASP). Patterns may have a fourth optional part that expresses 
additional (boolean) conditions that need to hold in order for RSP to hold 
(Conditions), as in the case of the availabilty patterns in Section 5.3.4. 
In order to avoid confusion between the orchestration pattern and the 
secure composition pattern concepts, in the context of this work we use the 
term pattern to indicate a secure composition pattern, and the term 
orchestration to indicate an orchestration pattern.  
5.2 Orchestration Patterns 
An orchestration pattern is a template specifying a service 
orchestration workflow with activity placeholders that can be bound to 
concrete service operations or to other orchestration patterns. These 
templates are based on the basic workflow patterns introduced by van Der 
Aalst, W.M. et al. [107] representing the control flow of orchestrations. The 
orchestration patterns augment the workflow patterns of [107] with a 
description of the data flow connecting the activities.  
The same authors, in [90], have also defined the workflow data 
patterns, however these other patterns are not directly related with the 
control flow ones and are used to recognise the different mechanisms 
implemented by different workflows vendor to treat variables. In our 
approach we are only interested in which activities receive or send which 
data. The additional level of detail offered by the workflow data patterns 
(e.g., if the variables are sent/received in a pull or a push mode, if shared 
memory is used, …) was not required by the scope of the approach we are 
presenting, but it may be an interesting direction for future works as it may 
be helpful in order to explore and represent further security properties w.r.t. 
the ones in this thesis. 
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Our work focuses on a minimal set of workflow patterns that can be 
used to recursively build elaborate workflows. The concepts introduced by 
our approach, however, could be used on arbitrary workflow patterns (e.g. 
loops, handlers). Our initial set of workflow patterns include: 
• the sequential pattern, which represents the execution of one activity 
after another one is completed. This can represent a set of BPEL 
invoke activities or further workflow patterns (i.e., BPEL non-
atomic activities) connected by a BPEL sequence activity; 
• the choice pattern, which represents the execution of one activity 
from a set of alternative activities based on some input value. This 
can represent a set of BPEL invoke activities or further workflow 
patterns (i.e., BPEL non-atomic activities) connected by a BPEL 
pick or if‐then‐else activity; 
• the parallel pattern (or split-join), which represents the simultaneous 
execution of two or more activities. This can represent a set of BPEL 
invoke activities or further workflow patterns (i.e., BPEL non-
atomic activities) connected by a BPEL flow activity. 
The remaining BPEL atomic activities (i.e., assign,  receive  and 
reply activities) are used in our approach to encode the data flow. 
As stated above, this set of workflow patterns can be used to 
recursively build elaborate workflows. 
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Figure 5.1: Example of workflow pattern recursion 
An example of the recursion of workflow patterns is shown in Figure 
5.1. Each workflow pattern contains a set of activity placeholders that can 
be either another pattern or an atomic activity. In the workflow shown in 
Figure 5.1(a), the sequential workflow pattern between C and D is 
highlighted. This pattern can be seen as a single activity instantiating the 
placeholder A in the parallel pattern between B and A shown in Figure 
5.1(b). Likewise, the parallel pattern can be seen as a single activity 
instantiating the only activity in the workflow in Figure 5.1(c). This 
decomposition allows the secure composition patterns, which are based on 
the workflow patterns, to be used on arbitrary workflows. 
The orchestration patterns used in this thesis are enriched versions of 
the basic workflow patterns described above. The orchestration patterns are 
enriched as they also describe the data flows between the activity 
placeholders that appear in a workflow pattern (this corresponds to the 
result of BPEL assign, receive and reply activities). 
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Figure 5.2: Example of a sequential orchestration pattern 
An example of an orchestration pattern is provided in Figure 5.2, based 
on the sequential workflow pattern. The orchestration pattern shown in the 
figure represents an elementary control flow between two activity 
placeholders, i.e., A and B, that must be executed one after the other in the 
specific order shown in the figure (the order of execution of A and B is 
represented as a solid arrow in the figure). The data flow in this 
orchestration pattern is: 
• An input message IN
A
 is passed to A that is part of the input 
message passed to the workflow IN. In particular the two parts in 
IN
A
, in
A
1 and in
A
2, are taken from the first two parts of IN, in1 and 
in2. 
• An input message IN
B
 is passed to B. IN
B
 comes partly from the 
input of the workflow IN and partly from the output of the first 
activity OUT
A
. In particular the first part of IN
B
, in
B
1, is taken from 
the second part of OUT
A
, out
A
2, and the second part of IN
B
, in
B
2, is 
taken from the third part of IN, in3. 
• The final output OUT is taken directly from the output of B, OUT
B
.  
 
<A> IN
A
 = <in
A
1, in
A
2> 
OUT
A
 = <out
A
1, out
A
2> 
IN = <in1, in2, in3> 
in
A
1 := in1 
in
A
2 := in2 
in
B
2 := in3 
in
B
1 := out
A
2 
<B> IN
B
 = <in
B
1, in
B
2> 
OUT
B
 = <out
B
> 
OUT = <out> 
out := out
B
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Note that the data flow in the picture is just one of the possible data 
flows for this workflow; other ones can be obtained by changing the 
assignments. To represent an alternative data flow, a variant of the 
sequential orchestration pattern with the same control flow but different 
data flow is required, as shown in Figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3: The Cascade orchestration pattern 
More specifically Figure 5.3 shows a variant of the sequential 
orchestration pattern called Cascade. The Cascade orchestration pattern 
requires for all the inputs to the workflow (IN) to be consumed by the first 
activity (IN
A
), for all the outputs of the first activity (OUT
A
) to be 
consumed by the second activity (IN
B
), and finally for all the outputs of the 
second activity (OUT
B
), to be returned as output of the workflow (OUT). 
The example in Figure 5.4, instead, is based on the parallel workflow 
pattern. This orchestration pattern specifies the simultaneous execution of 
just two activities, A and B, and where the data flow is set. In more detail, 
the data flow in the figure orchestration pattern states that:  
• An input message IN
A
 is passed to A that is part of the input 
message passed to the workflow IN. In particular in
A
 is taken from 
the first part of IN, in1. 
  <A> "
INA = IN"
OUTA"
IN"
<B>"IN
B = OUTA"
OUTB"
OUT = OUTB"
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• An input message IN
B
 is passed to B that is part of the input 
message passed to the workflow IN. In particular the two parts in 
IN
B
, in
B
1 and in
B
2, are taken from the second and third parts of IN, 
in2 and in3. 
• The final output OUT comes partly from the output message of A, 
OUT
A
, and partly from the output message of B, OUT
B
. In 
particular the first part of OUT, out1, is taken from the second part 
of OUT
A
, out
A
2, and the second part of OUT, out2, is taken from the 
only part of OUT, out
B
. 
 
Figure 5.4: Example of a parallel orchestration pattern 
5.3 Secure Composition Patterns 
The orchestration patterns are used to describe cases on which exists 
some inference between security requirements at the composition and the 
security requirements for the individual activity of the orchestration. These 
inferences should be proved or verified through formal methods, to be able 
to respect the security requirement definition.  
As an example, take a composition where a payment is handled by two 
different services based on if the payment card is a debit or a credit card. A 
 
<A> 
IN
A
 = <in
A
> OUT
A
 = <out
A
1, out
A
2> 
IN = <in1, in2, in3> 
in
B
1 := in2 
in
B
2 := in3 
in
A
 := in1 
 +
 
out1 := out
A
2 
OUT = <out1, out2> 
 +
 
out2 := out
B
 
IN
B
 = <in
B
1, in
B
2> OUT
B
 = <out
B
> 
<B> 
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security requirement for such composition is to treat the information about 
the payment card (i.e., card number, expire date) with confidentiality. As 
this information is used by both branches of the choice orchestration 
between the two services, then two security requirements are generated, one 
for each service, asking to treat the data that they receive with 
confidentiality. Bear in mind that if a service in the workflow would not use 
such data (as for example a third branch to pay with PayPal), it should not 
be asked to respect security requirements w.r.t. data it does not use. 
5.3.1 Representation of a Secure Composition 
Pattern 
As mentioned in the overview, each secure composition pattern 
contains three parts: (i) the orchestration pattern representing the workflow 
on which the inferences apply, called WF, (ii) the security requirement 
requested for the composition, called RSP, and (iii) the security 
requirements needed from the activity placeholders of the orchestration 
pattern to guarantee RSP, called ASP. Patterns may have a fourth optional 
part that expresses additional (boolean) conditions that need to hold in order 
for RSP to hold (Conditions) and that can be verified only after a workflow 
has been fully instantiated with services. 
Figure 5.5 shows an example of the graphical notation we use to 
describe a secure composition pattern. In the WF part of the table, the 
orchestration pattern P is shown, describing both the control and the data 
flow of the pattern between activity placeholders. ASP contains the security 
requirements that need to hold on each placeholder (SecReq
X
) in order for 
the security requirement on P, described in the RSP part of the table, to 
hold. 
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WF <P> 
 
ASP 
SecReq
A
 = ρ(A, inA) 
SecReq
B
 = σ(B, inB1) 
RSP 
SecReq
P
 = ρ(P, inP1) 
Figure 5.5: Example of a secure composition pattern 
The example in Figure 5.5 shows a secure composition pattern where ρ 
and σ are security properties that hold on their first parameter. This pattern 
is about preserving property ρ in one of the variants of the sequential 
orchestration, as stated in the security requirement SecReq
P
. In more detail, 
when property ρ is required on an input of the pattern inP1, and this input is 
used only as input of the first activity placeholder of the orchestration (in
A
), 
the security requirements needed to guarantee SecReq
P
 are ρ on inA for A 
(SecReq
A
) and σ on inB1 for B (SecReq
B
). This second requirement could be 
necessary, for example, because information about in
A
 (and so about in
P
1) is 
part of A’s output (i.e., out
A
1=in
B
1). 
Generally speaking, we want for RSP to hold if all the conditions in 
ASP hold, meaning that we need a proof for the proposition: 
ASP.SecReqA and ASP.SecReqB and … ⇒  RSP.SecReqP 
 
<A> 
IN
A
 = <in
A
> 
OUT
A
 = <out
A
1, …> 
IN
P
 = <in
P
1, …> 
in
A
 := in
P
1 … (¬in
P
1) 
in
B
1 := out
A
1 
<B> IN
B
 = <in
B
1, …> 
OUT
B
 = <out
B
, …> 
OUT
P
 = <out
P
> 
out
P
 := out
B
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So, in the case of Figure 5.5, we would need a proof for: 
ρ(A, inA) and σ(B, inB1) ⇒  ρ(P, in
P
1) 
When a secure composition pattern is used to infer the security 
requirements for the pattern’s placeholders, however, the logical implication 
is used in the “opposite” direction, i.e, we identify the security requirements 
for the individual pattern’s placeholders using the following rule: 
RSP.SecReqP ⇒  ASP.SecReqA and ASP.SecReqB and …  
The rational for reversed ordering of the logical implication expressed 
in the formula above is that if ASP.SecReqA and ASP.SecReqB and … hold 
then RSP.SecReqP will also hold, and therefore, the security aware service 
composition process has to check the requirements ASP.SecReqA and 
ASP.SecReqB and … are respected, as this would guarantee that their 
composition would satisfy RSP.SecReqP. In other words, the security aware 
service composition process is driven by the verification of the sufficient 
conditions for a composition level security property to hold rather than the 
necessary conditions.  
5.3.2 Integrity  
The secure composition pattern described in this section is about 
preserving integrity on the Cascade orchestration pattern. In the scope of 
this research, we adopt the following data integrity definition, taken from 
RFC4949 [44]: 
“The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an 
unauthorized or accidental manner.” 
More specifically, the formal definition of integrity we used in the 
context of this work takes advantage of the precede property: 
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Definition 1: Given a set of traces of actions T, where each action can 
appear only once in each trace, the precede property between action � and 
action � (�������(�, �)) holds if and only if ∀ traces � ∈ T with � ∈ �, 
� = … ,�,… , �,…  holds. 
The traces used in Definition 1 are, in our case, traces of a single 
interaction between a client and a service, where each communication is 
split in send and receive actions. 
Definition 2: Given a service S, with input x and output y, the precede 
integrity property Integritypr(S, x, y) holds if and only if ∀ trace of 
communication between S and a client C, precede(send(C, S, x), receive(C, 
S, y)) holds. 
In other words, precede integrity holds if whenever a client receives y 
(i.e., f(x)) from service S, then the client has previously sent x to S.  
5.3.2.1 Precede Integrity on Cascade Pattern 
As shown in Figure 5.6, when the security requirement over the process 
portion encoded by the orchestration pattern P, called SecReq
P
, requests to 
preserve the integrity of the orchestration’s input and output data (IN
P
 and 
OUT
P
) through Precede Integrity, given that the orchestration pattern is the 
Cascade orchestration, i.e.: 
(i) the set of inputs of the first activity placeholder IN
A
 is equal to 
the set of inputs of the pattern IN
P
 
(ii) the set of inputs of the second activity placeholder IN
B
 is equal 
to the set of outputs of the first activity placeholder OUT
A
, and 
(iii) the set of outputs of the pattern OUT
P
 is equal to the set of 
outputs of the second activity placeholder OUT
B
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Then the security requirements needed to guarantee SecReq
P
 are: (a) 
Precede Integrity on A inputs and outputs (SecReq
A
) and (b) Precede 
Integrity on B inputs and outputs (SecReq
B
). 
WF <P> 
 
ASP 
SecReq
A
 = Integritypr(A, IN
A
, OUT
A
)  
SecReq
B
 = Integritypr(B, IN
B
, OUT
B
)
 
RSP 
SecReq
P
 = Integritypr(P, IN
P
, OUT
P
) 
Figure 5.6: Precede Integrity on Cascade Pattern 
5.3.2.2 Orchestrator Requirements 
In order to maintain data integrity, it is necessary to ensure that all the 
actors that handle the data do not tamper with the data. 
The proof of the relation expressed by the pattern in this case (and in 
fact in all other cases) requires the introduction of one more concept, 
namely the concept of an orchestrator. An orchestrator in this context 
expresses the actual environment (e.g., middleware) that will execute the 
workflow expressed by a secure composition pattern, invoking individual 
services, passing data across them (i.e., receiving the outputs of one service 
S
1
 that are to be received as inputs by another service S
2
 and passing them 
  <A> "
INA = INP"
OUTA"
INP"
<B>"IN
B = OUTA"
OUTB"
OUTP = OUTB"
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to S
2
), and handling interactions with the external actors interacting with the 
workflow (i.e., receiving data from these actors and passing them to the 
service they were intended for, and receiving data from workflow services 
and passing them to the external actors they were intended for). 
Given the presence of an orchestrator, the proof for the integrity pattern 
makes it also necessary to make a key assumption about the new 
component. This assumption is that the orchestrator itself is trustworthy, 
i.e., it does not tamper with the data that go through it. An orchestrator O 
will be defined to be trustworthy with respect to the Precede Integrity on 
Cascade Pattern if the following properties hold: 
i. O sends to service A exactly the same data that it has received from 
a client for P,  
ii. O sends to service B exactly the same data service A sent to it and  
iii. O sends to the client exactly the same data it received from B for the 
client. 
5.3.2.3 Proof 
The security requirements about activity placeholder A and activity 
placeholder B (i.e., the hypothesis) can be translated into: 
Integrity(A, IN
A
, OUT
A
) = precede(send(C
A
, A, IN
A
), receive(C
A
, A, OUT
A
)) 
Integrity(B, IN
B
, OUT
B
) = precede(send(C
B
, B, IN
B
), receive(C
B
, B, OUT
B
)) 
A and B, within the pattern, have as a client the orchestrator that 
execute the workflow. This means that C
A
= Orch and C
B
= Orch, so we 
have: 
precede(send(Orch, A, IN
A
), receive(Orch, A, OUT
A
))   (P1) 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
98 / 253 
precede(send(Orch, B, IN
B
), receive(Orch, B, OUT
B
)) (P2) 
In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the orchestrator is 
required to treat the data that it passes between endpoints with integrity, i.e., 
it must satisfy the following properties:  
precede(send(C, Orch, Data), send(Orch, A, Data)) (P3) 
precede(receive(Orch, A, Data), send(Orch, B, Data)) (P4) 
precede(receive(Orch, B, Data), receive (C, Orch, Data)) (P5) 
More specifically, (P3) corresponds to point i., (P4) to point ii. and (P5) 
to point iii. of the previous section. 
Following Definition 1, it is possible to prove that precede is a 
transitive property, i.e.: ������� �, � ∧ ������� �, � ⟹ ������� �, � . In 
fact, from ������� �, �  we know that ∀� ∈ T with � ∈ �, but also that 
� ∈ � as � = … , �,… , �,… . Then, due to ������� �, �  we know that 
� = … ,�,… , �,… , so we can conclude that � = … ,�,… , �,… , �,… . 
Thanks to the transitivity of precede, from (P3), (P1), (P4), (P2), (P5) 
we know that the following property holds: 
precede(send(C, Orch, IN
P
), receive(C, Orch, OUT
P
)) 
Since the orchestrator is just the executor of the pattern, this property 
corresponds to: 
precede(send(C
P
, P, IN
P
), receive(C
P
, P, OUT
P
)) = Integrity(P, IN
P
, OUT
P
)  
that is the security property required to hold for the orchestration pattern. 
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5.3.3 Confidentiality 
One of the main topics studied in the information flow field is 
confidentiality as shown for example in the survey in [91].  
In information flow, data activities are classified in low- and high-level. 
A data activity is regarded as low-level if the information about it is public. 
A data activity is regarded as a high-level if the information about it is 
secret. 
Similarly, users are classified in low-level security users and high-level 
security users. Low-level security users are users who are able to access 
only public information, whilst high-level security users are users who can 
access both public and secret information. In information flow approaches 
there are several property definitions whose intent is to express the concept 
of confidentiality. The main difference between them is about what the low-
level users are forbidden to know or discover about the high-level data 
activity (e.g. no information, just that an input activity happened or exactly 
which inputs were passed). In the following, we provide some of these 
definitions that we use in our secure information flow patterns. 
Separability [63]: Separability is a form of confidentiality that requires 
complete independence between the high- and low-level sequences of 
activities. To achieve this it is necessary that all the high-level data activity 
can be interleaved in any position of the trace of the low-level activities, 
and that all values for the high-level data activity must be possible for any 
low-level trace. This means that there is absolutely no interaction between 
high-level and low-level data activities, i.e., the high-level and low-level 
data activities should be processed by separate system processes during the 
operation of a system without any communication whatsoever between 
them. 
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In most of the cases, separability is a too strong definition for 
confidentiality, as it does not allow high-level data outputs to depend on any 
low-level activity.  
As an example, take a system where the low-level user activity (both 
inputs and outputs) is logged and sent as high-level output to the 
administrator (high-level user). This system is obviously secure, but do not 
respect the separability property. 
To address this, other forms of confidentiality have been defined in 
literature. 
Non-inference [71]: Non-inference (note that is different from non-
interference) is a property stating that removing all high-level data activity 
from any trace results in another valid trace. This means that a low-level 
user, who is able to see just low-level data activity, cannot deduce the 
occurrence of any high-level data activity by just observing a trace. 
This definition considers the previous example as secure, as traces with 
or without administrator checking the logs are valid. Non-inference, 
however, is too weak as argued in [63], as in this definition there is no 
check that high-level data inputs to a process are not revealed through low-
level data outputs of it; in the absence of such checks there may be a leak of 
high-level security data. 
As an example, take into consideration a system that may receive a 
confidential credit card number CH as input, and that whenever the low-
level user requests it, it receives from the system a string SL that is either 
the credit card number CH or a random string. This system does respect non-
inference, as removing occurrences of CH from a trace leads to a behaviour 
that is still possible, however the system cannot be said to be secure, as the 
low-level user can infer when the high-level input have occurred.  
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Perfect Security Property (PSP): According to [114], a system has 
“perfect security” if for any low-level trace observed the following two 
conditions hold: (i) all interleaving of high-level input in a trace are valid 
traces and (ii) high-level outputs can be inserted anywhere in a trace (if 
possible) and might depend on low-level activity, leading to valid traces. 
PSP is a weaker version of separability as, due to condition (ii), it 
allows the high-level outputs to depend on low-level events. It is, however, 
stronger than non-inference as, due to condition (i), high-level inputs cannot 
be used to compose low-level outputs (as all the high-level input 
interleaving must be possible with the same low-level outputs). 
From the above definitions, in fact, it is possible to prove the 
following, as described in [59]: 
Separability ⇒ PSP ⇒ Non-inference  (R1) 
Furthermore, PSP can be proven to be the weakest property where the 
low-level user cannot determine anything about high-level activity. The 
interested reader might refer to [59] for proofs and comparisons with other 
properties. 
In the following, we present secure composition pattern that can 
guarantee PSP in a service workflow. The patterns cover sequential and 
parallel orchestration. 
5.3.3.1 Notation 
In the following, let P be the composition of two activities, A and B; 
IN
X
 and OUT
X
 be the sets of inputs and outputs for an activity placeholder 
X, with X ∈ { A, B, P }; E
X
 = I
X
 ∪ OX; and VX and CX be two subsets of EX 
that partition it into its public/visible (i.e., low-level) V
X
 and confidential 
(i.e., high-level) C
X
 parts. 
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5.3.3.2 PSP on Cascade Pattern 
As shown in Figure 5.7, when the security requirement SecReq
P
 over 
the process portion encoded by a Cascade orchestration P (see Section 5.2 
and 5.3.2.1 for a description of the Cascade orchestration) requests PSP 
confidentiality for a portion of input/output parameters C
P
, then the security 
requirements SecReq
X
 needed to guarantee SecReq
P
, for X ∈ { A, B }, are 
that PSP holds with: (a) the public actions of X are part of the public actions 
of P (i.e., V
X
 ⊆ VP), and (b) the confidential actions of X do not include any 
public action of P (i.e., C
A
 ∩ VP = ∅). These conditions ensure that the low-
level user cannot see any difference between the public trace of P and the 
public trace of the single service P is representing. 
WF <P> 
 
ASP 
SecReq
A
 = PSP(A, V
A
, C
A
) with  
V
A
 ⊆ VP and CA ∩ VP = ∅ 
SecReq
B
 = PSP(B, V
B
, C
B
) with  
V
B
 ⊆ VP and CB ∩ VP = ∅ 
RSP 
SecReq
P
 = PSP(P, V
P
, C
P
)  
Figure 5.7: PSP on Cascade Pattern 
  <A> "
INA = INP"
OUTA"
INP"
<B>"IN
B = OUTA"
OUTB"
OUTP = OUTB"
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5.3.3.3 PSP on Product Pattern 
Similarly, as shown in Figure 5.8, when the security requirement over 
the process portion encoded by the orchestration pattern P, called SecReq
P
, 
requests to preserve the confidentiality of a portion of the pattern’s input 
and output data C
P
 through PSP, given that the orchestration pattern is the 
Product orchestration, i.e.: 
(i) a parallel orchestration where the activity corresponding to 
placeholder A and the one corresponding to placeholder B are 
executed simultaneously, 
(ii) the sets of inputs of the two activity placeholders, IN
A
 and IN
B
, 
are a partition of the set of inputs of the pattern IN (i.e., IN
A
 
⊆ IN
P
, IN
B
 ⊆ IN
P
, and IN
A
 ∩ IN
B
 = ∅), and 
(iii) the sets of outputs of the two activity placeholders, OUT
A
 and 
OUT
B
, are a partition of the set of outputs of the pattern OUT 
(i.e., OUT
A
 ⊆ OUT
P
, OUT
B
 ⊆ OUT
P
, and OUT
A
 ∩ OUT
B
 = ∅). 
Then the security requirements SecReq
X
 needed to guarantee SecReq
P
, 
for X ∈ { A, B }, are that PSP holds with: (a) the public actions of X are 
part of the public actions of P (i.e., V
X
 ⊆ VP), and (b) the confidential 
actions of X do not include any public action of P (i.e., C
A
 ∩ VP = ∅). 
These conditions ensure that the low-level user cannot see any difference 
between the public trace of P and the public trace of the single service P is 
representing. 
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WF <P> 
 
ASP 
SecReq
A
 = PSP(A, V
A
, C
A
) with  
V
A
 ⊆ VP and CA ∩ VP = ∅ 
SecReq
B
 = PSP(B, V
B
, C
B
) with  
V
B
 ⊆ VP and CB ∩ VP = ∅ 
RSP 
SecReq
P
 = PSP(P, V
P
, C
P
)  
Figure 5.8: PSP on Product Pattern 
5.3.3.4 Orchestrator Requirements 
As for the Integrity, the orchestrator must be trustworthy in order for 
the security requirements to be preserved. In particular, for the given 
patterns of PSP, an assumption made in proving the pattern is that the 
orchestrator should not change the level of the data activities. This means 
that it should only pass the data without any modification (e.g., encrypting 
or decrypting the data), or passing the data to any entity other than the ones 
present in the pattern. 
 
<A> 
<B> 
IN
P
 
 +
 
IN
A
 
IN
B
 
IN
A
 ⊆ INP 
IN
B
 ⊆ INP 
IN
A
 ∩ INB = ∅ 
OUT
P
  
 +
 
OUT
A
 
OUT
B
 
OUT
A
 ⊆ OUTP 
OUT
B
 ⊆ OUTP 
OUT
A
 ∩ OUTB = ∅ 
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5.3.3.5 Proofs 
The proofs for the patterns for PSP are based on the composition results 
in [59]. We report here the relevant conclusions (page 7, under First Class 
of Compositionality Results): 
“Three main approaches to satisfy the first condition of Lemma 1 […] 
Following the second approach (security property ensures N1=∅=N2), we 
obtain that noninference (…), separability (…), and the perfect security 
property (…) are preserved under arbitrary compositions” 
More specifically, the compositions took into consideration in the cited 
work coincide with the Product Pattern and the Cascade Pattern. 
Furthermore non-inference and separability support the same kind of result, 
meaning that security composition patterns similar to the ones presented can 
be created also for these properties. 
In order for Lemma 1 to hold, however, there are a set of assumptions, 
i.e., that (1) �! ∩ �! =  �! and (2) �! ∩ �! ⊆ �!, with � ∈ {�,�}.  
In order for (1) to hold, we require the two conditions in SecReq
X
, that 
are: (i) the public actions of X are part of the public actions of P (�! ⊆ �!), 
and (ii) the confidential actions of X do not include any public action of P 
(�! ∩ �! = ∅). In fact, (i) is true if and only if �! ∩ �! = �!. Then, by (ii) 
we have �! ∩ �! ∪ �! ∩ �! = �!. By the distributive law �! ∩
�
!
∪ �
!
= �
!. Since �! ∪ �! =  �!, then we can conclude that (1) 
�
!
∩ �
!
=  �
! holds.  
Regarding (2) instead, only the condition (i) for SecReq
X
, �! ⊆ �!, is 
required. In fact, from the fact that �! and �! partition �!, we know that 
�
!
∩ �
!
= ∅. So by (i) we can say that �! ∩ �! = ∅. Furthermore, we 
know that �! ∩ �! ⊆  �! holds, as it is a basic property of the subset 
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definition. Obviously ∅ ∪  �! ∩ �!  ⊆  �! still holds, so we can substitute 
the empty set with the one we created earlier, obtaining �! ∩ �! ∪
 �
!
∩ �
!
 ⊆  �
!. By the distributive law we obtain �! ∩ �! ∪ �!  ⊆
 �
! that, since �! ∪ �! =  �!, then we can conclude that (2) �! ∩ �! ⊆
�
! holds. 
So, if these conditions are met, then as proven in [59], separability, PSP 
and non-inference are preserved under both parallel and sequential 
composition of activities. 
Note also that, as a consequence of the relation (R1), the secure 
composition patterns for the PSP are valid also in cases where: 
• SecReq
P
 = Non-inference(P, V
P
, C
P
) as PSP ⇒ Non-inference 
• For X = A or B, SecReq
X
 = Separability(X, V
X
, C
X
) with V
X
 ⊆ 
V
P
 and C
X
 ∩ VP = ∅, as Separability ⇒ PSP. 
5.3.4 Availability  
The next secure composition pattern is a pattern for availability. In the 
scope of this research, we adopt the following availability definition, taken 
from RFC4949 [44]: 
“The property of a system or a system resource being accessible, or 
usable or operational upon demand, by an authorized system entity, 
according to performance specifications for the system; i.e., a system is 
available if it provides services according to the system design whenever 
users request them.” 
Availability conveys into the security area several concepts about 
quality of service (QoS), where the “performance specifications” are service 
level agreements (SLAs) that have been certified by an external authority. 
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Properties under the category of availability are different from the ones 
presented so far, as they involve the computation of one or more measure 
for the given service (e.g., execution time, throughput, uptime probability) 
and a constraint (boundary) for the values of these measures. 
In the following, we give a set of secure composition patterns for 
availability using as a basis the measure of execution time. However, 
patterns for other measures of availability could in principle be defined in a 
similar way. 
5.3.4.1 Maximum Execution Time on Generic Sequential 
Pattern 
Figure 5.9 shows the Maximum Execution Time on Sequential 
Workflow Pattern, where the security requirement SecReq
P
 over the 
Generic Sequential orchestration P (i.e., an orchestration based on the 
sequential workflow pattern, but where no data flow specification is given) 
requests that the maximum execution time is less than a given number xP. In 
this case the security requirements needed to guarantee SecReq
P
 are that the 
maximum execution times for the first activity placeholder A and the 
second activity placeholder B are xA and xB, and that the sum of xA and xB is 
equal or less than xP. 
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WF <P> 
 
ASP 
SecReq
A
 = Avail(A, maxTime = xA)  
SecReq
B
 = Avail(B, maxTime = xB)  
RSP 
SecReq
P
 = Avail(P, maxTime = xP) 
Condition 
xP ≥ xA + xB 
 
Figure 5.9: Maximum Execution Time on Generic Sequential Pattern 
5.3.4.2 Maximum Execution Time on Generic Choice 
Pattern 
Figure 5.10 shows the Maximum Execution Time on Choice Workflow 
Pattern, where the security requirement SecReq
P
 over the Generic Choice 
orchestration P (i.e., an orchestration based on the choice workflow pattern, 
but where no data flow specification is given) requests that the maximum 
execution time is less than a given number xP. In this case the security 
requirements needed to guarantee SecReq
P
 are that the maximum execution 
times for activity placeholders A, B are xA, xB and that the maximum value 
between xA, xB is equal or less than xP. 
  
<A> " <B>"
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WF <P> 
 
ASP 
SecReq
A
 = Avail(A, maxTime = xA)  
SecReq
B
 = Avail(B, maxTime = xB)  
RSP 
SecReq
P
 = Avail(P, maxTime = xP) 
Condition 
xP ≥ max( xA , xB ) 
 
Figure 5.10: Maximum Execution Time on Generic Choice Pattern 
5.3.4.3 Orchestrator Requirements 
The orchestrator influences almost all the availability dimensions. In 
this sense, the orchestrator impact may have to be part of the pattern. For 
the maximum execution time, for example, the time that will take to execute 
the composition code should be added to the computed time xP.  
5.3.4.4 Proofs 
The proofs of the patterns described for availability are trivial, as based 
on the behaviour of the numerical dimension of QoS taken into 
consideration and on the orchestration, a different aggregation formula can 
 
<A> 
  
<B> 
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be defined. The interested reader may find a summary of aggregation 
formulas for QoS properties utilising workflow patterns in [46]. 
5.4 Security Inference Rules 
As explained in Section 5.3, the formally proven secure composition 
patterns are encoded by production rules expressed in Drools (see Section 
4.3). This makes it possible to apply the patterns in an automated manner in 
the composition process and derive dependencies between security 
requirements of services using rules, instead of trying to derive these 
relations from first principles (i.e., by re-constructing the proofs 
underpinning the patterns) at runtime. The latter would be a 
computationally expensive process. 
5.4.1 Methodology to Encode the Rules 
In this section we present some guidelines about how to encode the 
secure composition patterns into Drools production rules.  
We distinguish between two kinds of rules: inference rules and 
verification rules. The inference rules can be used to generate security 
requirements for activity placeholders from a security requirement over a 
pattern, by using the WF, ASP and RSP parts of a pattern. Inference rules 
are used as part of the process of generating secure service compositions to 
replace unavailable services in operating service workflows at runtime or to 
generate possible secure service workflows during the design of service 
oriented systems. Verification rules are used to verify the Conditions of the 
patterns through the security properties that hold for the partner services 
that participate in a service workflow. 
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5.4.1.1 Inference Rules 
The set of rules that generates security requirements for activity 
placeholders of an orchestration pattern (ASP) in order to guarantee a 
security requirement over the pattern (RSP) are called inference rules. 
These rules can be used either when the workflow is not yet instantiated 
with the partner services or when the workflow is instantiated, in order to 
generate the security requirements to request during the instantiation phase 
or to check if they are satisfied by the partner services. 
The inference rules encode three parts of secure composition patterns: 
(i) the orchestration pattern on which the inferences apply (WF), (ii) the 
security requirement requested for the composition (RSP) and (iii) the 
security requirements for the activity placeholders that guarantee the 
requested requirement (ASP). The first two parts (WF and RSP) should be 
encoded as conditions for the rule to be applied (the when part of the rule).  
The ASP part of the pattern should be encoded as the consequence of the 
rule (the then part of the rule), since it determines which requirements 
should be added in order for the RSP requirement to hold. In fact, as a 
consequence of pattern proofs asserting that: 
ASP ⇒ RSP 
production rules are expressed as: 
If RSP is required of WF Then require ASP 
as if ASP holds then RSP would also hold as a consequence of it. 
In order to support the encoding of secure composition patterns, we 
defined a set of classes that are used to represent orchestration patterns and 
security requirements. These classes are shown in Figure 5.11 and Figure 
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5.12 and classes represent the vocabulary used for the security production 
rules. 
The Placeholder is the basic building block of a pattern, representing 
an activity placeholder that supports a set of input and output Parameters 
listed in its parameters field. 
The Placeholder can be differentiated in three subtypes: 
1. UnassignedActivity – a service invocation placeholder. It contains 
the structural description (i.e., the WSDL, in the wsdl field) that 
needs to be matched to properly instantiate the required 
functionality.  
2. PartnerLinkActivity – a service invocation already bound to a partner 
service. It contains information about the service bound to the 
activity and an array listing the security properties certified for that 
service (in the certifiedProperties field).  
3. OrchestrationPattern – control flow constructs handling further 
Placeholders. In the context of this work, three main orchestration 
patterns have been defined (see also Section 5.2): the Sequential, the 
Parallel and the Choice patterns. 
Through the usage of the classes described above, it is possible to 
encode the orchestration pattern part of a secure composition pattern. 
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Figure 5.11: Class diagram of the activity and pattern classes available for 
the security production rules 
As an example, we are going to encode the pattern shown in Figure 5.5 
into a security production rule.  
The first task is to encode the orchestration pattern (WF) into the rule, 
as shown in the snippet in Table 5.1. The snippet matches the sequential 
orchestrations (lines 12-14) that have, as a first activity, a Placeholder that 
takes as input an input of the orchestration (lines 5-6) and that has, as 
second activity an Placeholder that takes as input one of the outputs of the 
first activity, but not the input of the orchestration, and that outputs the 
output of the orchestration (lines 8-10). 
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$inP1 : String( ) 
$outA1 : String( ) 
$outP : String( ) 
 
$A : Placeholder( parameters.inputs contains $inP1,  
parameters.outputs contains $outA1 ) 
 
$B : Placeholder( parameters.inputs contains $outA1,  
parameters.inputs not contains $inP1, 
parameters.outputs contains $outP) 
 
$WF : Sequential( firstActivity == $A, secondActivity == $B, 
parameters.inputs contains $inP1, 
parameters.outputs contains $outP) 
Table 5.1: Snippet encoding an orchestration pattern into a Drools rule 
The security requirements can be expressed, instead, through the 
classes in Figure 5.12. A Requirement represents a security requirement of a 
security property (secProperty field) for a certain Placeholder (subject 
field). It can optionally contain a set of Parameters, indicating on which 
inputs or outputs the security property should hold, and further requirements 
(in the inferredReqs field) that have been generated in order for this one to 
hold. The satisfied field keeps track if the security requirement has been 
checked and it is guaranteed by a certified security property.  
The SecProperty class represents a security property, containing the 
security property name (propertyName field) and an optional set of 
attribute-value fields allowing expressing extra conditions over the property 
(attributesMap field). 
The SecPlan class represents a set of security requirements that are 
requested to hold at the same time (conjunction). Each SecPlan object can 
hold a different set of inferred requirements for the same initial 
requirements, allowing expressing different options to guarantee a set of 
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requirements (disjunction); more details about how this is used can be found 
in Section 6.4.1.  
The SecPlan class includes also the method isAtomic() allowing 
checking if the requirements contained have been successfully inferred to 
the workflow’s leaves, i.e., the UnassignedActivities and 
PartnerLinkActivities. 
 
Figure 5.12: Class diagram of the requirement and security property classes 
available for the security production rules 
Following the example above, Table 5.2 shows the encoding of the 
pattern security requirement (RSP) from Figure 5.5 into a security 
production rule.  
The snippet matches the Requirement (lines 1-4) of the security 
property named “rho” for the input $inP1 of the pattern $WF described in 
the previous snippet. As this is a rule to infer finer grained requirements 
from a more generic one, the Requirement should not be already satisfied 
and it must be part of a SecPlan (lines 6-7) that is not completely 
propagated (i.e., not atomic). 
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$RSP : Requirement( secProperty.propertyName == "rho",  
subject == $WF,  
parameters.inputs contains $inP1,  
satisfied == false ) 
 
$secPlan : SecPlan( requirements contains $RSP, 
atomic == false ) 
Table 5.2: Snippet encoding a security requirement into a Drools rule 
The consequence part of the rule should encode the actions that 
generate the requirements over the activity placeholders (ASP) that 
guarantee that the requirement over the pattern holds.  
Returning to our on-going example, Table 5.3 shows a snippet 
encoding the consequences part of the rule. The code generates the two new 
security requirements (lines 4-5 and 9-10), and inserts them into Drools 
Knowledge Base (lines 7 and 12).  
Furthermore, a new SecPlan is generated using the old one as a basis 
(line 1), in order to be. The original requirement (RSP) is removed from the 
set (line 2), substituted now with the two new requirements (ASP) that 
guarantee it (line 6 and 11).  
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SecPlan newSecPlan = new SecPlan($secPlan); 
newSecPlan.removeRequirement($origReq); 
 
Requirement ASP_A = new Requirement( 
$RSP, "rho", $A, $inP1, null); 
newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(ASP_A); 
insert(ASP_A); 
 
Requirement ASP_B = new Requirement( 
$RSP, "sigma", $B, $outA1, null); 
newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(ASP_B); 
insert(ASP_B); 
 
insert(newSecPlan); 
Table 5.3: Snippet encoding the creation of the inferred security 
requirements in a Drools rule 
5.4.1.2 Verification Rules 
In some cases the inference rules alone cannot guarantee a security 
requirement, as the secure composition pattern might need to check a 
condition over the actual certified security properties for each activity. This 
information is available only after the instantiation in the pattern of partner 
services for each activity placeholder.  
The verification rules are used after the instantiation of the 
orchestration pattern (WF) in order to verify that the certified security 
properties guarantee the pattern’s security requirement (RSP). These rules 
are needed in particular for those cases where the pattern’s security 
requirement can be guaranteed not just by checking that the security 
requirements inferred by the inference rules are satisfied by the partner 
services through their certificates, but also by verifying additional 
conditions over the certified security properties of the partner services 
(Condition). An example is the availability security property, which can be 
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guaranteed by checking conditions over the numeric values in the certified 
security properties (the rule need the numeric values in the certificates in 
order to be computed). 
The main difference between the inference and the verification rules is, 
then, that while the computation for inference rules flows from the security 
requirements of the pattern (RSP) to the ones for the single activity 
placeholders (ASP), the computation for the verification rules flows in the 
opposite direction.  
More specifically, verification rules check if the certified security 
properties guarantee the security requirements and the conditions over them, 
as shown in the examples of Section 5.4.4. This process starts from the 
single instantiated activities (partner services) and goes over patterns where 
their activities are already checked and satisfy the conditions. Once an 
activity or a pattern is successfully checked, the process updates the 
satisfied field of the security requirements accordingly. 
5.4.2 Integrity 
The inference rule presented in Table 5.4 encodes the Precede Integrity 
on Cascade Pattern shown in Figure 5.6. 
The rule states that if we have some data $input and $output used in 
an activity S0 as inputs and outputs, and that S0 guarantees Precede Integrity 
on them, then when we substitute S0 with the sequence $WF = $A  $B, a 
requirement $RSP for the integrity of the data is formulated on $WF.  
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rule "Precede Integrity on Cascade" 
  when 
    $A : Placeholder( $input : parameters.inputs,  
$AtoBdata : parameters.outputs ) 
    $B : Placeholder( parameters.inputs == $AtoBdata,  
$output : parameters.outputs ) 
    $WF : Sequential( parameters.inputs == $inputs, 
parameters.outputs == $outputs,  
firstActivity == $A,  
secondActivity == $B ) 
 
    $RSP : Requirement(  
secProperty.propertyName == "integrity_pr",  
subject == $WF,  
parameters.inputs == $input,  
parameters.outputs == $output,  
satisfied == false ) 
    $secPlan : SecPlan( requirements contains $RSP,  
atomic == false ) 
 
  then 
    SecPlan newSecPlan = new SecPlan($secPlan); 
    newSecPlan.removeRequirement($RSP); 
     
    Requirement ASP_A = new Requirement( 
$RSP, "integrity_pr", $A, $input, $AtoBdata); 
    newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(ASP_A); 
    insert(ASP_A); 
 
    Requirement ASP_B = new Requirement( 
$RSP, "integrity_pr", $B, $AtoBdata, $output); 
    newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(ASP_B); 
    insert(ASP_B); 
 
    insert(newSecPlan); 
end 
Table 5.4: Inference rule for Precede Integrity on Cascade Pattern 
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In more detail, the rule requires the following data flow conditions to 
encode the Cascade orchestration: 
• $A input is the pattern input ($input), 
• $A output, called $AtoBdata, is $B input, and 
• $B output is the pattern output ($output). 
If these conditions are met, then the two requirements ASP_A and 
ASP_B, with ASP_A = Integritypr(A, $input, $AtoBdata) and ASP_B = 
Integritypr(B, $AtoBdata, $output), guarantee the original requirement. 
More specifically, lines 7-10 describe the control flow of the 
orchestration pattern, and lines 3-8 describe its data flow. Lines 12-19 
encode the original security requirement RSP. Lines 25-33 encode the 
requirements that must hold on the single placeholders to guarantee the 
original requirement (ASP).  
5.4.3 Confidentiality 
The rules presented in this section encode the patterns shown in Section 
5.3.3.1 about the Perfect Security Property (PSP).  
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show the inference rules for PSP on, 
respectively, Cascade and Product orchestrations. These two rules are very 
similar, as they differ only in the orchestration pattern. 
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rule "PSP on Cascade" 
  when 
    $A : Placeholder( $input : parameters.inputs,  
$AtoBdata : parameters.outputs ) 
    $B : Placeholder( parameters.inputs == $AtoBdata,  
$output : parameters.outputs ) 
    $WF : Sequential( parameters.inputs == $inputs, 
parameters.outputs == $outputs,  
firstActivity == $A, secondActivity == $B ) 
 
    $RSP : Requirement( secProperty.propertyName == "PSP",  
subject == $WF, satisfied == false ) 
    $S : SecPlan( requirements contains $RSP, atomic == false ) 
  then 
    SecPlan newSecPlan = new SecPlan($S); 
    newSecPlan.removeRequirement($RSP); 
    Set V_P = $RSP.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap().get("V"); 
 
    Requirement ASP_A = new Requirement($RSP, "PSP", $A); 
    ASP_A.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap() 
.put("V", new Operation("subset", V_P)); 
    ASP_A.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap() 
.put("C", new Operation("subset",  
new Operation("complement", V_P))); 
    newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(ASP_A); 
    insert(ASP_A); 
 
    Requirement ASP_B = new Requirement($RSP, "PSP", $B); 
    ASP_B.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap() 
.put("V", new Operation("subset", V_P)); 
    ASP_B.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap() 
.put("C", new Operation("subset",  
new Operation("complement", V_P))); 
    newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(ASP_B); 
    insert(ASP_B); 
 
    insert(newSecPlan); 
end 
Table 5.5: Inference rule for PSP on Cascade Pattern  
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rule "PSP on Product" 
  when 
    $paramsA : Parameters( )  
    $paramsB : Parameters( inputs disjoint $paramsA.inputs  
outputs disjoint $paramsA.outputs )  
    $paramsWF : Parameters( inputs containsall $paramsA.inputs  
inputs containsall $paramsB.inputs  
outputs containsall $paramsA.outputs  
outputs containsall $paramsB.outputs)  
 
    $A : Placeholder( parameters == $paramsA ) 
    $B : Placeholder( parameters == $paramsB ) 
    $WF : Parallel( parameters == $paramsWF, $acts : activities )  
 
    $RSP : Requirement( secProperty.propertyName == "PSP",  
subject == $WF, satisfied == false ) 
    $S : SecPlan( requirements contains $RSP, atomic == false ) 
  then 
    SecPlan newSecPlan = new SecPlan($S); 
    newSecPlan.removeRequirement($RSP); 
    Set V_P = $RSP.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap().get("V"); 
 
    for(Placeholder currAct : $acts){ 
        Requirement currASP = new Requirement( 
$RSP, "PSP", currAct); 
        currASP.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap() 
.put("V", new Operation("subset", V_P)); 
        currASP.getSecProperty().getAttributesMap() 
.put("C", new Operation("subset",  
new Operation("complement", V_P))); 
        newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(currASP); 
        insert(currASP); 
    } 
 
    insert(newSecPlan); 
end 
Table 5.6: Inference rule for PSP on Product Pattern 
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More specifically, after specifying on which orchestration the rule 
applies, i.e., Cascade or the Product orchestration (lines 3-9 for the Cascade 
rule, 3-13 for the Product rule), if PSP is requested over the orchestration 
(lines 11-12 for the Cascade rule, lines 15-16 for the Product rule), then a 
Requirement is generated for each activity placeholder in the 
orchestration, asking for the PSP (lines 19-35 for the Cascade rule, 24-32 
for the Product rule). In particular, as two additional conditions are needed 
for the proof to hold, then these conditions are added to the security 
property (lines 20-24 and 29-33 for the Cascade rule, 26-30 for the Product 
rule).  
In more detail, the two additional conditions make usage of the 
Operation class offered in our implementation by the query language of 
the discovery tool and that is used to encode set operations that will be 
executed during the discovery process to find suitable matches. If no such a 
discovery feature is available it is possible to encode the secure composition 
pattern into a simpler inference rule with no such conditions, and encode the 
conditions in the verification rules, where the actual security properties 
offered by the services are available to be checked.  
5.4.4 Availability 
As mentioned earlier, availability is one case where the inference rules 
are not enough. Availability, in fact, comprises a set of numerical metrics: 
the composition of such metrics is supported by numerical functions that 
can be computed and checked only after the instantiation of the activity 
placeholders with partner link services. We introduce verification rules in 
order to check those conditions that required the pattern to be already 
instantiated. 
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rule "Availability inference" 
  when 
    $WF : OrchestrationPattern( $acts: childActivities ) 
 
    $RSP : Requirement(  
secProperty.propertyName == "availability", 
$secProp : secProperty, subject == $WF ) 
    $S : SecPlan( requirements contains $RSP, atomic == false ) 
  then 
    SecPlan newSecPlan = new SecPlan($S); 
    newSecPlan.removeRequirement($RSP); 
     
    for(Placeholder currAct : $acts){ 
        Requirement currASP = new Requirement( 
$RSP, new SecProperty($secProp), currAct); 
        newSecPlan.getRequirements().add(currASP); 
        insert(currASP); 
    } 
    insert(newSecPlan); 
end 
Table 5.7: Inference rule for Availability  
Table 5.7 shows an inference rule for availability that simply replicates 
the security requirement RSP over the activity placeholders, in order to 
query partner services that are certified to take care of availability. This rule 
is applied on any orchestration (line 3) that is requested to maintain 
availability (lines 5-7) and generates availability requirements for all the 
activity placeholders in the pattern (lines 14-17). 
In the following we specify the verification rules that encode the 
patterns about the Maximum Execution Time dimension of availability. 
Furthermore, since the verification rules check that the certified 
properties guarantee the security requirements, an additional rule must be 
encoded for the base case, i.e., the activity bounded to a partner service 
PartnerLinkActivity.  
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The verification rule for the PartnerLinkActivity is shown in 
Table 5.8. This rule compares the maximum execution time maxTime in the 
certified security property (lines 3-5) of the PartnerLinkActivity (lines 
7-8) with the one requested (lines 12-15). If the time in the Requirement is 
greater or equal than the certified one, then the requirement is updated with 
the certified time and is marked as satisfied. 
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rule "Verification of Max Execution Time on PartnerLinkActivity" 
  when 
    $certAttributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime" ) 
    $certProp : SecProperty( propertyName == "availability", 
 attributesMap == $certAttributes ) 
 
    $activity : PartnerLinkActivity(  
certifiedProperties contains $certProp ) 
 
    $attributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime",  
this["maxTime"] >= $certAttributes["maxTime"] ) 
    $RSP : Requirement(  
secProperty.propertyName == "availability", 
secProperty.attributesMap == $attributes, 
subject == $activity, satisfied == false ) 
  then 
    modify($attributes){ 
put("maxTime", $certAttributes.get("maxTime"))}; 
    modify($RSP){setSatisfied(true)}; 
end 
Table 5.8: Verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on Partner 
Link Activity 
The verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on Generic 
Sequential Pattern is shown in Table 5.9. This rule might seem a little bit 
complicated as it makes use of the forall condition and accumulate 
functions, however the application of these functions is quite standard, so 
new rules can be built by just following the following examples. 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
126 / 253 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
rule "Verification for Max Execution Time on Generic Sequential" 
  when 
    $WF : Sequential( $acts : childActivities ) 
 
    forall( $currAct : Placeholder( ) from $acts 
         $attributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime" ) 
         Requirement( secProperty.propertyName == "availability",  
secProperty.attributesMap == $attributes, 
subject == $currAct, satisfied == true ) ) 
 
    $totalTime : Number( ) from accumulate (  
         $attributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime",  
$maxTime : this["maxTime"] ) 
         and 
         Requirement( secProperty.propertyName == "availability", 
secProperty.attributesMap == $attributes, 
$acts contains subject, satisfied == true ), 
         sum( $maxTime ) ) 
 
    $attributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime",  
this["maxTime"] >= $totalTime ) 
    $RSP : Requirement(  
secProperty.propertyName == "availability",  
secProperty.attributesMap == $attributes,  
subject == $WF, satisfied == false ) 
  then 
    modify($attributes){put("maxTime", $totalTime)}; 
    modify($RSP){setSatisfied(true)}; 
end 
Table 5.9: Verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on Generic 
Sequential Pattern  
The rule is applied on sequential orchestrations with no data flow 
specifications (line 3) and first checks that all the activities in pattern have a 
Requirement for availability, in particular for the maximum execution 
time dimension, and that all these Requirements are satisfied (the 
forall part, lines 5-9).  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
127 / 253 
Then the maxTime of all the activities in the pattern are accumulated 
through the sum function (the accumulate part, lines 11-18), as specified 
by the Condition part of the secure composition pattern. 
Finally the rule compares the accumulated maxTime with the one in the 
pattern’s Requirement RSP. If the time in the Requirement is greater or 
equal than the accumulated one, then the requirement is updated with the 
computed time and is marked as satisfied, as specified by the Condition part 
of the secure composition pattern. 
The verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on Generic 
Choice Pattern, shown in Table 5.10, differs from the one on the Generic 
Sequential orchestration only for the orchestration pattern (line 3) and the 
accumulation function (line 18), i.e., the function returning the maximum 
(max) instead of the sum function. 
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rule "Verification for Max Execution Time on Generic Choice" 
  when 
    $WF : Choice( $acts : childActivities ) 
 
    forall( $currAct : Placeholder( ) from $acts 
         $attributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime" ) 
         Requirement( secProperty.propertyName == "availability",  
secProperty.attributesMap == $attributes, 
subject == $currAct, satisfied == true ) ) 
 
    $totalTime : Number( ) from accumulate (  
         $attributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime",  
$maxTime : this["maxTime"] ) 
         and 
         Requirement( secProperty.propertyName == "availability", 
secProperty.attributesMap == $attributes, 
$acts contains subject, satisfied == true ), 
         max( $maxTime ) ) 
 
    $attributes : Map( keySet contains "maxTime",  
this["maxTime"] >= $totalTime ) 
    $RSP : Requirement(  
secProperty.propertyName == "availability",  
secProperty.attributesMap == $attributes,  
subject == $WF, satisfied == false ) 
  then 
    modify($attributes){put("maxTime", $totalTime)}; 
    modify($RSP){setSatisfied(true)}; 
end 
Table 5.10: Verification rule for the Maximum Execution Time on the 
Choice Pattern  
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter we presented our approach to assess security over 
service orchestrations that makes use of secure composition patterns.  
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The secure composition patterns infer the security requirements needed 
from partner services part of a composition in order to guarantee a given 
security requirement on the entire composition. 
The secure composition patterns summarize proven inferences between 
security requirements guaranteed by activity placeholders. These inferences 
are then encoded into business rules, called security production rules, in 
order to allow automated reasoning about a composition security. 
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Chapter 6 
Security Aware Service 
Composition Process 
6.1 Overview 
Secure composition patterns can be used in different phases of the 
lifecycle of SBSs in order to guarantee the security of service compositions 
within such systems. More specifically the patterns allow (a) the generation 
of secure service compositions, and (b) the validation of the security of 
existing service compositions.  
The former, (a), can be used either at design time, for designing entire 
or parts of workflows, and at runtime for substituting services that violate 
security requirements with service compositions generated to replace them. 
The latter, (b), is used at design time only, in order to ensure that a 
workflow or parts of it satisfy indeed a given security requirement.  
6.2 Scenario 
In this section we present a use case scenario for the security aware 
composition process that we are going to use to exemplify the approach 
throughout the document. The user in this scenario is a Business Analyst of 
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a Stock Broker organization, working on the design a SBS that automates 
the buying of stocks for their clients based on market data and client 
preferences. This SBS relies on a combination of internal and external 
services (e.g., Xignite, Amazon AWS) deployed on different clouds, making 
it an example of a hybrid cloud application. 
The Business Analyst identifies a series of security threats (listed in 
Section 6.2.2) and introduces to the design of the SBS a set of security 
requirements to address these threats. During the design, the Business 
Analyst makes usage of the validation capabilities of the approach described 
in this work to assess if the security requirements are satisfied. If this is not 
the case, the Business Analyst can use the static discovery of secure 
services to substitute any service that has inadequate security. Finally, 
during the SBS implementation a service adaptation mechanism is included 
in order to support business continuity whenever one of the services used by 
the SBS becomes unavailable or no longer supports the functional/security 
requirements. The service adaptation mechanism uses the dynamic 
discovery of secure services to locate alternative services that support the 
requirements. In particular both the static and the dynamic discovery of 
secure service make usage of the generation of secure service composition 
described in this thesis when no atomic service can provide the requested 
functionality and security. 
6.2.1 Stock Broker SBS 
A simple version of the SBS workflow designed by the Business 
Analyst is presented in Figure 6.1. For the sake of presenting a reasonable 
example without dwelling into complex technicalities, we omit details of 
the process, like the ones about error handling and transactions support, as 
we assume that the Business Analyst is going to take care of them in a 
second design stage. 
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Figure 6.1: The Stock Broker SBS workflow 
Upon receiving a set of user preferences, the SBS retrieves the current 
and the predicted stock values from a financial service (e.g., Xignite). Then 
it internally analyses all the information collected (activity 
AnalyzeStockInformation in the figure) in order to check if the user 
requirements are met by the stock values. If this is the case, then the stocks 
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are traded and the payment is processed by internal services that contact the 
bank/financial supplier through the SWIFT protocol [98][99]. Finally a 
report of the transaction is generated, stored in a storage service (e.g., 
Amazon S3), and finally sent back to the user. 
6.2.2 Security Threats 
This section presents a threat analysis of the given scenario following 
the STRIDE Threat Model [52], by identifying the threat categories and the 
resources at risk. STRIDE is the acronym of the following threat categories: 
• Spoofing identity: when a malicious party successfully poses as 
an authorized user. 
• Tampering with data: when the content of data or messages is 
altered without permission, either by a malicious party or by a 
malfunction.  
• Repudiation: when a party denies authoring or initiating an 
action and no proof exists to contradict this. 
• Information disclosure: when an unauthorized user accesses 
supposedly secure information.  
• Denial of service: when a valid user access to a system or 
resource is limited or eliminated. 
• Elevation of privilege: when a malicious user gains higher 
privileges than the ones that should be granted to that user. 
Based on this model, the threats in the Stock Broker scenario can be 
identified as follows:  
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A. Spoofing the communications between the investor and the Stock 
Brokerage firm. A malicious user may pose as another investor and 
maliciously manage their portfolio. Also, a malicious user may pose as 
the Stock Brokerage SBS and obtain secret information from the 
investors. As the investor - Stock Brokerage firm relationship is not 
communicated to the underlying service providers, this threat does not 
require additional controls for the services used by the SBS and it 
should be taken care of with appropriate authentication at SBS level. 
B. Spoofing the communications between the Stock Brokerage firm and the 
bank/financial supplier. A malicious user may pose as one of these 
parties and transfer funds, stocks or gaining secret information about 
this. As the SBS uses services internal to the Stock Brokerage 
organization to communicate with the bank/financial supplier, this threat 
should be addressed with appropriate authorization mechanisms in the 
implementation of such services.  
C. Tampering of the investment plan, the trading account details or the 
trading report. A malicious user or a malfunction may alter this data, 
possibly changing the outcomes of a trading session. This threat requires 
assurance about the integrity of these data against both the SBS and the 
services used by it. 
D. Repudiation of the investment plan from the user. A malicious user may 
deny that he/she has sent an investment plan to the SBS, and try to claim 
back the money for an unsuccessful investment. Again, as the investor - 
Stock Brokerage firm relationship is not communicated to the underlying 
service providers, this threat does not require additional controls for the 
services used by the SBS and it should be taken care of with appropriate 
non-repudiation mechanisms at the SBS level. 
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E. Repudiation of the successful trading from the bank/financial supplier. 
A malicious supplier may deny the trading from having taken place. 
This threat should be taken care of at a level of the internal services 
contacting the bank/financial supplier. In particular if SWIFT is used, 
non-repudiation is granted by the SWIFTNet protocol [99]. 
F. Repudiation of the successful trading from the SBS. In order to avoid 
the Stock Broker firm to potentially deny the result of a trading session, 
a report is sent to the user. This threat menaces the investor - Stock 
Brokerage firm relationship, and it should be taken care of with 
appropriate non-repudiation mechanisms at the SBS level (e.g., by 
signing the report). 
G. Disclosure of the investment plan, the trading account details or the 
trading report. A malicious user may use secret information about 
investment strategies of competing investors as additional information 
for their investments, or use the obtained trading account details to 
maliciously manage the account of someone else. This threat requires 
assurance about the confidentiality of this data from both the SBS and 
from the services used by it.  
H. Denial of service of the SBS. A malicious user or a malfunction may 
limit the access to the SBS or any of the services used by it, impeding or 
delaying a trading session. This threat requires assurance about the 
availability of both the SBS and of the services used by it. 
The approach presented in this thesis addresses the threats introduced 
by the services used by the SBS. This is achieved by defining appropriate 
security requirements that reduce or mitigate fully the security threats and 
by checking that the security requirements are actually provided by the 
services involved in a composition. In particular, from the above list of 
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threats, the security requirements that should be introduced for the services 
part of this scenario are about integrity and confidentiality of the data 
exchanged (against threats C and G) and availability of the services (against 
threat H). The other security threats, directed to the SBS or the internal 
services implementation, can be addressed instead with alternative 
approaches present in literature, as the ones described in Section 2.4. 
This analysis intentionally does not go into the details of identifying 
the actual sources for each threat, like vulnerabilities and attacks (e.g., SQL, 
OS, DNS or LDAP injection, cross-site scripting, SSL Heartbeat 
vulnerability), as this level of detail often depends on the implementation of 
the service and this implementation is usually unknown to the SBS 
designer. The vulnerabilities and attacks, however, have to be identified and 
addressed in order to release a security descriptor for each of the services 
used in a SBS, describing the security properties that the service guarantees. 
The security descriptors are used then to satisfy a security requirement 
introduced to minimize the security threats presented in this section. The 
interested reader may find a survey of service and cloud computing security 
issues in [104]. 
6.3 Workflows 
In the following algorithms we assume that service composition 
workflows are represented as a composition of the orchestration patterns 
described above, as they represent abstract orchestrations that are not 
necessarily bound to services.  
A workflow is defined by the outermost orchestration pattern that 
describes it and by the information about its functional applicability (in the 
current implementation this is achieved through a WSDL of the resulting 
composition). Each pattern contains a set of placeholders for activities. The 
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placeholders can contain the description of a single operation (in the current 
implementation this is also described through a WSDL) that should 
instantiate the activity or another pattern.  
Workflow[orchestration= 
  Sequential( 
    PartnerLinkActivity(http://example.com/StockISIN.wsdl), 
    Sequential( 
        UnassignedActivity(GetQuoteActivity), 
        UnassignedActivity(GetConversion) ) )] 
Table 6.1: Example of a workflow  
Each service placeholder in the workflow can be instantiated with a 
partner link service, as shown in the example in Table 6.1 (the 
PartnerLinkActivity). When all the service placeholders in a workflow 
are not instantiated (i.e., bounded to a concrete service), we call the 
workflow “abstract workflow”. 
An abstract workflow represents an activity that can be replaced by a 
set of other activities and contains: (a) information about the control flow 
between these activities, and (b) the set of orchestration patterns used to 
generate it. 
Figure 6.2 shows the XML Schema used to represent an abstract 
workflow. The root of the schema is the Workflow element, which is 
required to have: (i) a name, (ii) a WSDL describing the abstract workflow 
interface (located either remotely or locally), and (iii) the outermost 
orchestration pattern of the workflow, described through the 
OrchestrationType XML Schema type. 
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Figure 6.2: The Workflow element of the abstract workflow schema 
The OrchestrationType contents are shown in Figure 6.3. The main 
element describing an orchestration pattern can be a Sequential, a 
Choice, or a Parallel element. The Sequential element is required to 
have two sub-elements describing the first and the second activity 
placeholders in the orchestration through the usage of the 
PlaceholderType type. The Choice element allows the specification of 
the condition over which the control flow is decided, an activity placeholder 
that is executed if the condition is true, and optionally an activity 
placeholder that is executed if the condition is false. The Parallel 
element contains one or more activity placeholders described through the 
PlaceholderType XML Schema type. 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
139 / 253 
 
Figure 6.3: The OrchestrationType type of the abstract workflow schema 
Figure 6.4 shows the PlaceholderType used to describe an activity 
placeholder. In particular an activity placeholder can represent either an 
orchestration pattern, or an atomic activity. The latter is encoded through 
the Activity element and is described through a name and a WSDL 
interface describing the functional requirements of the activity to perform. 
The WSDL is used to find and bound a service for the activity during the 
instantiation phase of the workflow. 
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Figure 6.4: The PlaceholderType type of the abstract workflow schema 
Table 6.2 shows an example of the XML encoding of an abstract 
workflow, based on the workflow in Table 6.1. 
<Workflow name="GetCurrentQuoteInUSD"> 
    <WSDL location="http://localhost:8080/wfs/GCQ_USD.wsdl" /> 
    <Pattern> 
        <Sequential> 
            <FirstActivity> 
                <Activity name="GetISIN"> 
                    <WSDL filename="GetISIN.wsdl" /> 
                </Activity> 
            </FirstActivity> 
            <SecondActivity> 
                <Pattern> 
                    <Sequential> 
                        <FirstActivity> 
                            <Activity name="GetQuoteActivity"> 
                                <WSDL filename="GetEURStock.wsdl" /> 
                            </Activity> 
                        </FirstActivity> 
                        <SecondActivity> 
                            <Activity name="GetConversion"> 
                                <WSDL filename="Exchange.wsdl" /> 
                            </Activity> 
                        </SecondActivity> 
                    </Sequential> 
                </Pattern> 
            </SecondActivity> 
        </Sequential> 
    </Pattern> 
</Workflow> 
Table 6.2: Example of an abstract workflow 
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6.4 Algorithms 
In the following we present the algorithms that we have developed to 
validate security requirements at design time and to build a secure service 
workflow. The first algorithm is fundamental to both approaches, as it 
describes how to use the secure composition patterns in order to infer 
security requirements for activities within a composition. In the case of 
validation, the inference of such requirements is used to check if the 
workflow services indeed satisfy them, and therefore the workflow can be 
confirmed to have the required overall security requirement. In the case of 
generation of secure service composition, the inference of the security 
requirements required of individual services is used in order to drive the 
search process that discovers if there are such services that could instantiate 
the placeholders of the workflows. 
6.4.1 Inference of Security Requirements 
The algorithm described in this section generates the security 
requirements to be requested to the (potential) partner services of a 
workflow. The algorithm is invoked having as an input the initial security 
requirement and a workflow. Based on these two inputs, the algorithm 
derives the security requirements that should be requested from the partner 
services that are (or will be) bound to each activity in the workflow. This 
may lead to find more than one combination of security requirements for the 
different activities. Each of these combinations is called a Security Plan in 
the context of this thesis. 
The derivation of the security requirements is driven by the inference 
rules that express the security requirements that need to be satisfied by the 
individual partner services, which will instantiate the workflow for the latter 
to satisfy other requested security requirement as a whole. As discussed in 
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Chapter 5, the rules express dependencies between the security 
requirements of the individual activities of the workflow and the security 
requirements of the workflow as a whole. These dependencies have been 
established by the proofs of different secure composition patterns; in fact 
the security production rules can be considered encodings of the secure 
composition patterns. 
6.4.1.1 Algorithm 
The algorithm for making inferences about the security requirements of 
the placeholders of (and therefore the services that may be bound to) a 
workflow is shown in Table 6.3.  
As shown in the table, given an input service workflow WF and a 
security requirement RSP, the algorithm tries to apply all the secure 
composition patterns that would be able to guarantee RSP. A pattern is 
applied if the workflow specification of the pattern (Pattern.WF) matches 
with WF. If a pattern matches the workflow, then the security plans 
computed up to that point are updated to replace the security requirement 
RSP with the security requirements for the matched placeholders in WF 
(these can be individual activities or sub-workflows) as determined by the 
pattern. If a matched placeholder PH of WF is an atomic activity, the 
process ends w.r.t it. If PH is a sub-workflow, the algorithm will continue 
trying to apply further patterns for it recursively. 
More specifically, as mentioned in Section 5.4.1, the process of 
inferring security requirements can generate alternative plans. Each plan is 
represented by a set of security requirements, meaning that the enclosed 
requirements must hold at the same time. All the possible plans (i.e., the 
sets of security requirements) are collected in the list that is the output of 
the process. 
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Algorithm: INFERRECURSION(RSP, WF, InSecPlans) 
Input:  WF – workflow 
 RSP[WF] – requested security requirement for WF 
 InSecPlans – list of security plans used for recursion  
Output:  OutSecPlans – list of security plans of inferred requirements 
 
For each pattern Patt such that Patt.CSP matches RSP do 
If Patt.WF matches WF then 
For each placeholder PH of WF do 
SecReqs[PH] := security requirements identified by Patt.ASP 
EndFor 
For each security plan S in InSecPlans do 
S’ := replace RSP by SecReqs in S 
Add S’ to SecPlansPatt  
EndFor 
For each placeholder PH in WF that is a sub-workflow do 
 SecPlansPatt:= INFERRECURSION 
  (PH, SecReqs[PH], SecPlansPatt) 
EndFor 
Add all the plans SecPlansPatt to OutSecPlans 
EndIf 
EndFor 
Return OutSecPlans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Algorithm: INFERREQUIREMENT(WF, RSP[WF]) 
Input:  WF – workflow  
 RSP[WF] – requested security requirement for WF 
Output:  SecPlans – list of plans of inferred security requirements 
 
Return INFERRECURSION(WF, RSP[WF], {RSP[WF]}) 
Table 6.3: Algorithm for the inference of Security Requirements  
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As discussed in Section 5.4, the security production rules are expressed 
in Drools production rules. The algorithm for the inference of security 
requirements has been implemented in Drools rule based reasoning.  
6.4.1.2 Example 
Consider the case of the ProcessOrder (PO) workflow shown in Figure 
6.5, where a Stock is bought and paid for in parallel, and then a report of the 
action is written. We can use the algorithm above in order to derive the 
security requirements that should be required of the different activities in 
the process in order to guarantee the confidentiality of the Stock Investor 
current account. This security requirement can be expressed as PSP, with 
EPO
H
 = {currentAccount} and EPO
L
 = {paymOrder, stocksOrder, 
tradingAccount, report}. 
 
Figure 6.5: The ProcessOrder workflow 
ProcessOrder can be seen as a sequential workflow consisting of a sub-
workflow WF’ and the atomic activity WriteReport that follows it (see 
Figure 6.6). WF’ itself is a parallel workflow involving two atomic 
activities: ProcessPayment and TradeStocks. 
Process 
Payment 
Trade 
Stocks 
currentAccount, 
paymOrder 
tradingAccount, 
stocksOrder tradeResult 
paymResult 
Write 
Report 
report 
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Figure 6.6: The Orchestration Patterns of the ProcessOrder workflow 
Hence, when INFERREQUIREMENT is applied on to the workflow, in the 
first iteration the inference rule for PSP on the sequential flow presented in 
Section 5.4.3 can be applied on WF. This returns two security requirements: 
(1) PSP confidentiality for the inputs currentAccount, paymResult and the 
output tradeResult of WF’, and (2) PSP-confidentiality for the input 
paymResult and output tradeResult of WriteReport. 
The second iteration of the algorithm applies the inference rule for PSP 
on the parallel flow to WF’. The algorithm then creates and adds two 
security requirements to the final plan: one requiring PSP confidentiality for 
Write 
Report 
currentAccount, 
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tradeResult report 
WF 
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currentAccount, 
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currentAccount and paymResult of ProcessPayment, and another requiring 
PSP confidentiality for tradeResult of TradeStocks. 
6.4.2 Verification of Security Requirements 
The algorithm described in this section verifies the security 
requirements requested to the partner services of a workflow. The algorithm 
is invoked having as an input the fully instantiated workflow and the 
security requirements that have to be guaranteed. Based on these two inputs, 
the algorithm verifies that the security requirements are guaranteed by the 
appropriate partner services through their (certified) security property. The 
verification of these conditions is driven by the verification rules.  
6.4.2.1 Algorithm 
As shown in the table, given an input service workflow WF and a 
security requirement RSP, the algorithm tries to apply all the secure 
composition patterns that would be able to guarantee RSP. A pattern is 
applied if the workflow specification of the pattern (Pattern.WF) matches 
with WF. If a pattern matches the workflow, then the security plans 
computed up to that point are updated to replace the security requirement 
RSP with the security requirements for the matched placeholder in WF 
(these can be individual activities or sub-workflows). If a matched 
placeholder PH of WF is an atomic activity, the process ends w.r.t it. If PH 
is a sub-workflow, the algorithm is applied recursively for it. 
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Algorithm: VERIFYREQUIREMENT(WF, SP) 
Input:  WF – workflow 
 SP – security requirements that need to hold 
Output:  true or false – status of the verification 
 
For each activity Act in WF do 
If Act.Service.Certificates contains SP[Act] then 
HoldsSP[Act] := true 
EndIf 
For each sub-workflow SW such that  
 for all the placeholders PH in SW HoldsSP[PH] do 
Patt := pattern such that Patt.WF = SW and Patt.SP = SP[SW]  
If EVALUATE(Patt.Condition, SW) then 
 HoldsSP[SW] := true 
Endif 
EndFor 
Return HoldsSP[WF] 
Table 6.4: Algorithm for the verification of Security Requirements 
As in the case of the inference algorithms, the algorithm in Table 6.4 is 
realised through the application of Drools rules. 
6.4.2.2 Example 
Suppose we have a workflow that contains two partner services in a 
Generic Sequential Pattern. A security requirement on this workflow 
requires that the maximum execution time of the workflow is 500 
milliseconds. The two partner services have a certificate each, stating that 
the maximum execution time of each of them is 300 milliseconds. The 
verification rules in Section 5.4.4 then cannot infer that the security 
requirement is satisfied, so the verification for this workflow fails. 
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6.4.3 Validation of Workflows 
The algorithm described in this section is focused on checking if the 
fully instantiated workflow taken into consideration respects the requested 
security requirement. This algorithm is useful in order to check fully 
instantiated SBS workflows against security requirements.  
Furthermore the following algorithm allows validation of workflow 
fragments, i.e., portions of a workflow delimited by a control flow activity 
(or sub-workflows). In case of BPEL workflows, a fragment consists of a 
scope or a control flow (i.e., sequence, flow, while, forEach, repeatUntil, if-
then-else or pick) activity that can contain multiple service invocations (in 
the form of invoke activities) and further control flow activities. 
6.4.3.1 Algorithm 
Given a request to check whether a workflow (WF) satisfies a security 
requirement RSP, the algorithm INFERREQUIREMENT is applied to identify 
the list of alternative security plans (i.e., combinations of security 
requirements of the individual services in the fragment) that would 
guarantee RSP. As explained earlier INFERREQUIREMENT tries to apply 
different secure composition patterns in order to identify these alternative 
plans. If such plans exist, each of them is analysed further to check if the 
security requirements in the plan are provided by the services in the 
fragment. 
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Algorithm: VALIDATEWORKFLOW(WF, RSP) 
Input:  WF – workflow 
 RSP– security requirement that needs to be validated 
Output:  validationStatus – true if WF satisfies the security requirement 
 SecPlans – list of security plans for the activities in WF 
 
SecPlans:= INFERREQUIREMENT(WF, RSP) 
For each plan SP in SecPlans do 
validPlan := true 
For each service S invoked in the fragment WF do 
R := SERVICEDISCOVERY(S, SP[S]) 
If service S is not contained in R then 
 validPlan:= false 
Endif 
EndFor 
If validPlan = true and VERIFYREQUIREMENTS(WF, SP) then 
Return true, SecPlans 
Endif 
EndFor 
Return false, SecPlans 
Table 6.5: Algorithm for the validation of workflows 
To validate whether an individual service satisfies the security 
requirement by a security plan, we express the requirement as a service 
discovery query and then use the discovery tool described in Section 4.4 to 
match the specification of the individual service with the query and 
establish if it satisfies the query or not (see SERVICEDISCOVERY(S, SP[S]) 
invocation in the algorithm). In applying the service discovery process, we 
assume the existence of machine-readable security property descriptors for 
a service (e.g. certificates) indicating the security properties that a service S 
has. If the individual service validation succeeds for all the services of the 
fragment by even one of the identified security plan, and the patterns that 
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required it are verified, then the workflow is validated. Otherwise, if no 
security plan can be found, or if none of the found security plan can be 
satisfied by the services in the workflow, or if the satisfied security plans 
are not verified by the verification rules, the fragment is reported as not 
validated. 
6.4.3.2 Example 
Consider again the case of the ProcessOrder (PO) workflow previously 
explained. The workflow has been implemented into a SBS, bounding the 
activities to services as shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.7: Services used by the ProcessOrder SBS 
Assume that we have another rule to preserve the PSP can state that the 
confidentiality can be achieved by means of Separability. In this case we 
have 2 security plans, one requiring Separability for the three activities in 
the workflow, and the other requiring PSP. The algorithm considers one 
security plan at a time, so in a first instance it will check if the Separability 
plan is valid. 
A first service discovery is performed for ProcessPayment, looking for 
services with the required interface and the Separability security property. 
The service XYBankPayment that is currently bound to the ProcessPayment 
activity can be found in the discovery results, so it appears to have the 
Process 
Payment 
Trade 
Stocks 
Write 
Report 
XYBankPayment 
WZTrading 
123Reporting 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
151 / 253 
requested Separability property. A second service discovery is performed 
for TradeStocks, however in this case the service WZTrading that is bound 
to it cannot be found in the discovery results. This means that the current 
security plan is not valid. 
Going forward to the second security plan, the service discovery for all 
the workflow activities successfully return the bounded services, meaning 
that they all provide the security properties requested by the plan. Since 
there is at least one valid security plan, the algorithm returns true. 
6.4.4 Discovery of Secure Workflows 
The algorithm described in this section attempts to find appropriate 
workflows that can address the conditions expressed in a query (both the 
structural and the security conditions), in order to generate compositions.  
The algorithm assumes the existence of a repository of abstract 
workflows that describe the control and data-flow of well-known 
procedures, in order to focus in the algorithm on the security requirement 
inference. The abstract workflows are assumed to be supplied by domain 
experts or generative composition algorithms. The practice of requiring a 
set of existent workflows is quite common, as described in Section 2.3.  
Alternative approaches can combine the security requirement inference of 
the given algorithm with a (existing) generative approach for the workflow, 
an overview of which is also present in the same section. 
6.4.4.1 Algorithm 
When the standard discovery doesn’t find a single replacement service 
for a given service, then the query associated with the service to be replaced 
(Q) is sent to the algorithm that discovers secure workflows shown in Table 
6.6. 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
152 / 253 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Algorithm: GETSECUREWORKFLOWS(Q) 
Input:  Q – query for required service 
Output:  WStack – stack of workflows to instantiate  
 ReqMap – list of requirements for each workflow 
 
For each abstract workflow AW in the repository do 
If STRUCTURALMATCHING(Q, AW) == true then 
RSP = GETSECURITYREQUIREMENTS(Q) 
SecPlans = INFERREQUIREMENT(AW, RSP) 
For each security plan S in SecPlans do 
WF := Clone AW 
Push WF in WStack  
ReqMap[WF] := S 
EndFor 
EndIf 
EndFor 
Return WStack, ReqMap 
Table 6.6: Algorithm for the discovery of secure workflows 
Initially the algorithm identifies the abstract workflows that provide the 
requested functionality by calling the structural matching algorithm on the 
abstract workflow repository.  
Then the algorithm described in Section 6.4.1 inferring the security 
requirements is called on each matching workflow, generating in this way a 
list of security requirements, representing different plans. For each plan, 
i.e., each set of security requirements, a copy of the workflow with the 
considered security requirement is created and to the outputs of the process.  
6.4.4.2 Example 
When a service providing Stock quotations for a given Symbol has to 
be substituted, the algorithm receives a query to find alternatives. By 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
153 / 253 
matching the service structural description in the query, it finds in the 
abstract workflow repository a workflow with two activities in a sequence. 
The first activity converts a Symbol into an ISIN (different identifier format 
for the same Stock), while the second one uses the ISIN to provide Stock 
quotations.  
 
Figure 6.8: The GetStockDetails service (a) and the workflow that can 
replace the GetStockDetail service (b) 
The query conditions about security require integrity on the data, 
making explicit references to the appropriate parts of the security property 
descriptor (e.g. certificate) and in a complex combination of expressions 
and operators, as shown in Table 6.7.  
  
GetStock 
Details 
symbol stockValues 
GetISIN 
symbol ISIN 
GetValue 
FromISIN 
stockValues 
(a) 
(b) 
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<AssertQuery name="A1" type="HARD" assertScope="SINGLE"> 
  <LogicalExpression><Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
    <Operand1><AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
        //ASSERTCore/ToC/Assets/Asset[@Type='InputParameter']/Name 
    </AssertOperand></Operand1> 
    <Operand2><Function name="WSDLLookup"><Arguments> 
        <Argument WSDLElementType="input‐message" 
                  WSDLElementName="symbol"/> 
    </Arguments></Function></Operand2> 
  </Condition> 
 
  <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
  <LogicalExpression><Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
    <Operand1><AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
        //ASSERTCore/ToC/Assets/Asset[@Type='OutputParameter']/Name 
    </AssertOperand></Operand1> 
    <Operand2><Function name="WSDLLookup"><Arguments> 
        <Argument WSDLElementType="output‐message" 
                  WSDLElementName="stockValue"/> 
    </Arguments></Function></Operand2> 
  </Condition> 
 
  <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
  <LogicalExpression><Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
    <Operand1><AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
        //ASSERTCore/SecurityProperty/@PropertyAbstractCategory 
    </AssertOperand></Operand1> 
    <Operand2> 
      <Constant type="STRING">Integrity</Constant> 
    </Operand2> 
  </Condition></LogicalExpression> 
  </LogicalExpression> 
  </LogicalExpression> 
</AssertQuery> 
Table 6.7: Example of query making explicit references to certificate parts 
through XPath 
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This complex expression is converted to a security requirement, 
containing a reference to the workflow and the security property “integrity” 
on the referenced parameters (symbol and stockValue). 
The security requirements are derived through the inference algorithm 
previously explained, returning 2 plans, one requesting integrity from both 
activities and the other requesting authentication of the data. The process 
then returns two instances of the same workflow having different security 
requirements over the activities. 
6.4.5 Workflow Instantiation 
The algorithm described in this section instantiates the activities in the 
given workflows with services, by constructing ad hoc queries containing 
the structural conditions and the given security requirements. The 
workflows and the corresponding security requirements in input can be 
obtained through the algorithm described in the previous section. 
6.4.5.1 Algorithm 
The algorithm dealing with the instantiation of workflows is shown in 
Table 6.8. This algorithm makes use of a service discovery framework, 
supporting the discovery of security requirements. 
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Algorithm: WORKFLOWINSTANTIATION(WStack, ReqMap) 
Input:  WStack – stack of workflows to instantiate  
 ReqMap – list of requirements for each workflow 
Output:  ResultSet – set of instantiated workflows 
 
While there are more workflows in WStack do 
Pop the first workflow W from the WStack 
Get the first unassigned activity A from W 
Services = SERVICEDISCOVERY(A, ReqMap[W]) 
For each service S in Services do 
WS := substitute A with S in W 
If there is another unassigned activity in WS then 
Push WS in WStack 
Else 
If VERIFYREQUIREMENTS(WS, ReqMap[WS]) 
Add WS to ResultSet 
EndIf 
EndIf 
EndFor 
EndWhile 
Return ResultSet 
Table 6.8: Workflow Instantiation Algorithm 
The activities of the workflows are instantiated progressively, by 
investigating each workflow W in a depth-first manner. 
The algorithm takes the first unassigned activity A in W (in the control 
flow order) and queries the service discovery based on the structural 
requirements in the workflow information (e.g. the WSDL of A) and the 
security requirements. 
The list of candidate service resulting from the discovery process is 
then used to instantiate A in W. In particular in the prototype we arbitrarily 
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limited the instantiation by taking just the first N (with N=10) services 
based on the structural distance, to avoid the generation of too many 
workflows. Each service is used to instantiate a new workflow WS. This 
also means that if no service can be found to instantiate A, no more 
processing will happen on W (the workflow is discarded). 
If WS is not fully instantiated, then it is added to the working stack; 
otherwise the instantiation process for that workflow is ended, so if the 
security requirements are verified the workflow can be added to the list 
returned as result of the process.  
6.4.5.2 Example 
After the execution of the algorithm for discovery of secure workflows, 
we obtained two workflows that can be used to replace GetStockDetails. 
The requirements for the activities in the first workflow are integrity of the 
data, and for the second workflow data authentication is required. The 
instantiation algorithm takes into account a workflow at a time and tries to 
fully instantiate it by using the structural and security requirements for each 
activity.  
Starting from the first workflow then, the algorithm tries to instantiate 
the GetISIN activity. The service discovery is performed, asking for services 
that respect GetISIN interface and that have the requested security 
requirement, i.e., integrity of data. The service discovery finds two 
compatible services, Symbol2ISIN and ConvertStockIDs. Two new 
workflows are then inserted in the stack in order to be taken in 
consideration, one instantiating GetISIN with Symbol2ISIN and the other 
with ConvertStockIDs. At this point the workflow containing Symbol2ISIN 
is taken into consideration, in order to get the second activity instantiated as 
well. If no services are found, the workflow is discarded, otherwise if the 
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workflow is fully instantiated is added to the list of results and other 
workflows are taken into consideration. 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter we described the algorithms, which -through the usage 
od secure composition patterns- determine and assess the security 
requirements requested of the services that form a composition, in order to 
guarantee a security requirement across the entire composition.  
The first two algorithms (INFERREQUIREMENT and 
VERIFYREQUIREMENT) are more generic, allowing the inference and 
verification of security requirements. The next algorithm 
(VALIDATEWORKFLOW) supports the design time check of validity of 
security of an SBS workflow that is being designed. The last two algorithms 
(GETSECUREWORKFLOWS and WORKFLOWINSTANTIATION) encode a secure 
service composition process, available both at design and runtime, that 
consists of discover alternative workflows that can satisfy functional and 
security requirements followed by instantiation of the workflows with 
services that respect the inferred security requirements. 
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Chapter 7 
Implementation 
7.1 Overview 
Based on the approach described in the previous chapter, two tools 
have been implemented to support security aware composition respectively 
at runtime, during service discovery, and at design-time, while devising a 
SBS. These tools are called Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool and 
Security aware BPEL Design Tool. 
The discovery tool is based on an existing tool, RSDT (see Section 
4.3); where most of the new features are performed by a new component 
called Composition Manager. This component is responsible for the 
creation of secure service compositions to meet queries in cases where the 
latter do not match with any single service. Furthermore, the component 
generates a virtual service pointer that can be used by SBSs to invoke the 
composition through the tool. 
The Security aware BPEL design tool, instead, is an extension of the 
BPEL Designer plugin for Eclipse [25] that allows the security validation 
and adaptation of partner services (or service compositions) for a SBS being 
built as a service orchestration.  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
160 / 253 
7.2 Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool 
The prototype described in this section is based on RSDT, the 
discovery tool described in Section 4.3, but extended to consider also 
security conditions, certificates and service composition. 
The Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool allows runtime service 
discovery based also on security requirements and security descriptors, 
describing which security properties hold for a specific service. The current 
implementation uses the concept of certificates as security descriptors, 
however the approach is compatible with any security descriptor. 
Furthermore the tool allows the generation of service compositions that may 
be used as alternative services and that respect the functional and security 
requirements that are requested. In particular service composition is 
triggered only after an attempt to find a single service that satisfies a query 
has failed. This failure may be because there is no service that satisfies the 
interface, behavioural, quality or security conditions expressed by the query 
and does not necessarily relate only to security or non-security conditions 
about of the required service. 
7.2.1 Query language 
The queries for this discovery tool are expressed in A-SerDiQueL, an 
extension of SerDiQueL (see Section 4.4.3) that we have developed to 
support the specification of security conditions as part of service discovery 
queries. 
The specification of security conditions in A-SerDiQueL assumes that 
the security properties of services are described in certificates, as advocated 
by the ASSERT4SOA project [5][80]. In addition to specifying the relevant 
security property, certificates may include descriptions of the evidence 
justifying the certification of the property, the authority that has issued the 
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certificate, the validity period of the certificate and any other information 
related with the asserted property or the certification process. 
Certificates are represented in XML according to a specific XML 
schema, and are published in service registries as service descriptions 
(facets). An example of an A-SerDiQueL condition regarding the integrity 
of an input parameter named xyz is shown in Table 7.1. 
<AssertQuery name="A1" type="HARD" assertScope="SINGLE"> 
  <LogicalExpression><Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
        <Operand1> 
           <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
         //ASSERTCore/ToC/Assets/Asset[@Type='InputParameter']/Name 
           </AssertOperand> 
        </Operand1> 
        <Operand2> 
           <Function name="WSDLLookup"><Arguments> 
             <Argument WSDLElementType="input‐message"  
                   WSDLElementName="xyz" /> 
           </Arguments></Function> 
        </Operand2> 
     </Condition> 
     <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
     <LogicalExpression><Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
          <Operand1> 
            <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
       //ASSERTCore/SecurityProperty/@PropertyAbstractCategory 
            </AssertOperand> 
          </Operand1> 
          <Operand2> 
            <Constant type="STRING">Integrity 
            </Constant> 
          </Operand2> 
     </Condition></LogicalExpression> 
  </LogicalExpression> 
</AssertQuery> 
Table 7.1: Example of a security requirement expressed in A-SerDiQueL 
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7.2.2 Architecture 
As shown in Figure 7.1, the prototype can be called by sending a 
discovery query to the Query Handler. This component parses the query and 
sends the parsed objects to the Discovery Manager, to find services that 
match the query. The Discovery Manager collects the list of candidate 
services and sends it together with the query to the Matchmaking 
Subsystem. This subsystem handles different slave matchmakers (MM) in 
order to match the different parts of the query against the list of services. In 
particular the structural interface of the service is matched by the Structural 
MM, while security conditions are matched by Security matchmakers.  
 
Figure 7.1: Architecture of the Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool 
Our tool supports the usage, through a plugin mechanism, of other 
matchmakers developed by third-parties, as the Ontological and Certificate 
Type Specific MMs developed in the context of the ASSERT4SOA project 
[5][80]. The Ontological Security MM is able to do matching on certificate 
attributes defined as concepts in an ontology, by comparing concepts, 
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instead of just comparing strings. The Certificate Type Specific MMs are 
based on the certificate type, allowing matching and comparison on the 
basis of characteristics of the type specific model used to certify the service 
(e.g. matching of a model described in the query with the one described in 
each security certificate).  
If no services are found, the Discovery Manager calls the Composition 
Manager to try building a service composition that matches the query. The 
Composition Manager finds abstract workflows that match the searched 
functionality and potentially can satisfy the security requirements 
(following the GETSECUREWORKFLOWS algorithm in Section 6.4.4) and 
instantiates them with services that respect the inferred security 
requirements (using the WORKFLOWINSTANTIATION algorithm in Section 
6.4.5). A BPEL process is then generated from each instantiated workflow, 
in order to make possible to execute the composition as a single service. 
Finally, the references to the discovered services are embedded in a 
response and sent by the Query Handler to the client. 
7.2.3 Detailed Design of the Composition Manager  
The purpose of the Composition Manager is to generate service 
compositions providing the queried functionality and security requirements 
on the overall, by discovering single services through the Discovery 
Manager. 
7.2.3.1 Package compositionmanager 
In this section we are going to describe the compositionmanager 
package through the usage of a Class Diagram and a table summarizing the 
purpose of each package and class. 
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Figure 7.2: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager 
 
 Package/Class Description 
composition 
manager 
Provides the main functionalities of the composition 
manager 
Composition 
Manager 
The entry point of the component. Produces a list of 
service compositions from a discovery query, by 
implementing WORKFLOWINSTANTIATION algorithm 
in Section 6.4.5. 
Workflow 
Repository 
Retrieves a stack of abstract workflows from the 
repository, based on the structural and security part of 
the query, following the GETSECUREWORKFLOWS 
algorithm in Section 6.4.4. 
QueryBuilder Generates the service discovery queries used to 
instantiate the activities within a workflow. 
Table 7.2: Description of the classes in the package compositionmanager 
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7.2.3.2 Package compositionmanager.secrule 
In this section we are going to describe the compositionmanager 
.secrule package through the usage of a Class Diagram and a table 
summarizing the purpose of each package and class. 
 
Figure 7.3: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager.secrule 
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Package/Class Description 
composition 
manager 
.secrule 
Provides the interconnection with the rule-based 
system by converting the query and the requirements 
and managing the Knowledge Base 
RuleReasoner Manages the Knowledge Base: it inserts the facts, 
fires the rules and retrieves the resulting facts. 
Through the rules it implements the 
INFERREQUIREMENT and VERIFYREQUIREMENT 
algorithms described in Section 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 
RequirementParser Converts the security conditions of the query into 
Requirement and vice versa. 
SecPlan Representation for the rule-based system of a 
collection of Requirement that compose a security 
plan. 
Requirement Representation for the rule-based system of the 
requirement of a security property upon an activity or 
a pattern of the workflow. 
SecProperty Security property description that allows a set of 
attributes to describe the specific instance of a 
property. 
Table 7.3: Description of the classes in the package compositionmanager 
.secrule 
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7.2.3.3 Package compositionmanager.workflow 
In this section we are going to describe the compositionmanager 
.workflow package through the usage of a Class Diagram and a table 
summarizing the purpose of each package and class. 
 
 
 Figure 7.4: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager .workflow 
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Package/Class Description 
composition 
manager 
.workflow 
Contains the data structures representing the workflows: 
orchestration patterns and activities. 
Workflow Represents a workflow and contains the WSDL 
representation of the operation that it provides and a 
pattern that is the root of the workflow. 
Placeholder Represents a placeholder inside an orchestration pattern 
that can be fit by a service activity or another pattern. 
OrchestrationP. Represents a control flow pattern. 
Sequential Control flow pattern representing the sequential 
invocation of two placeholders.  
Parallel Control flow pattern representing the parallel invocation 
of two or more placeholders. 
Choice Control flow pattern representing the choice of which path 
of execution to take base on a condition (e.g. if-then-else). 
Unassigned 
Activity 
Represents an unassigned activity. Contains a WSDL 
representing the structure required from a service to 
instantiate it. 
PartnerLink 
Activity 
Represents an activity that has already been instantiated 
with a partner service. Contains also a list of the security 
properties guaranteed by the service through certificates. 
Parameters Contains the information about input and output 
parameters of the placeholder. 
Table 7.4: Description of the classes in the package compositionmanager 
.workflow 
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7.2.3.4 Package compositionmanager.bpel 
In this section we are going to describe the compositionmanager 
.bpel package through the usage of a Class Diagram and a table 
summarizing the purpose of each package and class. 
 
Figure 7.5: Class Diagram of the package compositionmanager.bpel 
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Package/Class Description 
composition 
manager 
.bpel 
Provides the means to handle BPEL, WSDL and 
deployment descriptors for the generated 
compositions, in order to allow publishing the 
compositions and execute them straight away. 
BPELWriter Given an instantiated workflow (i.e., a composition), 
it produces a BPEL referring to the correct partner 
links. 
WSDLWriter Produces the WSDL of the composition, importing 
the WSDLs of the partner services. 
Deploy Representation of the deployment descriptor file used 
by Apache-ODE to run a BPEL file. 
ServiceInstantiator Makes the correct edits to the BPEL and WSDL in 
order to substitute the placeholder with the service 
that instantiate the composition. 
Table 7.5: Description of the classes in the package 
compositionmanager.bpel 
7.2.4 Example 
The example used to demonstrate the approach is based on the Stock 
Brokerage scenario described in Section 6.2 and focuses on a Stock Service 
providing the current value of the given stock. In particular the Stock 
Service provides an operation called Get Stock Value Details. This 
operation takes as input the stock symbol of a given stock and returns the 
current stock value in USD dollars.  
The query that requires the composition expresses a security 
requirement regarding integrity of data on the input and the output of the 
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activity realised by the service in the scenario. The service discovery query 
Q to replace the service providing the described operation, is shown in 
Table 7.6. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf‐8"?> 
<tns:ServiceQuery xmlns:... name="QueryStockQuote" 
   queryID="UUID:550e8400‐e29b‐41d4‐a716‐446655440060"> 
  <par:Parameters> 
    <par:Mode value="PULL" /> 
    <par:Threshold value="0.1" /> 
    <par:Composition value="true" /> 
  </par:Parameters> 
 
  <!‐‐ Structural sub‐query ‐‐> 
  <tns:StructuralQuery> 
    <wsdl:definitions xmlns:...> 
       <wsdl:types> 
         <xsd:schema elementFormDefault="qualified" 
           targetNamespace="http://www.webserviceX.NET/"> 
           <xsd:element name="Quote"> 
             <xsd:complexType><xsd:sequence> 
               <xsd:element minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
                  name="symbol" type="xsd:string" /> 
             </xsd:sequence></xsd:complexType> 
           </xsd:element> 
           <xsd:element name="QuoteResponse"> 
             <xsd:complexType><xsd:sequence> 
               <xsd:element minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
                  name="USDValue" type="xsd:string" /> 
              </xsd:sequence></xsd:complexType> 
           </xsd:element> 
         </xsd:schema> 
       </wsdl:types> 
       <wsdl:message name="GetQuoteSoapIn"> 
          <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="tns:Quote" /> 
       </wsdl:message> 
       <wsdl:message name="GetQuoteSoapOut"> 
          <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="tns:QuoteResponse" /> 
       </wsdl:message> 
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       <wsdl:portType name="StockQuoteSoap"> 
          <wsdl:operation name="GetUSDStockQuote"> 
             <wsdl:input message="tns:GetQuoteSoapIn" /> 
             <wsdl:output message="tns:GetQuoteSoapOut" /> 
          </wsdl:operation> 
       </wsdl:portType> 
    </wsdl:definitions> 
  </tns:StructuralQuery> 
 
  <AssertQuery name="A1" type="HARD" assertScope="SINGLE"> 
    <LogicalExpression> 
       <Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
          <Operand1> 
             <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
           //ASSERTCore/ToC/Assets/Asset[@Type='InputParameter']/Name 
             </AssertOperand> 
          </Operand1> 
          <Operand2> 
             <Function name="WSDLLookup"><Arguments> 
                 <Argument WSDLElementType="input‐message"  
                       WSDLElementName="symbol" /> 
              </Arguments></Function> 
          </Operand2> 
       </Condition> 
       <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
       <LogicalExpression> 
         <Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
           <Operand1> 
              <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
             //ASSERTCore/SecurityProperty/@PropertyAbstractCategory 
              </AssertOperand> 
            </Operand1> 
            <Operand2> 
              <Constant type="STRING">Integrity</Constant> 
            </Operand2> 
          </Condition> 
       </LogicalExpression> 
    </LogicalExpression> 
  </AssertQuery> 
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  <AssertQuery name="A2" type="HARD" assertScope="SINGLE"> 
    <LogicalExpression> 
       <Condition relation="EQUALS‐TO"> 
          <Operand1> 
             <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
          //ASSERTCore/ToC/Assets/Asset[@Type='OutputParameter']/Name 
             </AssertOperand> 
          </Operand1> 
          <Operand2> 
             <Function name="WSDLLookup"><Arguments> 
               <Argument WSDLElementType="input‐message"  
                     WSDLElementName="USDValue" /> 
             </Arguments></Function> 
          </Operand2> 
       </Condition> 
       <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
       <LogicalExpression> 
          <Condition relation="EQUIVALENT‐CLASS"> 
            <Operand1> 
              <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
             //ASSERTCore/SecurityProperty/@PropertyAbstractCategory 
              </AssertOperand> 
            </Operand1> 
            <Operand2> 
              <Constant type="STRING">Integrity</Constant> 
            </Operand2> 
          </Condition> 
       </LogicalExpression> 
    </LogicalExpression> 
  </AssertQuery> 
 
</tns:ServiceQuery> 
Table 7.6: Stock Service replacement query 
When Stock Service becomes unavailable, the discovery query Q is 
executed. If the single service discovery doesn’t find any service, service 
composition is performed.  
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The first task is to discover workflows that can support the queried 
security requirements; this is accomplished by the 
GETSECUREWORKFLOWS(Q) algorithm. The algorithm discovers an abstract 
workflow W matching the structural constraints, containing three activities 
connected by two Cascade Patterns. The first activity of the outer sequence 
is Get ISIN, which converts the symbol identifying the stock into the ISIN 
(that is another identifier of the stock). The second activity is instantiated 
with the other Cascade Pattern. 
Workflow[orchestration= 
  Sequential( 
    UnassignedActivity(GetISIN), 
    Sequential( 
        UnassignedActivity(GetQuoteActivity), 
        UnassignedActivity(GetConversion) ) )] 
Figure 7.6: Representation of the abstract workflow extracted from the tests 
execution 
The first activity of this inner sequence is Get Stock Quote, which 
returns the current stock value in EUR given the stock ISIN. The second 
activity is Get Currency Converter, which converts a given amount from 
EUR to USD. 
To infer the security requirements for each of the services that are 
going to instantiate the activities, the INFERREQUIREMENT(RSP, W) 
algorithm is called. In particular the requirement about the integrity is 
propagated by the pattern described in Section 5.3.2.1, generating three new 
requirements about integrity for the activity placeholders.  
At first the rule representing said pattern is fired for the security 
requirement on the external sequential orchestration. As a consequence of 
this rule, the requirement of integrity on the inputs and outputs is inferred to 
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both the activities in the pattern: Get ISIN and the other (internal) sequential 
orchestration. 
The new security requirement on the internal sequential orchestration 
then fires again the rule above. This rule then splits the requirement into 
two different integrity requirements: one for Get Stock Quote and one for 
Currency Converter. Other abstract workflows with appropriate security 
requirements are discovered in the same way and added to the stack in 
output. 
The workflows and their security requirements are then passed to the 
WORKFLOWINSTANTIATION(WStack, ReqMap) algorithm in order to 
discover appropriate partner services for the workflows. The first 
unassigned activity of the first workflow in the stack has to be instantiated, 
in this case Get ISIN of W. The query for Get ISIN is then built from the 
structural specifications in the workflow and the security requirements 
generated in the previous step, namely integrity for its inputs and outputs, as 
shown in Table 7.7. 
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<tns:ServiceQuery xmlns:... ...> 
  <par:Parameters> 
    <par:Mode value="PULL" /> 
    <par:Threshold value="0.1" /> 
  </par:Parameters> 
 
  <tns:StructuralQuery> 
    <wsdl:definitions xmlns:...> 
      <wsdl:types> 
        <xsd:schema elementFormDefault="qualified" ...> 
          <xsd:element name="GetISINReq"> 
            <xsd:complexType><xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
                    name="symbol" type="xsd:string" /> 
            </xsd:sequence></xsd:complexType> 
          </xsd:element> 
          <xsd:element name="GetISINRes"> 
            <xsd:complexType><xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
                    name="ISIN" type="xsd:string" /> 
            </xsd:sequence></xsd:complexType> 
          </xsd:element> 
        </xsd:schema> 
      </wsdl:types> 
      <wsdl:message name="GetISINSoapIn"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="tns:GetISINReq" /> 
      </wsdl:message> 
      <wsdl:message name="GetISINSoapOut"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="tns:GetISINRes" /> 
      </wsdl:message> 
      <wsdl:portType name="StockISINSoap"> 
        <wsdl:operation name="GetISIN"> 
          <wsdl:input message="tns:GetISINSoapIn" /> 
          <wsdl:output message="tns:GetISINSoapOut" /> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
      </wsdl:portType> 
    </wsdl:definitions> 
  </tns:StructuralQuery> 
 
  <AssertQuery name="A1" type="HARD" assertScope="SINGLE"> 
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41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
    <LogicalExpression> 
       <Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
          <Operand1> 
             <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
      //ASSERTCore/ToC/Assets/Asset[@Type='InputParameter']/Name 
             </AssertOperand> 
          </Operand1> 
          <Operand2> 
             <Function name="WSDLLookup"><Arguments> 
               <Argument WSDLElementType="input‐message"  
                     WSDLElementName="symbol" /> 
             </Arguments></Function> 
          </Operand2> 
       </Condition> 
       <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
       <LogicalExpression> 
          <Condition relation="EQUAL‐TO"> 
            <Operand1> 
              <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
         //ASSERTCore/SecurityProperty/@PropertyAbstractCategory 
              </AssertOperand> 
            </Operand1> 
            <Operand2> 
              <Constant type="STRING">Integrity 
              </Constant> 
            </Operand2> 
          </Condition> 
       </LogicalExpression> 
    </LogicalExpression> 
  </AssertQuery> 
 
  <AssertQuery name="A2" type="HARD" assertScope="SINGLE"> 
    <LogicalExpression> 
       <Condition relation="EQUALS‐TO"> 
          <Operand1> 
             <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
     //ASSERTCore/ToC/Assets/Asset[@Type='OutputParameter']/Name 
             </AssertOperand> 
          </Operand1> 
          <Operand2> 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
178 / 253 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
             <Function name="WSDLLookup"><Arguments> 
               <Argument WSDLElementType="input‐message"  
                     WSDLElementName="ISIN" /> 
             </Arguments></Function> 
          </Operand2> 
       </Condition> 
       <LogicalOperator>AND</LogicalOperator> 
       <LogicalExpression> 
          <Condition relation="EQUIVALENT‐CLASS"> 
            <Operand1> 
              <AssertOperand facetType="Assert"> 
         //ASSERTCore/SecurityProperty/@PropertyAbstractCategory 
              </AssertOperand> 
            </Operand1> 
            <Operand2> 
              <Constant type="STRING">Integrity 
              </Constant> 
            </Operand2> 
          </Condition> 
       </LogicalExpression> 
    </LogicalExpression> 
  </AssertQuery> 
 
</tns:ServiceQuery> 
Table 7.7: Get ISIN discovery query 
More specifically, lines 1 – 5 contain generic query parameters, 
indicating the type of query execution (i.e., PULL), and the minimum 
distance value for accepting results. Lines 7 – 38 show the structural 
conditions defining the required interface of the service using a WSDL 
specification.  
Lines 40 – 70 contain a first set of security conditions (called A1) that 
must be evaluated against a single certificate (as their scope is SINGLE) and 
satisfied by all candidate services (as their type is HARD). The conditions 
specify that the input Symbol must be in the list of assets on which the 
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certification of the security property is applied (lines 41 – 54) and that 
certified security property provided by the service is called Integrity (lines 
56 – 68). 
A second set of security conditions is shown in lines 72 – 102 and can 
be evaluated against different certificates then the first one. In particular 
even these conditions must be evaluated against a single certificate (as their 
scope is SINGLE) and satisfied by all candidate services (as their type is 
HARD). The conditions specify that the output ISIN must be in the list of 
assets on which the certification of the security property is applied (lines 73 
– 86) and that the certified security property provided by the service is 
called Integrity (lines 88 – 100). 
The service discovery executes the query to find in the registry a set of 
services that match the structural and security conditions. Each service is 
used to instantiate a new workflow copy of W. 
Workflow[orchestration= 
  Sequential( 
    PartnerLinkActivity(http://example.com/StockISIN.wsdl), 
    Sequential( 
        UnassignedActivity(GetQuoteActivity), 
        UnassignedActivity(GetConversion) ) )] 
Figure 7.7: Representation of the abstract workflow after the first 
instantiation 
The activity is now bounded to a partner service, represented by its 
WSDL address in Figure 7.7, and it contains the security properties 
extracted from the certificates associated to the service. All the instantiated 
workflows are added to the stack, as they still need partner services for the 
other activity placeholders. 
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Similarly a query for the second activity is created and executed, and 
the workflow gets instantiated again: 
Workflow[orchestration= 
  Sequential( 
    PartnerLinkActivity(http://example.com/StockISIN.wsdl), 
    Sequential( 
        PartnerLinkActivity(http://example.com/QuoteFromISIN.wsdl), 
        UnassignedActivity(GetConversion) ) )] 
Figure 7.8: Representation of the abstract workflow after the second 
instantiation 
And finally the third one, completing the workflow: 
Workflow[orchestration= 
  Sequential( 
    PartnerLinkActivity(http://example.com/StockISIN.wsdl), 
    Sequential( 
        PartnerLinkActivity(http://example.com/QuoteFromISIN.wsdl), 
        PartnerLinkActivity(http://example.com/CurrConvert.wsdl) ) )] 
Figure 7.9: Representation of the final workflow 
Figure 7.10 shows the final results of the discovery from a GUI. On the 
left side is possible to select a partner service to replace, after selecting one, 
the discovery query for the service is shown on the bottom left part of the 
window. After executing the query, is possible to see the results on the right 
side. The top part shows all the alternatives that were found, whilst the 
middle part shows the workflow of the selected composition. 
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Figure 7.10: Execution result of the composition example 
7.3 Security Aware BPEL Design Tool 
The aim of the Security Aware BPEL Design Tool is to facilitate the 
tasks of an SBS Designer by allowing the specification of security 
requirements during the designing of a BPEL process. The information 
about security requirements provide the means to timely validate or 
substitute services, so that the services are appropriate for the application 
being developed. 
The specification of security requirements is not possible in the 
common BPEL design tools, but it is rather important part of the model of a 
process. The Security Aware BPEL Design Tool allows defining security 
requirements to an invoke activity or to the control flow constructs that 
contain other activities (e.g. scope, sequence, flow, pick, if-then-else, …). 
After such definition, the SBS Designer can ask the system to validate the 
security requirements, i.e., check that the service operations associated with 
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the activities subject to a security requirement guarantee the requirements, 
without having to investigate this with external tools. If a service doesn’t 
guarantee the requirements, the SBS Designer can use the tool to explore 
and select an alternative service that complies with the requirements or, if 
no atomic service is found, an alternative workflow that can be substituted 
with the activity to satisfy the requirements. After selection of an alternative 
service or service composition, the BPEL process is automatically adapted 
in order to use the new service or to incorporate the composition workflow. 
This addition allows the SBS Designer to fix BPEL processes that do not 
respect security requirements without having to (i) manually check the 
satisfaction of the requirements, (ii) write a query to search for alternative 
services that respect the security requirements, (iii) submit the query to the 
discovery engine and (iv) change manually the BPEL process with a 
suitable service suggested by the discovery engine. 
7.3.1 Architecture 
The overall architecture of the Security Aware BPEL Design Tool is 
shown in Figure 7.11. As shown in the figure, the tool is based on the BPEL 
Designer plugin of Eclipse and on the Security Aware Runtime Discovery 
Tool that is used as plugin for the Eclipse IDE platform. The new 
component we introduced is a Security Extension package for the BPEL 
Designer, were all the new functionalities are deployed. 
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Figure 7.11: Architecture of the Security Aware BPEL Design Tool 
BPEL Designer is an Eclipse plugin that offers comprehensive support 
for the definition, authoring, editing, deploying, testing and debugging of 
WS-BPEL 2.0 processes through Eclipse IDE. In the development of the 
Security Aware BPEL Design Tool, we have extended the plugin with the 
Security Extension component that: (i) allows the specification of security 
requirements for the invoke and control flow activities in a BPEL process, 
(ii) introduces a new button to request the validation of the security 
requirements, (iii) shows the results of the validation and eventual 
alternative services or service compositions that satisfy the requirements, 
and (iv) allows the adaptation of the BPEL process by replacing an existing 
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service linked with an invoke activity with an alternative service or 
replacing the invoke activity altogether with a service composition. In doing 
(iv), we also guarantee that under certain conditions the modified BPEL 
process can be executed. 
7.3.2 Detailed Design of the Security Extension 
The purpose of the Security Extension is to introduce the definition, 
validation and adaptation based on security requirements to the BPEL 
Designer plugin of Eclipse. This component is also the intermediary to the 
Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool at design time. 
7.3.2.1 Package securityextension 
In this section we are going to describe the securityextension 
package through the usage of a Class Diagram and a table summarizing the 
purpose of each package and class. 
 
Figure 7.12: Class Diagram of the package securityextension 
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Package/Class Description 
securityextension Provides the main functionalities of the security 
extension of the BPEL Designer 
ValidateActivity Checks the validity of the security requirements by 
contacting the appropriate functions in the 
Composition Manager and the Query Handler. It 
implements the VALIDATEWORKFLOW algorithm 
described in Section 6.4.3. 
AdaptActivity Adapts the BPEL process by replacing a service with 
another one in an invoke activity or by replacing the 
invoke activity altogether with the workflow of a 
service composition. 
utils.XMLUtils Utility class to handle XML documents. 
Table 7.8: Description of the classes in the package securityextension 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
186 / 253 
7.3.2.2 Package securityextension.securitymodel 
In this section we are going to describe the securityextension 
.securitymodel package through the usage of a Class Diagram and a 
table summarizing the purpose of each package and class. 
 
Figure 7.13: Class Diagram of the package securityextension .securitymodel 
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 Package/Class Description 
securityextension 
.securitymodel 
Provides the representation and the utilities to handle 
the Security Requirements linked with a BPEL 
process. 
SecRequirement Representation of a security requirement for an 
activity of a BPEL process. It allows the specification 
of an identifier, an activity that is subjected to the 
requirement, a security property and other details 
about the certificate and the assets for which the 
security property should hold. 
Assets Representation of the assets for which a property 
should hold. Each asset has a type and a name. 
SecRequirements 
Handler 
Provides the management facilities for the security 
requirements of a BPEL process, allowing to load and 
save them into files and to access to them. 
SecRequirements 
Reader 
Parses the XML file representation of a security 
requirement to the object representation for the 
SecRequirementsHandler. 
SecRequirements 
Writer 
Writes the XML file representation of a security 
requirement from the object representation for the 
SecRequirementsHandler. 
Table 7.9: Description of the classes in the package securityextension 
.securitymodel 
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7.3.2.3 Package securityextension.gui 
In this section we are going to describe the securityextension 
.gui package through the usage of a Class Diagram and a table 
summarizing the purpose of each package and class. 
 
Figure 7.14: Class Diagram of the package securityextension.gui 
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Package/Class Description 
securityextension 
.gui 
Provides the graphical user interface additions of the 
Security Extension. 
ValidationAnd 
AdaptationView 
Defines a new View for the Eclipse Workbench, 
comprising a tab where the information for the 
Validation and Adaptation are shown. 
ValidationAnd 
AdaptationPanel 
Defines the interface of the Validation and Adaptation 
panel. It shows the information about the queries 
executed for the validation process, the result of the 
validation and a list of alternative services or service 
compositions that satisfy the requirements. 
XmlTextPane Formats the XML of the queries in order to highlight 
the different parts of the XML encoding. 
Validation 
ProgressBar 
Progress bar that is shown during the validation 
process.  
Table 7.10: Description of the classes in the package securityextension .gui 
7.3.2.4 Other Packages 
The Security Extension introduces also several classes that 
conceptually should be part of the existing packages of the BPEL Designer. 
In particular all the classes should be part of the packages children of the 
org.eclipse.bpel.ui package. In order to isolate our additions from 
the original code of the BPEL Designer, these classes have been placed in 
the securityextension package, but retaining the part of the package 
name that should have been placed after org.eclipse.bpel.ui. 
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Figure 7.15: Class Diagram of other packages part of the extension 
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Class Description 
actions.editpart. 
Validate 
SecRequirements 
Defines a new button and the action to perform when 
pressed. The button allows requesting the validation 
of security requirements. 
properties. 
SecRequirements 
Section 
Defines a new property section for a given BPEL 
activity where it is possible to specify the security 
requirements for the activity. 
details.providers.* Retrieve the information to populate the combo-boxes 
in the SecRequirementsSection. 
Table 7.11: Description of the classes in the other packages part of the 
extension 
7.3.3 Example 
The specification of the security requirements for an activity of the 
BPEL process is performed under the Properties view of the activity. To 
open the Properties view, right click on the activity that you wish to check 
and select “Show in Properties” option in the pop up menu. Then in the 
Properties tab select “Security Specification” and use it to specify the 
requirements.  
As shown in Figure 7.16, in the security specification tab the designer 
can select different parameters to define a security requirement. More 
specifically, the designer needs to specify an ID for the security 
requirement, and select the category of the security property. The selection 
of the security property can be made from a list of possible categories. 
Optionally, the designer may also select the certificate type and the asset 
name and type that should guarantee the selected security property, where 
the assets can be selected from the input or output parameters. After 
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completion, pushing the “Add” button adds the security requirement to the 
list; in this way it is possible to define multiple security requirements for the 
same activity (to navigate through them, use the “Security Properties” 
dropdown menu). 
 
Figure 7.16: Security Specification for the GetCurrentStockDetails activity 
In the figure a security requirement is specified for the activity 
GetCurrentStockDetails of the Stock Brokerage scenario (described in 
Section 6.2), requiring that the Integrity of the input symbol is preserved. 
Once the security requirement is specified, the designer can select the 
“Verify Security Properties” option from the activity’s contextual menu in 
order to check that the services used as a partner links for the activity 
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satisfy the security requirements. This is obtained by right clicking on the 
activity to obtain the menu shown in Figure 7.17, and by clicking on the 
appropriate option. 
 
Figure 7.17: The activity contextual menu showing the “Verify Security 
Property” option 
After selecting “Verify Security Properties”, the tool opens the 
validation and adaptation view and a progress bar notifies that the validation 
process is ongoing. Once the validation is done, the results are displayed in 
the new view, as shown in Figure 7.18. 
In particular, the left side of the view shows the query that was used to 
validate the security requirements. Sub tabs in this part allow the selection 
of different parts of this query, namely the structural, behavioural, QoS and 
security related query part. On the right the validation result is shown 
(under Security Property Verification Status) and a list of other services or 
service compositions that satisfy the same requirements, and could be used 
as a replacement.   
In our example the partner service used for the GetCurrentStockDetails 
activity does not satisfy the requirements: this is shown by the display of 
the status message “Service does not satisfy security requirements” in red. 
Note that if the requirements were satisfied the status would be displayed by 
a green message saying: “Service satisfies security requirements”.  
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Furthermore, in this case, no single service satisfying the security 
requirements is found. Hence, the tool identified a service composition that 
could substitute the activity and guarantee the security requirements. By 
selecting the composition it is possible to investigate the workflow of the 
composition, as shown in the figure (see the panel Composition Details in 
the bottom right part of the figure). The discovered composition has been 
based on the sequential orchestration and is explained in the example 
section of the Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool. 
 
Figure 7.18: The Validation and Adaptation view 
If the security requirements are not satisfied by the service specified as 
a partner link for an invoke activity, it is possible to select a replacement 
service or service composition and click the “Replace By…” button. This 
will cause the adaptation of the BPEL process with the selected service or 
service composition. 
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Figure 7.19: BPEL process after the adaptation of a service composition in 
place of the GetCurrentStockDetails activity 
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In this example, when the designer selects the alternative composition 
and selects the “Replace By…” button, the GetCurrentStockDetails activity 
is replaced with the activities of the composition, within a scope, as shown 
in Figure 7.19 (the part highlighted in red is the composition that replaced 
the GetCurrentStockDetails activity).  
7.4 Summary 
In this chapter we described two tools that have been implemented and 
that make usage of the pattern-based Security Aware Service Composition 
approach described in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The first tool, Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool, can be used to 
find services based on discovery queries that can include security 
requirements. The innovative feature of the tool is the support to generation 
and discovery of service compositions that respect the security 
requirements. The service compositions are automatically deployed in a 
server, ready to be executed, allowing seamless runtime adaptation of a SBS 
with service compositions. 
The second tool is the Security Aware BPEL Design Tool. This tool is 
an extension of the BPEL Designer plugin for Eclipse that allows the 
introduction of security requirements and the security validation and 
adaptation for a SBS being built as a service orchestration. The graphical 
user interface offers seamless integration of the validation algorithm, the 
discovery platform and the service adaptation. The latter is performed on 
user request in order to replace a service that does not respect security 
requirements with a service or a service composition that does so. In 
particular the service orchestration is automatically updated in order to 
include new activities that call the new partner services. 
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The two tools described allow taking advantage of the Security Aware 
Service Composition approach in the different stages of SBSs lifecycle. 
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Chapter 8 
Evaluation 
8.1 Overview 
This chapter describes the performance study performed on the 
discovery tool. The approach adopted for the test session is described in 
Section 8.2. Results are reported and analysed in Section 8.2.3. Finally, 
Section 8.4 summarizes the results and considerations on the evaluation and 
application of the framework.  
8.2 Evaluation Setup 
8.2.1 Scenario 
The performance study has been based on services and security 
requirements part of the Stock Brokerage scenario described in Section 6.2. 
The scenario focuses on the discovery and integration of services in a SBS 
that automates the stock purchase using some stock investor preferences. 
The scenario devises a set of services and security requirements that are 
needed by the SBS; we give here, as an example, a short description of the 
service providing Get Current Stock Detail. Get Current Stock Details 
provides information about the current value of specific stocks. It takes as 
input the company code in string format (symbol) and returns the current 
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dollar value of the stock in string format (USDvalue). The SBS introduces 
the following security requirements for Get Current Stock Details:  
• Confidentiality of Data 
• Integrity of Data 
• Availability 
8.2.1.1 Service Registry 
Several incarnations of all the services in the scenario have been added 
to a registry. The registry has been augmented also with some additional 
services not part of the scenario to simulate a real world scenario, where the 
services that one might be interested in have to be discovered from a 
broader set of services. The WSDLs of the additional services come from 
the QWS Dataset [2][3], i.e., a collection of real web services available on 
the public web that is offered as a basis for tests and researches.  
The registry has also been populated with security certificates and each 
service has been associated with a variable number of certificates. In 
particular an initial set of security certificates have been composed 
manually to fulfil the security requirements introduced above. Additional 
security certificates have been randomly generated through the support of 
an automated tool.  
In more details, the registry contains 1200 service WSDLs, 44 of them 
are part of the stock brokerage scenario, while the others come from the 
QWS dataset. The registry has a very disparate composition, as in a real 
world scenario, with services offering an average of five operations (with a 
range from 1 to 264 operations per service) and transmitting input and 
output messages with an average of five data types per interaction (with a 
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range from 0 to 111 data types per operation). Such a disparate composition 
is important for this kind of evaluation, as the performances of the structural 
matching are strictly linked with the complexity of the operation and data 
graphs of the WSDLs in the registry.  
On the security side, the registry contains 3663 security certificates; 
meaning that each service has as an average three security certificates. In 
particular the registry contains services associated with a minimum of one 
and a maximum of twelve security certificates.  
A total of 91 security certificates have been manually generated to 
cover other possible security requirements for the stock brokerage scenario. 
The produced security certificates cover different security properties such as 
Confidentiality, Authenticity, Integrity, Privacy, Availability and Non-
Repudiation, with each property being in at least four different security 
certificates.  
Finally, to properly support the composition scenario, the repository 
containing abstract workflows (i.e., service coordination processes that 
realize known business processes through the definition of fixed interfaces 
for potential participating services, as described in Section 6.2) has been 
populated with 20 business processes.  
8.2.1.2 Service Discovery Queries 
A-SerDiQueL queries are used, for the sake of this study, as an 
instrument to investigate the behaviour of the discovery tool. A set of three 
queries has been formulated to test the different rules in the system used by 
the composition process.  
The queries differ mainly for the security conditions that affect the 
matching of services based on their security certificates. The structural 
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conditions in the queries instead, i.e., the ones that affect matching based on 
the service interface (WSDL), target all the same interface (i.e., one that 
provides Get Current Stock Details), as structural matching is a basic aspect 
of service discovery that was not part of the investigation (the interested 
reader can find some performance considerations on the traditional service 
discovery in [117]). The security conditions for the queries are:  
Q1. Security Property: Integrity AND 
Assets contains: symbol (input) AND 
Assets contains: USDvalue (output) 
Q2. Security Property: Perfect Security Property 
Q3. Security Property: Availability AND 
Maximum execution time ≤ 1000 millisec 
Take for example query Q1. The query requires a specific Security 
Property (i.e., Integrity). The other conditions that must hold to include a 
service in the results is that the certificate matched by the previous 
condition of this query has the symbol input element and the USDvalue 
output element (as specified in the service WSDL) specified in the Target of 
Certification’s Assets. 
8.2.2 Configuration 
8.2.2.1 Prototype 
The main enhancement in the prototype used for the actual testing is 
the introduction of a caching mechanism in the Discovery Manager. This 
feature is very important for the performances of a service discovery 
system. 
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The caching mechanism is used to maintain in memory the set of 
WSDL and certificate objects representing the services that are in the 
registry. Parsing the XML artefacts to generate this kind of object is a very 
time-consuming activity, so caching them through an offline initialisation 
allows achieving better online performances. The caching mechanism relies 
on the fact that whenever there is a change in the registry (e.g. a service is 
no longer supported, a security certificate is revoked, and so on), either (i) 
the registry sends notifications of the change in order to maintain the cache 
up to date, or (ii) the cache is synchronized periodically with the contents of 
the registries through a polling process. The prototype has been updated 
also to annotate the execution time of each component and return all of 
them to the client.  
8.2.2.2 Test Execution 
The performance for each query was evaluated incrementally for 
registries containing 150, 300, 600 and 1200 services in order to analyse the 
scalability of the solution. The execution time for each query using each 
registry capacity was calculated as average across 30 executions, to avoid 
distorted data.  
A simple client has been written to execute sequentially all the queries 
against the prototype and save the results in CSV files (i.e., comma-
separated values, a file format to represent tables with plain text files). The 
prototype and the client have been executed four times to support all the 
service registry sizes, by manually changing the service registry 
configuration file.  
The tests have been executed on a load-free iMac system with an Intel 
Core i3 CPU (3.06 GHz) and 4 GB RAM (DDR3, 1333 MHz) running Mac 
OS X 10.6.8.  
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8.2.3 Threats to validity 
Different factors may impact and bias the results of performance tests. 
In our study we tried to minimize such threats, however some factors may 
still have affected the results. 
The QWS dataset has been chosen to populate the registry with WSDLs 
from real web services available on the web, in order to allow 
generalization of our results to the industry. This solution relies on the 
range and quality of the dataset; please refer to [2][3] for a discussion on the 
characteristics of the dataset. 
The certificates in the registry have been produced ad-hoc for the 
experiments, as such artefacts are a rather new concept and they are not 
currently available in any repository. The distribution of security properties 
and other parameters over the certificate population has been uniformly 
randomized, however we expect that this will not be the case for real 
services. In particular one can expect certain properties to be more 
represented than others, based on industry interest and diffusion of 
mechanisms to achieve the required security. The impact of this difference 
in the distribution is only marginal, as the performances to match a 
certificate do not change with the change of security property. The number 
of services that provide a property, however, may change the number of 
workflows that are generated during a composition, and by so, it may 
influence the execution time. 
In order to avoid the performance data to be biased by the effect of 
concurrency, the tests have been performed on a load-free system. 
Furthermore, in order to remove also the effects of background processes 
and of the garbage collector that may be asynchronously executed, we 
performed each test 30 different times. 
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Finally, to avoid introducing human errors in the data collection phase, 
all the test results have been collected and analysed automatically, through 
the usage of CSV files and Excel formulas. 
8.3 Evaluation Results 
This section presents an analysis of the test results through a set of 
tables summarising the results. A more complete set of results can be found 
in Appendix A.  
 Avail. Integr. PSP  
Receive and parse 
query 
Mean 233.40 167.80 189.50 
S
in
g
le
 D
isc
o
v
e
ry
 
SD 70.02 45.05 11.87 
Retrieval of service 
descr. 
Mean 7.43 7.50 7.23 
SD 1.02 0.92 0.80 
Matching Mean 466.93 467.27 464.73 
SD 28.26 34.16 9.25 
Abstract WF 
Matching 
Mean 4.93 7.17 4.97 
C
o
m
p
o
sitio
n
 
SD 0.73 10.18 0.71 
Inference rules Mean 46.40 38.17 45.63 
SD 5.79 8.29 5.27 
Composition 
Algorithm 
Mean 1644.47 532.17 1159.97 
SD 711.79 78.53 123.75 
Sub-queries time Mean 21187.10 11439.73 19268.63 
SD 195.03 256.74 159.70 
BPEL Generation Mean 5353.33 2505.50 7007.43 
SD 222.94 385.05 195.70 
# Generated Compositions 79 (120) 40 104  
# Generated Sub-queries 51 25 46  
Table 8.1: Execution times by operations, with 1200 services in the registry 
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Table 8.1 shows the execution times for each operation that is part of 
the composition process when using the registry containing 1200 services, 
with respect to the three queries. The top section shows the operations of 
the single service discovery that are performed in the first instance when the 
query is submitted, i.e., receive and parse query, retrieval of services from 
the cache, structural and security matching. Since no single service can be 
found to match the query, the Composition Manager is called, and performs 
the operations in the middle of the table, i.e., abstract workflow (WF) 
matching, inference rules, discover services for the WF activities (through 
the generation of sub-queries), other operations of the composition 
algorithm and, finally, generation of a BPEL for each composition.  
In particular, the first two composition operations are part of the 
GETSECUREWORKFLOWS algorithm described in Section 6.4.4, and the third 
and fourth composition operations are part of the 
WORKFLOWINSTANTIATION algorithm described in Section 6.4.5. The fifth 
operation, i.e., the BPEL generation for each composition, is not part of the 
algorithms described in previous sections, however it is needed in order to 
be able to automatically use the produced composition. 
 The bottom section of the table shows the number of generated activity 
sub-queries and the number of the compositions returned by the algorithm. 
The first element to note, as highlighted in Figure 8.1, is how the 
different queries have very similar execution times not only for the single 
service discovery part, but also for the abstract workflow matching and for 
the inference rules. In particular the rules fired for each query are quite 
different, but this doesn’t seem to be reflected in a difference of timings.  
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Figure 8.1: Comparison of the single service discovery, inference rules, and 
abstract WF matching execution times over the different queries 
 
Figure 8.2: Proportion of the execution time spent for each composition 
operation over the different queries 
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The main differences that were observed were related to the execution 
time of the composition algorithm, the execution of sub-queries and the 
BPEL generation, that also constitute the most time expensive operations in 
the composition times as shown by Figure 8.2. These differences depend on 
the number of sub-queries generated by the process as shown in Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3: Correlation between the number of generated sub-queries and 
the composition time over the different queries 
More specifically, the current prototype includes only a single rule for 
integrity on the sequential orchestration; so abstract workflows including 
other orchestrations are not taken into consideration when an integrity 
requirement must be satisfied. This means that the abstract workflows that 
can guarantee the security requirements are fewer for the query about 
integrity than for the other two properties; this is reflected by the number of 
generated sub-queries and so, as explained above, by the composition time, 
as less composition are generated. 
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The availability rules, instead, make use of verification post-
instantiation (i.e., the verification rules described in Section 5.4.4). Table 
8.1 reports both the number of verified generated workflows (79) and the 
number of all the generated workflows in the parenthesis (120). The former 
conditions only the time for the BPEL generation while the latter influences 
the composition algorithm and the sub-queries times. 
 150 300 600 1200  
Receive and parse 
query 
Mean 131.43 138.10 150.40 196.90 
S
in
g
le
 D
isc
o
v
e
ry
 
SD 68.14 28.25 29.41 55.70 
Retrieval of 
service descr. 
Mean 1.28 2.32 4.38 7.39 
SD 0.75 0.61 0.89 0.93 
Matching Mean 63.34 144.78 239.33 466.31 
SD 7.07 6.98 23.15 26.17 
Abstract WF 
Matching 
Mean 4.98 4.98 4.70 5.69 
C
o
m
p
o
sitio
n
 
SD 0.98 1.07 0.78 6.00 
Inference rules Mean 44.40 45.40 44.01 43.40 
SD 9.59 22.99 21.69 7.56 
Composition 
Algorithm 
Mean 184.18 476.71 696.21 1112.20 
SD 129.47 222.39 307.25 619.18 
Sub-queries time Mean 815.14 3105.22 7114.00 17298.49 
SD 256.30 1021.81 2037.06 4221.27 
BPEL Generation Mean 700.08 2036.29 3024.07 4955.42 
SD 295.04 865.28 1166.30 1880.38 
# Generated Compositions 10 32 55 88  
# Generated Sub-queries 10 19 30 40  
Table 8.2: Summary of the results for each registry size, in milliseconds 
 
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
209 / 253 
Table 8.2 shows the results for each registry size, regardless of the 
query, to analyse the scalability of the approach. It is quite clear from the 
table that the global composition time becomes more and more time 
consuming with the increase of services in the registry.  
 
Figure 8.4: Comparison of the single service and service composition 
discovery times over the different sizes of the registry 
Figure 8.4 shows a comparison between the single service discovery 
and the composition discovery times: both the single service discovery and 
the composition discovery time increases proportionally with the increase of 
services in the registry. More specifically, the abstract WF matching and the 
firing of the inference rules are very fast operations whose duration does not 
increase depending on the number of services in the registry, as shown in 
Figure 8.5. These operations, in fact, depend only on the size of the abstract 
WF repository and the number of rules. Both these numbers, however, are 
not expected to become much bigger than the ones used for tests. 
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Figure 8.5: Comparison of the abstract WF matching and the inference rule 
times over the different sizes of the registry 
 
Figure 8.6: Correlation between the composition algorithm time and the 
number of generated workflows and sub-queries over the registry sizes 
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The discovery of services for the WF activities, instead, is the operation 
that results in the biggest increase of the execution time, as previously 
described for Figure 8.2. This can be explained by two factors, the first 
being that service discovery naturally becomes more expensive the more 
services are in the registry, the second being that for each service that 
matches an activity in a WF, the algorithm generates a new WF with the 
activity instantiated by the service. This means the more matching services; 
the more WFs are generated and need to be completely instantiated. So an 
increase in the number of matched services corresponds to an increase in the 
number of sub-queries for the different WFs, and therefore to an increase of 
the time required to execute the composition process. These observations 
are also summarised in Figure 8.6, where the composition algorithm time is 
plotted against with the number of generated sub-queries and compositions.  
A possible optimisation that might produce drastic improvements on 
the composition time is to avoid separated executions of similar sub-
queries, as these are the most computationally expensive operations. In 
particular, the services that match the structural conditions of an activity in 
a WF might be pre-computed, stored and maintained in a cache, so that part 
of the discovery process might be skipped at runtime. Furthermore other 
similarities might be found also in the dynamically generated security 
conditions of sub-queries for the same activity but in different WFs: the 
algorithm can then be changed to process the same sub-query just once per 
process and keep a temporary buffer of the results.  
The last operation computed by the Composition Manager is the 
conversion of the generated compositions into BPEL files. This operation is 
depends on the number of generated compositions. Furthermore, the actual 
implementation uses the BPEL data model of Eclipse BPEL Designer [25]: 
this simplifies the generation of BPEL files that are structurally correct, but 
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introduces an overhead. An alternative to this is to treat the BPEL files as 
strings and just edit the strings using some predefined placeholders.  
Overall the composition process in the presented prototype is very time 
consuming, as expected. However, it is not an impossible task, with times 
that oscillate between 1 and 20 seconds. In particular, by using the proactive 
facilities provided by the discovery engine, the composition discovery can 
be obtained in a timely fashion for applications requiring it at runtime. As 
explained for the single service discovery, by subscribing a proactive query, 
the discovery engine maintains a buffer of discovered compositions in 
background, to be able to offer immediate responses when the need for 
replacements arises.  
8.4 Summary 
The approach has been evaluated through testing the performances of 
the Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool, and checking the overhead 
introduced by the security aware service composition approach. 
The performances of the single service discovery are generally in the 
order of seconds, allowing timely responses to service discovery queries, 
even at runtime.  
Service composition increases the discovery time, based on the number 
of services in the registry. This might be an issue for SBSs that require 
timely responses; however the proactive approach offered by RSDT 
addresses this exact problem. By subscribing a query to the discovery 
engine, it is possible to maintain an up-to-date buffer of results in the 
background and, when the need arises, the SBS can obtain an immediate 
response. 
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Even in this scenario, it is important to avoid the waste of resources. To 
improve the Composition Manager performance the composition algorithm 
might be changed to avoid the repetition of similar queries for the same 
activity in similar workflows. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
9.1 Overview 
In this thesis we have described a framework that allows inferring 
security requirements expressed for a security composition to requirements 
for the single activities of the composition and checking security 
requirements over security service descriptors. The framework introduces 
the concept of secure composition patterns, modelling proven causal 
relations of security requirements within an orchestration pattern. 
Furthermore, prototypes using the composition process have been 
implemented and tested extensively.  
9.2 Contributions 
The presented research provides the means to infer and validate 
security requirements over service compositions. This approach allows to: 
(i) generate secure service compositions at design and runtime, and (ii) 
validate the security requirements over a service workflow. To support the 
above we have developed: 
• Definition of the concept and of an initial set of secure composition 
patterns and production rules 
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We introduced the concept of secure composition patterns, i.e., 
models describing abstract dependencies between the service 
composition security requirements and the component service 
security requirements. The dependencies must be formally proven in 
order to ensure the same level of security of the original 
requirements. 
The patterns can be applied in different steps of a composition 
lifetime, to discover services guaranteeing the security or to validate 
the security of an existing composition.  
The secure composition patterns are a new concept, different from 
the Security Patterns present in literature (e.g., [4][23]) that usually 
represent the best practices and the mechanisms that can be used in 
order to comply to a security requirement. 
We gave the definition and the rule-based encoding of an initial set 
of secure composition patterns, comprising patterns for integrity, 
confidentiality and availability. This set, whether not complete, gives 
an idea of the different ways in which the approach can be used and 
of how the production rules can be encoded.  
• Development of security aware service composition algorithms 
A set of algorithms is given that allows: (i) the inference of security 
requirements from the service composition layer to the single 
composing services, (ii) the verification of security requirements on 
the service composition layer from the security descriptors at the 
service layer, (iii) the validation of security requirements over 
instantiated service orchestrations (i.e., workflows) and (iv) the 
generation of service compositions that respect security 
requirements. All these algorithms represent a novelty as they are 
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based and make usage of the new concept of secure composition 
patterns.  
The existing works in literature, as examined in Section 2.4.4.1, are 
limited to the verification of security properties (usually specified at 
design time) through formal methods, requiring conversions of the 
services, compositions and properties into models. Our approach 
does not require any conversion and allows SBS designer to check 
the security of a composition without the need to know formal 
models or specialized languages. Furthermore, the works in the 
literature quite often require knowing the service internals or the 
exact mechanisms that are in place to guarantee a property. The 
proposed approach is more general, offering a framework for any 
security property that does not require to know the specific 
implementation (or a model of it) of the services involved, but 
requires information just about the workflow of a service 
composition.  
• Development of a Security Aware Runtime Discovery Tool 
The discovery tool allows finding services that provide given 
structural and security requirements. The tool allows the creation of 
service compositions during the discovery of a service, and 
guarantees that the service compositions have the requested level of 
security, by using the algorithms listed in the previous point.  
The works in the literature, as discussed in Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4, 
are usually specialised to the discovery of specific security 
properties and offer specification and matching of properties only 
against single services, instead of entire service compositions. Our 
approach is generic w.r.t. the security properties that can be used it 
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with, and allows the expression and inference of security 
requirements over entire service compositions, so our work is an 
improvement in both these directions.  
Furthermore our approach is based on a tool that allows service 
discovery either at design or runtime, thanks to the proactive 
capabilities of the discovery tool described in Section 4.4. 
• Development of a Security Aware BPEL Design Tool 
The BPEL Design tool allows the description and the validation of 
security requirements during the design phase of a SBS. Service 
adaptation is also offered in order to replace services with alternative 
services or service compositions that comply with the functionality 
and the security requested.  
Existing approaches allow only the expression of security 
requirements on single activities and to bound services that respect 
the requirements, as we point out in Section 2.4.5. The tool presented 
in this thesis, instead, allows also: (i) the expression of security 
requirements over workflow fragments, (ii) the inference and 
validation of security requirements over the activities part of the 
workflow, and (iii) to discover and automatically adapt alternative 
service or service compositions that satisfy the requirements. 
• Evaluation of the approach 
The feasibility and scalability of the approach have been tested, 
giving results in the order of seconds. While such result is already 
encouraging, the proactive approach offered by the discovery tool 
offers an answer to the SBSs where the timely availability of 
discovery results is critical. Furthermore, some improvement 
directions were given. 
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9.3 Approach Implications 
The presented approach is compatible with technologies and languages 
already available in the market, however it implies additional efforts on the 
security aspects from Service Providers and SBS Designers.  
Our approach requires some security descriptors of each service to be 
available in service registries. While some languages are available to 
describe security aspects (see Section 2.4.1), these are not used to describe 
services in publicly available service registries, to the best of our 
knowledge. While the exact mechanisms that implement a security property 
might need to be confidential, the security properties provided by a service 
can be a very important aspect for service selection (and so, for service 
provisioning).  
Our approach goes in this direction and requires a level of transparency 
about the security of services, encouraging trust in service-based solutions. 
It is important to notice that this assumption we made requires Service 
Providers to handle additional tasks like creating the security descriptors 
and submit them to (compatible) service registry, so not all Service 
Providers might consider this in the immediate future. Some Service 
Providers, however, may consider facing the additional costs to handle this 
task, since security may be advertised by providers as an additional feature 
that outclass competitors and since security has been one of the critical 
concerns in the SOC field [55]; kick-starting the market in this direction. 
A step that can improve the level of transparency and trust, and that can 
be reflected also by our approach, can be offered by security certificates 
signed by third parties. As explained in Section 2.4.1 certification processes 
and Certification Authorities are already used by some software companies, 
probably the most important and known being the Common Criteria 
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certification, however these solutions are not taking advantage of the SOC 
paradigm. A new certification approach for services, releasing digital 
certificates that could be used as security descriptors by our approach, 
would however require Certification Authorities and Laboratories to adopt 
new standards and change their processes (for more details, please refer to 
the ASSERT4SOA [5] and the CUMULUS [21] projects). 
Finally our approach puts the service users and SBS designers in 
control of the security level they can require, so a minimal training on 
security may be needed in order to be able to use the features presented in 
this work. 
9.4 Future Work 
This work presented a new approach that allows for Security Aware 
Service Composition, however the ideas presented can be used as a basis for 
different tracks for future works. In this section we describe some directions 
for research that originate from this work: 
• Development of additional secure composition patterns. 
The set of secure composition pattern presented in this work shows 
the feasibility of the idea in different cases, however it may lack of 
completeness and generality. The topic of proving secure 
composition patterns is a very big area for further research that can 
address with different formalisms. Some fields already have works 
researching in this direction, e.g. the proofs for composability 
patterns in the Information Theory field [59][63], however further 
research is needed to have a more complete set of patterns.  
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• Semi-Automated Proofs for secure composition patterns. 
One of the possible drawbacks for the presented approach is the fact 
that the secure composition patterns need to be formally proven. The 
definition of additional secure composition patterns, then, would 
require quite some time and efforts before being proven, limiting the 
results of our approach. 
An interesting line of research is to make usage of existing theorem 
proving or automated reasoning approaches (e.g., Coq, Isabelle) in 
order to help obtaining proofs for the secure composition patterns.  
• Variations of the composition algorithms. 
The composition algorithms presented in Section 6.4 can be seen as 
a basis for further works, some changes that we envision are: (i) 
recursive instantiation of abstract workflows with other abstract 
workflows, in order to enable a richer offer of workflows during 
functional matching; (ii) usage of algorithms that define service 
workflows for the functional part of the composition, instead of 
relying on abstract workflows (as the ones described in Section 
2.3.1); (iii) adding some optimizations to prune and cache the sub-
queries used during the composition process, as sub-queries are one 
of the most time consuming aspects of the instantiation algorithm, 
but also they are often quite similar to each other; and (iv) to allow 
comparison and sorting of the generated service compositions, by 
defining appropriate metrics. 
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Appendix A:  
Performance Test Results 
A.1 Overview 
In this appendix we report all the raw results from the performance 
tests. In particular each section presents the test results for a given registry 
size and security property in a table where each row represents one of the 30 
executions of the test. The legend for the columns is the following: 
A. Receive and parse query 
B. Retrieval of service descriptions from the registry 
C. Structural Matching 
D. Security Matching 
E. Abstract WF Matching 
F. Inference rules 
G. BPEL Generation 
H. Number of generated workflows 
I. Number of verified workflows 
J. Composition Algorithm 
K. Sub-queries time 
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A.2 Registry size: 150 services 
A.2.1 Security Property: Availability 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
173 1 64 0 6 57 930 12 8 362 940 
167 2 62 0 4 61 1206 12 8 331 944 
172 1 84 0 6 70 808 12 8 450 989 
149 2 63 0 5 61 902 12 8 350 1034 
152 1 57 1 4 62 786 12 8 311 952 
138 1 64 0 5 59 784 12 8 313 945 
132 1 67 0 4 54 841 12 8 280 913 
134 2 88 0 6 82 927 12 8 293 965 
133 1 67 0 4 57 804 12 8 308 1010 
131 1 55 1 4 48 801 12 8 277 935 
135 2 58 1 4 49 936 12 8 304 909 
126 1 61 0 6 51 942 12 8 262 932 
125 1 61 1 6 50 795 12 8 264 960 
117 2 64 0 6 48 800 12 8 247 908 
111 1 58 0 4 42 720 12 8 228 875 
136 1 64 1 4 46 692 12 8 231 836 
113 1 60 1 4 51 682 12 8 237 888 
124 1 56 1 5 49 759 12 8 249 897 
115 1 64 0 4 44 743 12 8 226 892 
129 1 64 1 5 49 706 12 8 230 919 
119 1 66 0 5 51 731 12 8 213 884 
124 1 65 0 4 46 662 12 8 230 886 
123 1 53 0 5 41 662 12 8 240 890 
131 2 59 0 4 45 850 12 8 228 916 
118 1 56 0 5 43 634 12 8 238 930 
189 1 62 0 5 44 655 12 8 212 837 
141 1 61 0 5 48 683 12 8 233 952 
116 1 60 0 5 44 734 12 8 224 900 
117 1 58 0 5 38 646 12 8 219 895 
106 1 65 0 4 42 655 12 8 487 853 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
243 / 253 
A.2.2 Security Property: Integrity 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
128 1 63 0 4 35 328 4 4 76 465 
106 2 82 0 5 59 316 4 4 72 450 
130 2 58 1 5 36 286 4 4 68 442 
115 1 64 0 5 34 294 4 4 73 433 
144 2 64 0 5 35 313 4 4 64 450 
139 1 65 0 5 42 287 4 4 66 457 
122 1 65 0 4 34 293 4 4 65 438 
116 1 59 1 4 38 318 4 4 73 434 
116 1 59 0 7 35 296 4 4 69 417 
125 1 61 0 6 36 285 4 4 67 423 
126 1 78 0 6 34 287 4 4 64 433 
127 1 63 0 5 32 311 4 4 66 459 
142 1 68 0 5 40 315 4 4 76 480 
146 2 75 0 5 48 376 4 4 89 491 
103 1 63 1 6 30 536 4 4 78 461 
107 1 61 1 5 37 311 4 4 65 448 
121 2 75 1 5 41 401 4 4 91 537 
140 1 70 0 4 46 336 4 4 75 471 
123 1 68 0 5 38 293 4 4 84 522 
124 1 60 0 6 39 324 4 4 84 546 
110 1 68 0 5 29 339 4 4 77 458 
121 1 54 0 8 32 282 4 4 78 447 
94 1 61 0 6 38 308 4 4 66 471 
105 1 69 0 4 38 286 4 4 67 445 
114 1 59 1 4 33 261 4 4 60 423 
154 1 54 0 5 28 309 4 4 67 449 
305 1 60 1 4 36 278 4 4 74 446 
122 1 62 0 5 36 323 4 4 74 453 
107 1 53 0 4 34 475 4 4 100 545 
133 2 71 0 6 62 452 4 4 90 592 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.2.3 Security Property: PSP 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
132 1 85 0 5 53 983 14 12 243 1138 
118 2 62 0 5 42 970 14 12 213 1091 
106 1 61 0 4 48 972 14 12 188 1097 
104 1 56 0 7 39 929 14 12 241 1065 
115 2 54 1 5 36 1238 14 12 203 1060 
118 1 65 0 5 49 947 14 12 214 1041 
128 1 65 1 5 45 1094 14 12 220 1049 
108 2 59 0 6 42 938 14 12 188 1058 
130 1 59 0 6 49 950 14 12 217 1024 
106 1 65 0 4 42 1310 14 12 216 1059 
114 1 57 0 4 34 872 14 12 190 1030 
101 1 56 0 6 46 1136 14 12 194 1020 
102 1 62 0 4 34 940 14 12 188 1072 
124 1 78 0 8 69 1027 14 12 225 1121 
111 2 62 0 8 40 934 14 12 197 1053 
110 2 58 0 5 47 1052 14 12 189 1052 
102 1 60 1 5 43 923 14 12 195 1057 
116 0 63 0 5 39 933 14 12 202 1072 
119 1 69 0 4 49 905 14 12 213 1049 
99 1 66 0 5 41 922 14 12 203 1058 
725 1 63 0 4 41 938 14 12 186 1066 
105 2 57 0 7 39 1262 14 12 192 1053 
96 2 59 0 5 47 886 14 12 186 1020 
105 2 63 0 5 44 947 14 12 182 1025 
152 1 59 0 5 36 925 14 12 195 1031 
109 1 77 0 4 52 914 14 12 209 1022 
106 1 55 0 4 46 935 14 12 182 1122 
90 1 61 0 4 44 1101 14 12 208 1069 
114 7 56 0 4 40 894 14 12 196 1064 
103 1 71 0 4 53 935 14 12 206 1053 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
245 / 253 
A.3 Registry size: 300 services 
A.3.1 Security Property: Availability 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
176 2 141 0 10 49 2550 39 28 773 3615 
186 3 133 0 6 48 2520 39 28 1173 3701 
165 2 139 1 5 48 2485 39 28 694 3604 
156 2 154 0 5 46 2752 39 28 690 3615 
159 3 144 0 6 49 2418 39 28 667 3642 
149 3 146 1 5 50 2291 39 28 835 3476 
158 2 134 0 6 53 2330 39 28 664 3678 
155 2 152 0 7 51 2522 39 28 656 3770 
141 3 146 1 4 49 2263 39 28 656 3657 
138 3 147 0 5 45 2393 39 28 642 3589 
134 2 147 1 4 47 2165 39 28 615 3582 
141 3 145 0 4 47 2366 39 28 622 3670 
160 3 134 0 5 47 2135 39 28 603 3564 
134 2 143 0 4 45 2185 39 28 621 3600 
142 2 145 0 4 44 2314 39 28 659 3535 
153 2 148 0 5 47 2253 39 28 627 3556 
140 3 145 0 5 46 2469 39 28 612 3623 
141 2 152 0 5 43 2337 39 28 594 3563 
150 2 143 0 5 46 2172 39 28 752 3486 
152 3 133 0 4 51 2254 39 28 615 3596 
148 2 146 0 6 43 2388 39 28 623 3655 
149 3 154 0 5 45 2123 39 28 621 3674 
129 2 140 1 4 46 2436 39 28 579 3503 
132 2 143 1 4 41 2116 39 28 574 3481 
148 3 147 0 5 44 2435 39 28 602 3523 
155 3 140 1 5 45 2286 39 28 570 3461 
168 3 141 0 5 53 2202 39 28 590 3593 
132 2 143 1 5 46 2136 39 28 893 3586 
136 2 147 0 4 44 2311 39 28 574 3487 
146 2 139 0 5 41 2325 39 28 612 3561 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.3.2 Security Property: Integrity 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
143 2 142 0 5 35 830 12 12 185 1696 
131 2 150 0 5 37 827 12 12 202 1744 
122 2 133 0 4 31 917 12 12 168 1662 
141 3 141 1 4 32 834 12 12 194 1684 
136 3 142 0 5 253 905 12 12 198 1729 
145 3 145 1 4 39 862 12 12 175 1727 
133 3 164 0 5 41 864 12 12 174 1663 
144 3 152 0 6 44 853 12 12 255 2215 
135 3 139 1 4 32 984 12 12 183 1822 
108 2 142 0 8 36 853 12 12 177 1608 
126 3 145 1 5 32 1029 12 12 167 1704 
133 2 147 0 4 31 919 12 12 267 1871 
109 3 137 0 4 30 884 12 12 196 1701 
146 2 144 0 5 56 841 12 12 351 1696 
124 2 148 0 4 42 827 12 12 177 1688 
116 2 142 0 4 34 864 12 12 170 1660 
111 2 134 0 5 37 874 12 12 172 1654 
131 1 147 0 5 35 837 12 12 187 1678 
317 2 137 0 4 32 856 12 12 178 1668 
119 1 140 0 5 45 1020 12 12 178 1641 
111 3 142 0 5 37 784 12 12 175 1629 
98 2 137 1 5 30 852 12 12 176 1618 
118 2 130 0 4 31 852 12 12 173 1638 
106 3 144 0 5 35 855 12 12 255 1629 
104 3 150 0 4 35 814 12 12 169 1612 
113 2 147 0 5 29 876 12 12 178 1617 
117 3 151 0 5 36 1052 12 12 174 1698 
113 2 148 0 5 34 926 12 12 184 1672 
103 3 150 0 8 34 1066 12 12 181 1647 
129 2 140 0 4 37 928 12 12 181 1655 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.3.3 Security Property: PSP 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
128 2 142 1 5 59 3366 45 39 614 4173 
143 2 137 0 5 44 2997 45 39 905 4218 
134 1 141 0 5 47 3364 45 39 586 4236 
151 2 152 0 6 54 3274 45 39 673 4251 
144 2 142 0 5 49 3460 45 39 605 4206 
125 2 147 0 4 48 3023 45 39 579 4157 
127 2 151 0 5 42 3056 45 39 632 4483 
140 3 150 0 6 45 3236 45 39 589 4317 
198 3 171 0 6 48 3040 45 39 647 4294 
128 2 151 1 4 43 3297 45 39 621 4335 
129 3 144 0 5 45 3119 45 39 730 4326 
128 2 143 0 4 47 3147 45 39 612 4324 
111 1 147 0 6 45 2520 45 39 514 3817 
128 2 136 0 5 43 2716 45 39 520 3859 
142 3 150 1 4 48 2606 45 39 521 3800 
111 1 125 1 4 45 3064 45 39 505 3904 
140 3 141 1 4 43 2581 45 39 505 3832 
107 3 154 0 6 47 2748 45 39 537 3825 
130 2 148 0 6 43 2487 45 39 499 3853 
124 3 145 0 5 51 2994 45 39 510 3887 
130 2 145 0 5 44 2487 45 39 522 3781 
133 1 152 1 4 44 2733 45 39 518 3933 
151 3 157 0 5 59 2493 45 39 518 3886 
126 3 156 1 5 44 2808 45 39 544 3873 
235 2 144 0 4 45 2509 45 39 500 3890 
147 3 157 0 5 48 2710 45 39 522 3883 
131 2 148 0 5 43 2567 45 39 520 3887 
111 2 145 0 5 42 2939 45 39 513 3910 
130 2 143 1 9 46 2567 45 39 536 3850 
112 1 145 0 4 44 2741 45 39 499 3908 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.4 Registry size: 600 services 
A.4.1 Security Property: Availability 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
145 3 203 0 9 43 3474 72 50 983 8116 
174 5 235 0 5 42 3749 72 50 1223 8536 
174 5 248 0 5 44 3661 72 50 1171 8735 
162 4 242 1 4 45 3815 72 50 922 8323 
168 5 226 1 4 45 3509 72 50 991 8298 
181 5 257 0 5 53 3357 72 50 920 8319 
186 5 242 0 5 48 3424 72 50 937 8604 
166 5 265 1 5 52 3404 72 50 933 8507 
150 4 244 0 6 45 3636 72 50 900 8404 
164 4 243 0 5 52 3454 72 50 1099 8352 
175 6 236 0 5 44 3322 72 50 900 8365 
194 5 299 0 5 59 3054 72 50 1004 8448 
158 5 242 0 4 44 3686 72 50 936 8612 
150 4 219 0 4 45 3575 72 50 937 8556 
160 4 246 0 5 49 3641 72 50 909 8428 
169 4 252 0 4 45 3612 72 50 904 8358 
156 5 249 0 5 43 3056 72 50 897 8400 
155 4 245 1 4 47 3333 72 50 925 8674 
156 5 242 1 5 48 3376 72 50 989 8558 
163 3 248 0 5 46 3697 72 50 926 8416 
163 4 255 0 5 44 3720 72 50 931 8437 
178 5 246 0 5 48 3348 72 50 911 8415 
195 5 298 0 6 62 3360 72 50 920 8522 
155 4 239 0 5 47 3438 72 50 938 8695 
160 5 241 0 5 47 3350 72 50 934 8613 
170 4 243 0 5 228 3477 72 50 917 8506 
171 6 254 1 5 50 3675 72 50 912 8498 
168 4 251 1 5 47 3201 72 50 1054 8506 
197 6 297 1 5 57 3253 72 50 936 8573 
165 5 248 1 5 41 3142 72 50 1033 8708 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.4.2 Security Property: Integrity 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
140 3 253 0 5 35 1966 24 24 306 4323 
145 4 228 1 5 35 1384 24 24 303 4298 
125 4 245 0 4 35 1464 24 24 300 4311 
127 5 213 0 4 27 1378 24 24 333 4415 
128 6 251 0 4 36 1375 24 24 307 4274 
121 4 207 0 4 28 1432 24 24 366 4682 
138 5 210 0 4 26 1607 24 24 303 4244 
131 5 211 0 4 34 1490 24 24 297 4313 
122 4 206 0 4 28 1390 24 24 442 4257 
129 4 206 0 4 35 1404 24 24 291 4299 
143 5 214 0 5 29 1381 24 24 303 4259 
121 3 211 1 4 25 1628 24 24 310 4294 
152 3 236 0 4 29 1703 24 24 306 4215 
136 3 211 1 5 37 1439 24 24 313 4344 
117 4 207 1 4 25 1386 24 24 304 4253 
127 4 208 1 4 26 1689 24 24 334 4378 
152 3 235 0 4 27 1377 24 24 312 4180 
126 5 209 0 4 35 1415 24 24 306 4294 
338 3 233 0 6 36 1348 24 24 276 4043 
130 3 238 0 4 26 1385 24 24 288 4117 
113 6 217 1 5 27 1544 24 24 292 4147 
109 3 202 0 4 27 1385 24 24 296 4133 
105 3 208 0 4 37 1403 24 24 408 4159 
138 5 229 0 4 24 1438 24 24 283 4117 
101 3 207 0 4 32 1388 24 24 292 4132 
109 3 203 0 3 27 1533 24 24 296 4139 
114 5 226 1 4 50 1385 24 24 294 4137 
132 4 237 0 4 33 1358 24 24 303 4118 
99 4 206 1 4 33 1408 24 24 295 4143 
109 5 204 0 4 26 1435 24 24 302 4181 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
 
250 / 253 
A.4.3 Security Property: PSP 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
116 3 204 1 5 50 4220 68 60 724 8432 
150 4 243 0 4 41 4205 68 60 732 8635 
158 5 250 0 4 42 4436 68 60 734 8515 
161 3 304 0 5 46 4095 68 60 728 8471 
156 5 249 1 5 46 4298 68 60 977 8522 
143 4 241 0 6 59 3936 68 60 829 8553 
147 4 258 0 5 43 3874 68 60 730 8528 
148 4 246 1 5 46 3688 68 60 731 8738 
134 4 239 1 4 50 4158 68 60 744 8710 
147 5 251 0 4 44 4076 68 60 848 8555 
155 4 245 0 5 44 4346 68 60 726 8480 
142 4 244 0 5 44 4259 68 60 715 8489 
165 5 243 0 5 47 4115 68 60 725 8505 
179 6 292 1 6 59 4096 68 60 728 8549 
144 5 238 0 5 42 3859 68 60 750 8715 
152 3 250 0 5 42 3979 68 60 757 8736 
144 5 244 0 4 49 4094 68 60 749 8584 
150 5 250 1 5 42 4374 68 60 740 8550 
146 4 246 0 5 44 3981 68 60 736 8547 
152 5 248 0 5 45 4092 68 60 751 8583 
186 6 302 0 6 55 3670 68 60 807 8595 
148 6 245 0 4 52 5789 68 60 813 8929 
144 5 248 0 5 64 3692 68 60 1864 8871 
161 4 241 0 5 42 4258 68 60 774 8799 
150 5 229 0 4 44 4019 68 60 917 8681 
169 5 251 0 5 41 4514 68 60 746 8608 
139 4 250 1 5 57 4084 68 60 831 8574 
149 5 255 0 5 44 4109 68 60 997 8641 
147 5 254 0 6 46 4193 68 60 746 8612 
149 3 254 1 5 51 3940 68 60 757 8872 
 
   
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.5 Registry size: 1200 services 
A.5.1 Security Property: Availability 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
169 6 392 0 4 35 5324 120 79 1683 20534 
221 8 454 0 5 45 5255 120 79 1523 21006 
196 8 483 0 6 41 5181 120 79 1497 20964 
382 8 470 1 5 46 5273 120 79 1458 21036 
190 6 450 0 5 44 5271 120 79 1573 21031 
197 8 465 0 5 45 5918 120 79 1482 21125 
379 7 567 0 4 52 5429 120 79 1508 21072 
183 9 463 0 5 44 5571 120 79 1450 21078 
196 8 479 0 6 52 5319 120 79 1476 21161 
206 8 455 1 5 45 5117 120 79 1470 21138 
353 7 470 0 6 44 5457 120 79 1472 21195 
193 8 432 0 4 50 5174 120 79 1521 21082 
328 8 459 0 4 45 5338 120 79 1449 21189 
175 9 462 0 5 47 5336 120 79 1488 21168 
180 8 471 0 6 41 5443 120 79 1482 21171 
193 7 465 0 5 44 5172 120 79 1454 21117 
333 6 458 1 4 52 5180 120 79 1464 21142 
332 6 457 0 6 46 5221 120 79 1515 21196 
185 7 475 1 4 40 5273 120 79 1568 21152 
190 6 467 0 4 46 5139 120 79 1532 21373 
364 6 472 0 5 46 5325 120 79 1491 21276 
177 9 466 1 5 52 5150 120 79 1492 21211 
196 9 470 1 4 46 5524 120 79 1507 21290 
178 6 462 0 5 46 5330 120 79 1473 21371 
185 7 433 0 4 42 5280 120 79 1565 21344 
224 7 480 0 6 44 6159 120 79 5464 21642 
235 9 527 0 5 70 5177 120 79 1707 21197 
202 7 470 1 5 45 5402 120 79 1510 21401 
178 8 486 0 6 46 5269 120 79 1570 21448 
282 7 448 0 5 51 5593 120 79 1490 21503 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.5.2 Security Property: Integrity 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
171 8 487 1 5 35 2180 40 40 510 11827 
162 7 513 1 6 40 2291 40 40 777 11865 
147 7 461 0 5 65 2625 40 40 522 11639 
189 7 472 1 5 34 2459 40 40 516 11954 
182 9 529 1 5 38 2815 40 40 498 11544 
187 10 449 0 4 35 2431 40 40 531 11525 
145 8 486 1 5 36 3065 40 40 482 11579 
168 8 473 0 5 36 2497 40 40 599 11559 
161 7 489 1 4 34 2731 40 40 495 11559 
167 7 484 0 5 36 2529 40 40 486 11607 
147 7 491 0 5 39 2460 40 40 500 11566 
324 6 491 0 6 36 2437 40 40 489 11624 
179 7 443 0 15 33 2450 40 40 576 11663 
178 8 470 0 4 49 2155 40 40 505 11634 
182 9 563 0 6 60 2404 40 40 566 11683 
171 8 462 0 5 50 2351 40 40 533 11695 
180 7 470 0 5 33 2593 40 40 463 11112 
133 7 447 0 61 39 2440 40 40 525 11225 
130 6 444 0 4 34 2400 40 40 458 11092 
316 7 463 0 6 35 2360 40 40 454 11109 
151 8 463 0 5 45 2421 40 40 458 11138 
151 9 468 0 6 32 2452 40 40 649 11147 
118 8 461 0 6 34 2376 40 40 537 11148 
161 8 449 0 5 46 2037 40 40 458 11190 
128 7 434 1 4 32 2175 40 40 486 11395 
157 6 390 0 4 33 2309 40 40 628 11346 
144 8 444 0 6 32 4273 40 40 736 11236 
124 7 382 0 4 26 2312 40 40 592 11275 
136 7 471 0 4 33 2708 40 40 463 11177 
145 7 469 0 5 35 2429 40 40 473 11079 
 
  
Security Aware Service Composition 
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A.5.3 Security Property: PSP 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
187 7 448 0 5 43 6911 104 104 1036 18701 
182 7 473 0 5 41 6936 104 104 1340 19161 
174 6 470 0 5 43 7035 104 104 1060 19120 
180 7 469 0 4 43 7169 104 104 1084 19068 
177 8 454 1 4 54 7202 104 104 1050 19163 
172 7 463 0 6 44 6963 104 104 1060 19156 
182 7 463 1 4 42 6751 104 104 1147 19140 
196 7 463 0 5 47 6805 104 104 1081 19217 
179 6 440 0 5 44 6760 104 104 1181 19195 
191 8 468 0 4 45 6991 104 104 1100 19208 
184 7 458 0 5 52 6884 104 104 1562 19340 
170 7 454 0 5 45 6863 104 104 1065 19244 
188 7 462 1 5 44 6943 104 104 1327 19186 
202 8 468 0 6 48 6868 104 104 1172 19229 
188 7 465 0 6 44 6884 104 104 1099 19245 
179 7 481 0 6 56 7298 104 104 1081 19229 
194 7 464 1 4 43 7561 104 104 1111 19225 
198 9 460 1 4 65 7159 104 104 1078 19293 
183 8 462 0 5 41 7324 104 104 1097 19310 
191 7 461 0 6 41 6939 104 104 1088 19332 
202 7 462 0 5 43 7015 104 104 1080 19378 
192 6 474 0 4 43 6887 104 104 1140 19360 
179 6 465 0 5 44 7020 104 104 1109 19410 
204 7 463 0 6 53 6939 104 104 1277 19392 
216 7 473 0 5 42 6882 104 104 1262 19413 
186 9 474 0 4 43 7505 104 104 1106 19431 
212 9 462 0 5 42 6926 104 104 1193 19377 
185 8 459 0 5 47 6936 104 104 1088 19500 
200 7 477 0 6 43 6917 104 104 1286 19521 
212 7 487 0 5 44 6950 104 104 1439 19515 
 
 
